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ABSTRACT 
SELLING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:  
DATA, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CALCULATED EVOLUTION OF ADVERTISING 
Lee McGuigan 
Joseph Turow 
This dissertation tells the history of a future imagined by advertisers as they interpreted and constructed the 
affordances of digital information technologies. It looks at how related efforts to predict and influence 
consumer habits and to package and sell audience attention helped orchestrate the marriage of behavioral 
science and big-data analytics that defines digital marketing today. My research shows how advertising and 
commercial media industries rebuilt their information infrastructures around electronic data processing, 
networked computing, and elaborate forms of quantitative analysis, beginning in the 1950s. Advertisers, 
agencies, and media companies accommodated their activities to increasingly calculated ways of thinking 
about consumers and audiences, and to more statistical and computational forms of judgement. Responding 
to existing priorities and challenges, and to perceived opportunities to move closer to underlying ambitions, 
a variety of actors envisioned the future of marketing and media through a set of possibilities that became 
central to the commercialization of digital communications. People involved in the television business 
today use the term “advanced advertising” to describe a set of abilities at the heart of internet and mobile 
marketing: programmability (automation), addressability (personalization), shoppability (interactive 
commerce), and accountability (measurement and analytics). In contrast to the perception that these are 
unique elements of a “new” digital media environment that emerged in the mid-1990s, I find that these 
themes appear conspicuously in designs for using and shaping information technologies over the course of 
the past six decades. I use these potential abilities as entry points for analyzing a broader shift in advertising 
and commercial media that began well before the popular arrival of the internet. Across the second half of 
the twentieth century, the advertising industry, a major cultural and economic institution, was reconstructed 
around the goal of expanding its abilities to account for and calculate more of social and personal life. This 
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transformation sits at an intersection where the processing of data, the processing of commerce, and the 
processing of culture collide. 
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Introduction 
 
From now on, please consider that every time that you see an ad, someone like me 
working for a company like mine has made a conscious effort, using incredibly 
sophisticated research, computer software, and analytics, to put it there and to reach out 
and touch someone just like you. As the buyers of time and space, in some sense we 
control what TV programs you get to watch, what magazines continue to get published, 
and how Google and Yahoo! stay in (very healthy) business. It’s a simple Faustian 
bargain that you’ve made, but one with enormous implications.  
– David Verklin, then-CEO of Carat media-buying agency1 
 
The advertising industry chases a dream. It dreams of pairing the cultural force of national brand 
advertising with the precision and accountability of direct marketing. Perhaps nothing stirs 
imaginations more than the possibilities for television. By capitalizing on the data resources 
available in digital environments, many people working in advertising, marketing, media, and 
information technology industries hope to reorganize the television business in ways that depart 
from its historic structure but also approach the purest expression of its underlying commercial 
logic. Video advertising is being remodeled to target individual viewers, based on data-mined 
insights and predictions about their behaviors, and to attribute subsequent purchases to the 
influence of specific persuasive missives. Advertisers hope to calculate and increase their returns 
on investment (ROI), while programmers and video service providers aim to manage and 
maximize yield from advertising inventory. Advocates of this arrangement are trying to steer 
video advertising toward data-driven, “audience-based” buying—a new phase in ongoing efforts 
to disaggregate or re-sort mass audiences in ways that are useful for advertisers and profitable for 
the firms that package and sell them. Brokering the exchanges between these parties is a growing 
sector of intermediaries licensing consumer data, trading-desk software, and other surveillance, 
analytics, and optimization services that promise to help companies make better decisions and 
                                                          
1 David Verklin and Bernice Kanner, Watch This, Listen Up, Click Here: Inside the 300 Billion Dollar 
Business Behind the Media You Constantly Consume (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), x-xi. 
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improve performance relative to their competitors. Collectively these companies imagine the 
dawn of “advanced advertising,” a recent term of art in the TV business that stands for a set of 
general and, I will argue, longstanding strategies for leveraging information technologies to 
monetize individuals’ interactions with news and entertainment. While the video business is 
trying to replicate capabilities already established in facets of internet marketing, the relationship 
between television and the advertising industry helped forge a model—and a dream—for the 
digital world. 
This dream was not conjured overnight. The commercial media that have predominated 
America’s information environment for the past century were shaped around advertisers’ desires 
to produce consumers and consumption—that is, to influence people toward conforming, within a 
flexible range, to habits, lifestyles, and ideologies that support the profitable existence of these 
companies.2 Other values have competed against this priority, of course, but credible historical 
accounts illustrate that the production of consumers has been an organizing principle across print, 
broadcasting, and electronic media industries.3  
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Dallas W. Smythe, “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism,” Canadian Journal of 
Political and Social Theory 1, no. 3 (Fall 1977): 1-27; Herbert I. Schiller, Mass Communications and 
American Empire (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); George Gerbner, “Cultivation Analysis: An 
Overview,” Mass Communication & Society 1, nos. 3-4 (June 1998): 175-94; Graham Murdock, 
“Producing Consumerism: Commodities, Ideologies, Practices,” in Critique, Social Media and the 
Information Society, eds. Christian Fuchs and Marisol Sandoval (New York: Routledge, 2013), 125-143; 
William Leiss, Stephen Kline, Sut Jhally, Jacqueline Botterill, and Kyle Asquith, Social Communication in 
Advertising, 4th edition (New York: Routledge, 2018). 
3 A range of authors have advanced variations of this point in different historical contexts. See, e.g., Stuart 
Ewen, Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture (New York: 
Basic Books, 1976); Dallas W. Smythe, Dependency Road: Communications, Consciousness, Capitalism, 
and Canada (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1981); Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the 
American Mass Market (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989); Richard Ohmann, Selling 
Culture: Magazines, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the Century (London: Verso, 1996); Roland 
Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940 (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 1985); Lynn Spigel, Make Room for TV: Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Thomas Streeter, Selling the Air: A Critique of the 
Policy of Commercial Broadcasting in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); 
Joseph Turow, Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New Media World (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997); Mark Andrejevic, Reality TV: The Work of Being Watched (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
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The selling function presided from the outset over “the age of television.” In a 1957 
address to the San Francisco Ad Club, the director of merchandising and promotion for a 
broadcast station in Los Angeles evangelized the young medium in suggestive terms: “My 
contention is that any activity which occupies the American people six and seven hours a day 
cannot be by-passed by advertisers interested in selling the American people.”4 He joined a 
chorus of influential contemporaries in proclaiming television’s central importance to a consumer 
economy. Just three years earlier, as television penetration was about to cross the threshold of 
majority in U.S. homes, venerated management theorist Peter Drucker suggested that new 
technologies had transformed the practice of corporate management. Rather than supplying 
markets with the goods to match buyers’ demands, Drucker argued, “[management] must create 
customers and markets by conscious and systematic work. Above all, it must focus continuously 
on creating mass purchasing power and mass purchasing habits.” Drucker regarded television 
advertising as a form of “automation” for producing consumers, and he insisted that technological 
advancements in marketing and distribution would be as significant to the industrial system as the 
mechanization of manufacturing.5  
                                                                                                                                                                             
& Littlefield, 2004); Eileen Meehan, Why TV is Not Our Fault (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2005); James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information 
Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). For studies illustrating how the production of 
consumers has been built into devices and infrastructures for online and mobile communication, see Dan 
Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); 
Darin Barney, Prometheus Wired: The Hope for Democracy in the Age of Network Technology 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000); Robert W. McChesney, Digital Disconnect: How Capitalism is Turning 
the Internet Against Democracy (New York: New Press, 2013); Vincent Manzerolle, “Mobilizing the 
Audience Commodity: Digital Labour in a Wireless World,” ephemera 10, no. 4 (November 2010): 455-
469; Matthew Crain, “The Revolution Will Be Commercialized: Finance, Public Policy, and the 
Construction of Internet Advertising,” PhD diss., University of Illinois, 2013. 
4 “TV: Medium too Good Not to Use,” Broadcasting, December 9, 1957, 40. Emphasis added. 
5 Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York: Harper, 1954), 371. For other voices in this 
chorus, see J.F. Beatty, “How P&G Cleans Up with Television,” Broadcasting-Telecasting, June 3, 1957, 
106–108. On the early commercial history of TV, see Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty, 2nd revised edition 
(New York: Oxford, 1990); William Boddy, Fifties Television: The Industry and Its Critics (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1990); Lee McGuigan, “Procter & Gamble, Mass Media, and the Making of 
American Life,” Media, Culture & Society 37, no. 6 (September 2015): 887-903. 
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This dissertation is about “selling the American people.” When the station executive 
spoke these words in 1957 he was coaching advertisers to use television in marketing their goods 
and services to the public. Inadvertently, his syntax also evokes a set of processes and markets 
through which media audiences are produced, packaged, and sold to advertisers—what Fernando 
Bermejo calls “audience manufacture.”6 Turning the statement’s flexibility to our advantage, this 
study is concerned with both sides of this coin.  
Clearly these operations have exploited and reinforced the cultural and commercial 
prominence of mass media. But while researchers and theorists have long acknowledged that 
audiences are manufactured, existing scholarship does not fully reveal how the production of 
audiences, consumers, and markets has depended upon and urged forward the importance of 
information, computer processing, and networked communications throughout the entire political 
economy. More than 80 years ago, John B. Watson, a pioneer of behavioral psychology and a 
longtime employee at the world’s leading ad agency, offered a marketing principle that hinged on 
the power of strategic intelligence. “It is getting yourself into a position where you can predict the 
other fellow’s behavior that puts you in command in a selling situation,” Watson wrote.7 Ever 
since, and with increasing urgency, advertisers, their agencies, and many species of data brokers 
                                                          
6 Fernando Bermejo, “Audience Manufacture in Historical Perspective: From Broadcasting to Google,” 
New Media & Society 11, nos. 1-2 (February-March 2009): 133-154. Bermejo’s formulation synthesizes a 
number of important contributions to our understanding of how audiences are produced and exchanged: 
Smythe, “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism”; Graham Murdock, “Blindspots About 
Western Marxism: A Reply to Dallas Smythe,” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 2, no. 2 
(Spring-Summer 1978): 109-119; Eileen R. Meehan, “Ratings and the Institutional Approach: A Third 
Answer to the Commodity Question,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1, no. 2 (June 1984): 216-
225; Sut Jhally and Bill Livant, “Watching as Working: The Valorization of Audience Consciousness,” 
Journal of Communication, 36, no. 3 (September 1986): 124-143. 
7 Quoted in Peggy J. Kreshel, “John B. Watson at J. Walter Thompson: The Legitimation of ‘Science’ in 
Advertising,” Journal of Advertising 19, no. 2 (1990), 53. 
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and analysts have scrambled to occupy that position, leaning on a scaffold of information 
technologies.8 
Over a much longer period than we typically appreciate, related efforts to predict and 
influence consumers’ habits and to package and sell audience attention helped orchestrate the 
marriage of big data and behavioral science that defines digital marketing today. Especially 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century, participants in the advertising industry 
collectively imagined, appropriated, and reconstituted themselves around new abilities to manage 
information and commercial relationships. Responding both to the difficulties of coordinating an 
increasingly complex and data-intensive marketplace, and to perceived opportunities for 
advancing closer toward the ambition to determine advertising’s impact on sales, these actors 
came to envision the future of marketing and media through a set of possibilities that would be 
central to the commercialization of digital communications. Across more than six decades, efforts 
to reengineer advertising around 1) automation and optimization, 2) personalized targeting, 3) 
instant electronic shopping, and 4) vastly expanded capacities for observing and analyzing 
consumer behaviors have added up to a transformation in media and marketing. In many ways, 
these developments set blueprints for internet commerce. 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Armand Mattelart, Advertising International: The Privatisation of Public Space, Translated by 
Michael Chanan (London, Routledge, 1991); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy 
of Personal Information (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Greg Elmer, Profiling Machines: Mapping 
the Personal Information Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); Shoshana Zuboff, “Big Other: 
Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization,” Journal of Information 
Technology 30, no. 1 (March 2015): 75-89; Joseph Turow and Nick Couldry, “Media as Data Extraction: 
Towards a New Map of a Transformed Communications Field,” Journal of Communication 68, no. 2 (April 
2018): 415-423. For historical analyses of “informationalization” as a general development within and 
across the capitalist political economy of the U.S. and elsewhere, see Dan Schiller, How to Think About 
Information (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2007); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and James W. Cortada, 
eds., A Nation Transformed by Information: How Information Has Shaped the United States from Colonial 
Times to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network 
Society (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010). David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into 
the Origins of Cultural Change (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1990); Robin Mansell, Imagining the Internet: 
Communication, Innovation, and Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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This argument revises existing scholarship on advertising and new media. Historians 
remember the late 1950s as the start of a “creative revolution” that reshaped the profession and 
cultural resonance of advertising in the United States. The agencies representing national brands 
crafted new identities, rejecting bureaucracy, science, and other values from the preceding 
“organization” era.9 I argue, however, that this moment also marks an inflection point for an 
equally profound trajectory in the opposite direction. Across the 1950s and 1960s, the advertising 
industry began to rebuild its information infrastructures around electronic data processing, 
networked computing, and more sophisticated forms of prediction and analysis. Advertisers, 
agencies, and media companies accommodated their activities to increasingly calculated ways of 
thinking about consumers and audiences, and to more statistical and computational forms of 
judgement. Consumer research, direct marketing, and media buying were all elevated in stature as 
advertisers and their agencies used information resources to discriminate risks and profit 
opportunities more precisely. By the 1960s these and other actors had envisioned the possibility 
to reorganize mass media around more efficient, rational, and automated systems for managing 
consumers and monetizing audience attention—and already they were enlisting algorithms and 
other mathematical techniques to execute these designs. Over a matter of decades, a commitment 
to more detailed accounting of consumers’ past and probable behaviors moved gradually into the 
very heart of the sales effort and the digital media landscape. The escalation of quantitative 
strategies by marketers and “attention merchants”10 helped create conditions for both the public 
sphere and the intimacies of personal experience to be penetrated by computational and economic 
approaches to knowing, designing, and managing social worlds.   
                                                          
9 Stephen Fox, The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising and Its Creators (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1997); Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, 
Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
10 Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads (New York: Vintage, 
2017). 
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By foregrounding information, logistics, and calculation in a study of how strategic actors 
interpreted the commercial potentials of new technologies, starting with the electronic computer, I 
uncover a history that complicates received wisdom about the relationship between digital media 
and marketing. It is widely believed that technological changes beginning in the 1990s have 
revolutionized advertising, forcing companies to become accountable and data-driven. A flood of 
recent commentary credits internet firms with orchestrating a coup by which quantitative “Math 
Men” have usurped from creative “Mad Men” the mantle of power in advertising and commercial 
media industries.11 Scholars have marked this shift as well. Referring to algorithmic means for 
channeling the attention and activities of consumers online, a 2016 book describes the prevailing 
logic of media platforms as a form of “calculative culture.”12  
Without disputing the entire diagnosis, I demonstrate that this is part of a much longer 
historical process, begun well before the dawn of the Web. I argue also that the melding of 
behavioral science and data analytics at the center of this development is not a sudden and 
exogenous disruption but, in fact, an intensification of perennial efforts to increase control, 
efficiency, and predictability in selling the American people. A calculative culture did not arise 
from the platform economy dominated by Google and Facebook; it began evolving much earlier, 
as the imperative to know and influence consumers was articulated to post-War visions of a 
socio-economic framework founded on the processing and organization of information.13 
                                                          
11 Cambridge Analytica, “Don Draper’s Dead: Alexander Nix Meets Ogilvy’s Rory Sutherland,” CA 
Commercial [blog], August 8, 2017. https://ca-commercial.com/news/don-drapers-dead-alexander-nix-
meets-ogilvys-rory-sutherland; Ken Auletta, “How the Math Men Overthrew the Mad Men,” The New 
Yorker, May 21, 2018 https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-communications/how-the-math-men-
overthrew-the-mad-men; Ian Leslie, “The Death of Don Draper,” New Statesman, July 25, 2018. 
https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/internet/2018/07/death-don-draper. 
12 Sven Brodmerkel and Nicholas Carah, Brand Machine, Sensory Media and Calculative Culture (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
13 For an insightful analysis of the “imaginaries” that animated notions of an “information society,” see 
Mansell, Imagining the Internet, especially chapter 3. See, also, Daniel Bell, “The Social Framework of the 
Information Society”, in The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year View, eds. Michael Dertouzos and Joel Moses 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979), 163-211; Jorge Reina Schement, “Porat, Bell, and the Information Society 
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Viewed this way, efforts to sell audience attention and, as Armand Mattelart put it,  to 
“understand the black box of the consumer…[and] sound out the process of consumption” seem 
to provide a persistent motive force in the economic, cultural, and technological changes often 
attributed to digital convergence and rise of the internet.14 In chronicling the history of audience 
measurement techniques, a veteran media researcher reached a provocative verdict in the 1980s: 
“If, as the futurists state, we are entering an age to be dominated by information production and 
use, we can certainly point to electronic media ratings as being in the vanguard of that 
development.”15 This dissertation takes that proposition seriously. As an organizing priority for 
commercial media, selling the American people has been an engine for the development of 
methods and tools to extract, store, manage, analyze, and circulate data, and for the spread of 
informational resources, as both commodities and means of commodification, through the 
capitalist political economy.16   
In the following pages I introduce the conceptual and historical points of entry for my 
research, provide a warrant for this study, and outline the subsequent chapters. I begin by 
describing my institutional and information-centric orientation for understanding audience 
manufacture.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Reconsidered: The Growth of Information Work in the Early Twentieth Century,” Information Processing 
& Management 26, no. 4 (1990): 449-465; Beniger, The Control Revolution; Schiller, How to Think About 
Information, chapter 1. 
14 Mattelart, Advertising International, 213. 
15 Hugh Malcolm Beville, Jr., Audience Ratings: Radio, Television, Cable, Revised Student Edition 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988), 216. 
16 For more on commodification and information, see Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of 
Communication, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2009); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., “Toward a Political 
Economy of Personal Information,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 10, no. 1 (March 1993): 70-
97. 
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Audience Manufacture 
Data-driven methods for constructing, knowing, and managing reality have achieved remarkable 
currency across institutional settings.17 Developments in marketing and audience manufacture 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century open a window into the expanded authority of 
computation and quantification in parts of economic, political, and cultural life. Much of what 
defines and enables digital advertising belongs to this longer history of using information 
technologies for control in administration. Techniques and instruments for orchestrating the 
transactions and information flows involved in exchanging commodity audiences have helped 
chart a path toward what people today refer to as a “data-driven society,” or, more critically, as 
informational, cybernetic, or surveillance capitalism. A sociotechnical history of audience 
manufacture is also, therefore, a study in the imaginaries, institutions, and infrastructures of a 
data-driven form of capitalism.18 
A decisive contribution toward numerical decision-making in commercial media 
industries came from the introduction of electronic computers and data-processing technologies, 
beginning in the 1950s. Immediately, many organizations and individuals recognized that 
computerization would be of enormous importance in selling the American people. Tim Wu 
                                                          
17 Victor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How We 
Live, Work and Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013); Steve Lohr, Data-ism: The Revolution 
Transforming Decision Making, Consumer Behavior, and Almost Everything Else (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2015); Nick Couldry and Jun Yu, “Deconstructing Datafication’s Brave New 
World,” New Media & Society (2018): 1-19. 
18 Alex “Sandy” Petland, “The Data-Driven Society,” Scientific American 309, no. 4 (October 2013): 78-
83; Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, “Cybernetic Capitalism: Information, Technology, Everyday Life,” 
in The Political Economy of Information, eds. Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko (Madison, WI: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 44-75; John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, “Surveillance 
Capitalism: Monopoly-Finance Capital, the Military-Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age,” Monthly 
Review 66, no. 3 (July 2014): 1-31; Christian Fuchs, “Labor in Informational Capitalism and on the 
Internet,” The Information Society 26, no. 3 (2010): 170-196; Zuboff, “Big Other”; Castells, The Rise of the 
Networked Society; Schiller, Digital Capitalism. I confess to feeling some discomfort with the causal force 
implied by “data-driven capitalism.” As I will emphasize, dynamics in capitalism—of accelerating 
commodification, expanding market-based exchange, and better coordinating networks of economic 
activity—are driving uses of data as much as they are driven by them. I use this term to represent the views 
of the actors I examined, who are almost singularly focused on becoming more “data-driven.” 
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recently called Arthur Charles Nielsen the “grandfather of today’s data geeks,” and with good 
reason.19 As historian Karen Buzzard explains, “A.C. Nielsen played a pioneering role in 
advancing the science of marketing and advertising by aiming his service at reducing the cost of 
moving goods from factory ultimately to the consumer.” The A.C. Nielsen company (ACN) “was 
part of a rapidly growing sector of the economy known as the ‘information’ industry, which 
helped to align production, distribution, and consumption in a changing industrial society.”20 As a 
leading provider of information about media usage, ACN was “an extensive and early user of 
IBM equipment,” employing punched-card machines to tabulate audience ratings since the late 
1930s.21 In 1948 ACN contracted with the creators of the ENIAC—“America’s first full-scale 
electronic digital computer”22—to purchase from them “the first commercial adaptation of the 
Univac Electronic Computer.”23 While this $500,000 order went unfulfilled, Nielsen’s initiative, 
followed soon by major advertising agencies, suggests that audience manufacture and market 
research stand alongside insurance, credit reporting, and other industrial processes that have been 
inseparable from developments in computing, data collection, and statistical techniques for 
knowing the past, predicting the future, and managing risk in the breach. The ENIAC emerged 
from efforts by engineers at the University of Pennsylvania to automate calculations of ballistics 
tables; it is irresistible to point out that the trajectory of marketing since then has been 
                                                          
19 Wu, The Attention Merchants, 105. 
20 Karen Buzzard, Tracking the Audience: The Ratings Industry from Analog to Digital (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 22. 
21 James W. Cortada, The Digital Hand, Volume II: How Computers Changed the Work of American 
Financial, Telecommunications, Media, and Entertainment Industries (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 353. 
22 Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 46. 
23 “Nielsen Reports,” Broadcasting, September 6, 1948, 34. 
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characterized as a shift from a “shotgun” to a “rifle” approach. The goals, in both cases, are to 
anticipate the position of a moving target and to chart the flight of an intercepting missive.24 
Owing perhaps to our fascination with the current state of the art, we seem to forget that 
marketing and audience-making have always been information-intensive. The buying and selling 
of audiences, the placement of advertisements, and the efforts to quantify media exposure and 
correlate it with shopping behaviors all occasion enormous informational and administrative 
burdens. At least since the 1960s television advertising has involved more logistical complexity 
than the label “old media” admits. Keeping track of available inventory; defining and locating 
consumer targets; “trafficking” paid ad-units into a schedule; routing, cueing, and inserting the 
correct spot in the proper slot; negotiating prices; measuring audiences; settling accounts—these 
are just a few key elements in advertising transactions, executed through a complex assemblage 
of bureaucratic tools, techniques, and practices that order workflows within and across 
organizations. Simply deciding how to allocate expenditures has required marketers to invest in 
information resources. In explaining why media planning alone would ensure a permanent role 
for electronic computers in the advertising industry, an executive from the J. Walter Thompson 
agency acknowledged the difficult calculations puzzling him already in 1969. “The number of 
reasonable plans that can be designed to fit a particular plan and budget,” he admitted, “are 
                                                          
24 “As [Dallas] Smythe put it, ‘the shotgun is being superseded by rifles.’” William H. Melody, 
“Audiences, Commodities, and Market Relations: An Introduction to the Audience Commodity Thesis,” in 
The Audience Commodity in a Digital Age, eds. Lee McGuigan and Vincent Manzerolle (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2014), 27. It is worth noting that theories linking information, communication, and control, as well as 
“systems” approaches to engineering and management, migrated from weapons research into commercial 
applications in the mid-twentieth century. Thomas P. Hughes, Human-Built World: How to Think About 
Technology and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 82-94. For more on the ENIAC, see 
Edwards, The Closed World, 49-52. 
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almost unlimited.”25 Any suggestion that the strategic importance of data is unique to our “new” 
digital media environment is not supported by historical evidence.26 
Furthermore, I proceed from an understanding that commodity audiences themselves are 
informational products, brought into existence through conventions, instrumentation, and 
routinized exchange relations. Commodity audiences are produced by historically specific and 
usually standardized ways of defining, observing, quantifying, and evaluating viewers’ behaviors 
and attributes. Audience manufacture involves making viewers visible to measurement 
instruments and constructing protocols to make the extracted data—the evidence of audience 
attention—intelligible and legitimate for those who would buy, sell, or act upon it. Changes in 
how information is organized and how transactions are processed do not just impact this market, 
they effectively reconstitute it. Information technologies shape the basis of decision-making 
among buyers and sellers by representing the market in specific forms. Analyses which ignore the 
ways of seeing and stabilizing “attention” that render it as an exchangeable commodity run the 
risk of mystifying the institutions and infrastructures supporting a “marketplace for attention.”27 
                                                          
25 “Welty: ‘The Computer as a Tool Used in Media Planning is Here to Stay,’” J. Walter Thompson 
Company News 24, no. 5 (January 31, 1969), n.p. 
26 See Dan Schiller, Digital Depression: Information Technology and Economic Crisis (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 2014); Inger Stole, “Persistent Pursuit of Personal Information: A Historical Perspective 
on Digital Advertising Strategies,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 31, no. 2 (June 2014): 129-
133.   
27 Here I draw on “institutional” perspectives on the construction of audiences: Eileen R. Meehan, 
“Commodity Audiences, Actual Audiences: The Blindspot Debate,” in Illuminating the Blindspots: Essays 
Honoring Dallas W. Smythe, eds. Janet Wasko, Vincent Mosco, and Manjuneth Pendakur (Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex, 1993), 378-397; James S. Ettema and D. Charles Whitney, eds., Audiencemaking: How the Media 
Create the Audience (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994); Philip M. Napoli, Audience Economics: Media 
Institutions and the Audience Marketplace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Joseph Turow, 
“Audience Construction and Cultural Production: Marketing Surveillance in the Digital Age,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 597, no. 1 (January 2005): 103-121; Vincent Mosco, 
The Political Economy of Communication, 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009); Zoe Sherman, 
“Pricing the Eyes of Passersby: The Commodification of Audience Attention in U.S. Public Spaces, 1890-
1920,” Review of Radical Political Economics 46, no. 4 (December 2014): 502-508; Adam Arvidsson, “On 
the ‘Prehistory of the Panoptic Sort’: Mobility in Market Research,” Surveillance & Society 1, no. 4 (2004): 
456-474. 
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Much like in commodity futures trading, new information technologies and techniques 
have provided actors with resources for reimagining and reengineering audience manufacture in 
ways that come closer to economic ideals of rapid and “optimal” judgements.28 These 
developments give us a chance to consider more generally the mutual shaping of commerce, 
culture, and technology. Some social theorists have advanced an understanding of markets as 
architectures for “formatting calculative agencies.”29 In other words, markets are assemblages of 
technologies, practices, rules, organizations, and cognitive frameworks that produce economically 
“rational” thought and action.30 A key element in this process involves “framing” objects and 
relationships so as to set boundaries around what is admissible for the purposes of economic 
calculation and exchange. What portion of reality will be taken into account, and how will it be 
“known” and represented in commerce? The definition of consumer segments and the 
commodification of audiences likewise involve setting boundaries around what can and will be 
meaningfully accounted for.31 What counts as audience attention? What elements of identity can 
be discerned and used to classify someone for marketing purposes? I will show that advertising 
and media industries recognized developments in information technology as opportunities to 
expand and reformat their capacities for calculation.  
                                                          
28 Caitlin Zaloom, Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to London (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2006); Caitlin Zaloom, “Markets and Machines: Work in the Technological 
Sensoryscapes of Finance,” American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 815-837. Consider 
similarities between finance markets and audience markets: both trade in futures, both products are abstract 
and intangible within the exchange relation, and both depend on information technology to constitute and 
represent the market to buyers and sellers. 
29 Michel Callon, “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics,” The Sociological 
Review 46, no. S1 (May 1998), 23. 
30 Zaloom, Out of the Pits; Michel Callon and Fabian Muniesa, “Peripheral Vision: Economic Markets as 
Calculative Collection Devices,” Organization Studies 26, no. 8 (August 2005): 1229-1250; Franck 
Cochoy, “Calculation, Qualculation, Calqulation: Shopping Cart Arithmetic, Equipped Cognition and the 
Clustered Consumer,” Marketing Theory 8, no. 1 (March 2008): 15-44. 
31 This is what Napoli and others refer to as an “institutionalized” or “institutionally effective” audience. 
Napoli, Audience Economics, 22. See also Philip M. Napoli, Audience Evolution: New Technologies and 
the Transformation of Media Audiences (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 2-3. 
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Marketers and “attention merchants,” as Wu calls them, have been working across 
decades to operationalize the individual as a target—to make identifiable persons (or profiles) the 
basis for planning, executing, and evaluating their attempts to influence behavior and to “valorize 
consciousness.”32 Comprehensive efforts to catalogue habits and attributes that can be factored 
into predictions about how an individual will act in marketplaces have amounted to what a New 
York Times reporter described as mapping the “consumer genome.”33 The result has been a 
contradictory process in which marketers have tried to expand the frame of calculation to take 
into account every discernable personal quality or experience, but, at the same time, the recording 
and processing of those experiences formats reality in particular ways—typically as numerical 
data that are machine-readable and suitable for algorithmic decision-making.34 As a data scientist 
at IBM explains, his mission to achieve complete personalization in marketing requires that the 
consumer be converted into “something [he] can reasonably apply math and computing to.”35  
The advertising industry, a major cultural and economic institution that exerts structuring 
influences on many of the organizations, devices, and environments that mediate our encounters 
with people and ideas, has reconstructed itself around aspirations, and material tools and 
practices, to expand its abilities to account for and calculate more of social and personal life. This 
transformation sits at an intersection where the processing of data, the processing of commerce, 
and the processing of culture collide. 
                                                          
32 The “valorization of consciousness” is a term introduced by Sut Jhally and Bill Livant, “Watching as 
Working.”  
33 Natasha Singer, “Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome,” New York Times, June 16, 2012. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-
marketing.html  
34 Detlev Zwick and Janice Denegri Knott, “Manufacturing Customers: The Database as New Means of 
Production,” Journal of Consumer Culture 9, no. 2 (2009): 221-247. 
35 Lorh, Data-ism, 159. For a discussion of how people are constructed as legible, databased subjects, see 
John Cheney-Lippold, We Are Data: Algorithms and the Making of Our Digital Selves (New York: NYU 
Press, 2017). 
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In general, then, this research confronts a familiar theme. It tries to document and make 
sense of how advertisers have designed or accommodated new or existing technologies as part of 
their efforts to reach the right person, with the right message, at the right moment. But my topic 
and approach bring forward new historical details and potentially novel analytical insights. In a 
move that I hope will clear some new lines of sight for a critical political economy of media and 
technology, I conceptualize audience manufacture as a set of technical and administrative 
infrastructures for generating, processing, and coordinating flows of information and commerce. 
By approaching ad-supported media industries, even in the broadcast era, as sociotechnical 
arrangements designed (and redesigned) to negotiate challenges of metrology, knowledge, 
prediction, and logistics, we open to scrutiny a host of subterranean technologies, relationships, 
and modes of organization through which various sorts of information are produced, made 
meaningful, and used to motivate or justify decisions. Like the commodification of grain and risk, 
audience manufacture has “set quite a bit of paper in motion.”36 Google, Facebook, and other “ad 
tech” and data brokerage firms have consolidated power precisely by building themselves into 
logistical utilities—organizations that digest information, orchestrate transactions, and link those 
processes. 
When we recognize audiences as informational products, we can see that selling the 
American people is, and has always been, a massive effort in datafication—in rendering more 
types of behavior in forms that can be observed, counted, classified, analyzed, and commodified. 
The process engages a vast connective tissue, comprising scientific paradigms, professional 
routines, communication facilities, and bureaucratic technologies, as well as the social scientists, 
statisticians, engineers, accountants, clerical workers, sales and procurement staffs, and corporate 
managers who animate these arrangements. These actors are searching almost constantly for 
                                                          
36 Dan Bouk, How Our Days Became Numbered: Risk and the Rise of the Statistical Individual (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), xxi. 
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resources or strategies to cope with the challenges engendered by datafication and the manifold 
pressures to accelerate and streamline workflows. The appropriation of computerized data 
processing has made a decisive contribution to those efforts, shaping conditions of possibility for 
quantification, calculation, automation, and personalization to become increasingly central to 
advertising and commercial media.  
Borrowing a phrase from Richard Ohmann, I regard this transformation as “the result of 
particular human efforts to negotiate difficulties and seize opportunities.”37 The empirical basis of 
my argument is drawn from an historical investigation of what has come to be called “advanced 
advertising,” introduced above. As an inherently relational and aspirational concept, it provides a 
unique view of how the advertising industry incorporated new technologies within visions about 
how to negotiate difficulties, seize opportunities, and “advance” toward its highest ambitions. 
Advanced Advertising: Imagining a Better Future 
The dream of advanced advertising described at the outset of this chapter provides an entry point 
into a broader story about efforts to achieve the existential priorities of ad-supported 
communications: to produce consumers and to verify and maximize returns on advertising 
investments. A range of predictive, surveilling, and analytical techniques have been enlisted to 
advance this mission and to calm advertisers’ central anxiety. The problem of attributing sales 
outcomes to specific promotional campaigns has haunted marketers at least since turn-of-the-
twentieth-century magnates like John Wanamaker and William Lever worried that portions of 
their advertising outlays generated no measurable profit. This uncertainty, and the persistent 
desire to overcome it, have motivated considerable investments into schemes for collecting and 
analyzing data that would, first, help marketers isolate the individuals or groups most likely to be 
                                                          
37 Ohmann, Selling Culture, 13.  
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valuable customers, and then ultimately “close the loop” between advertisements and sales.38 
Pronouncements that new media eradicate this uncertainty have become a commonplace in 
industry discourse. But this (still-incomplete) potential does not spring from digital magic; it has 
been engineered through a decades-long effort to manage risk and increase efficiency by 
improving controls over information and communication throughout the data-intensive and 
logistically-taxing process of producing consumers. Surveillance, algorithmic predictions and 
decision-making, and other features that orbit big data as a center of gravity in marketing today 
are elaborations of dynamics central to the twin dimensions of selling the American people—
systematic efforts to influence consumer behavior and the commodification of audience attention. 
I grapple with the elaboration of these dynamics by investigating a set of affordances, or 
abilities, that constitute advanced advertising. These are programmability (automation), 
addressability (targeting), shoppability (e-commerce), and accountability (measurement and 
analytics). As I will explain in the next chapter, an affordance is the potential for action a person 
or an organization recognizes in a resource. Investigating affordances allows me to take a sort of 
archaeological stance, to excavate ideas and strategies that spill across settings, surface in 
different guises, and become articulated to different technologies—including relatively 
unsuccessful ones.39 Long before anyone used the term “advanced advertising,” people were 
imagining and designing ways to advance advertising. My study starts from the initial 
computerization of advertising and market research industries in the 1950s, a development which 
both responded to existing priorities and demands, and also catalyzed new ways of thinking about 
                                                          
38 The old saw that “I know that half of my advertising budget is wasted, but I’m not sure which half,” is a 
touchstone for much of what is discussed in this study. The phrase is usually attributed to John Wanamaker, 
but others, such as William Lever, are sometimes credited with saying it. See Joseph Turow, Niche Envy: 
Marketing Discrimination in the Digital Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 21; Mattelart, 
Advertising International, 213. 
39 On “media archaeology” as a method for researching the history of technology, see Jussi Parikka, What 
Is Media Archaeology? (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012). 
18 
 
 
marketing, media buying, and audience construction. Tracing the history of advanced advertising 
through its embryonic forms and motivating logics, we find actors envisioning and reaching 
toward arrangements that could foster and exploit the perceived capacities of information and 
communication technologies to remake audience manufacture around verifiable ROI.  
As we uncover evidence of these affordances and logics, it is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the history of “digital advertising” begins much earlier than we typically admit. 
To say that digital technologies enable unprecedented capabilities for tracking, targeting, and 
nudging individuals is true enough. But across more than half a century, the industrial production 
of consumers—and specific efforts to generate, process, and coordinate flows of information and 
commerce toward that purpose—beckoned, shaped, and reacted to technologies that now 
facilitate internet advertising’s sophisticated expressions. Since the 1950s in particular, 
advertisers and their agents have been honing more calculating mindsets and techniques. “When 
the internet came along,” Joseph Turow argues, “media buyers saw its interactive environment as 
terrific terrain for expanding their numerical understanding of audiences—and for using the 
measures and labels [they had developed to evaluate and classify consumers] directly to sell 
products.”40 It might be reasonable to argue, then, that the internet did not create digital 
advertising, but instead collective pursuits of the values underlying advanced advertising shaped 
the digital environments we experience today. Programmability, addressability, shoppability, and 
accountability are, indeed, the defining elements of how internet and mobile advertising are now 
understood. As we will see, these capacities were envisioned, pursued, and assembled throughout 
most of the history of commercial broadcasting in the United States. It is often claimed that big 
data and digital surveillance transformed advertising; this dissertation forces us to consider causal 
forces acting in the opposite direction. 
                                                          
40 Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry is Defining Your Identity and Your 
Worth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 20. 
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This argument runs counter to much of the discussion and scholarship about “new 
media.” Recent analysts have argued that a wave of digital technologies quite suddenly disrupted 
long-stagnant pools in advertising and video entertainment.41 But a closer look—one that focuses 
not on consumer-facing devices, textual production, and private reception, but rather on the 
logistical media and administrative practices that hold these industries together—reveals that the 
backwaters of ad-supported communications systems have been churning for decades. An article 
in MediaPost recently pointed out what many take for granted, that over the past decade or so 
“the [audience] marketplace has grown incredibly more complex, thanks to the proliferation of 
new media options, sources of data, and importantly, systems for managing and processing 
advertising buys.”42 The first two of those developments have been subject to countless scholarly 
treatments; the latter has been scrutinized hardly at all. And yet these so-called “ad ops” or “ad 
tech” underpin audience fragmentation and datafication, extend further back historically than 
supposed new-media disruption, and represent a pivotal connection with broader developments in 
informational capitalism. Long before video content was being encoded and transmitted digitally, 
the administration of audience manufacture was being reformed to accommodate networked, 
electronic facilities for processing information and transacting commerce. Companies like Google 
and Facebook represent the flowering of seeds planted decades ago; but, so far, the 
computerization of advertising and media buying has not been subject to an adequate critical 
account. I will to begin to remedy that. 
                                                          
41 Amanda D. Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized, 2nd edition (New York: NYU Press, 2014); 
Christina Spurgeon, Advertising and New Media (New York Routledge, 2007); Michael D. Smith and 
Rahul Telang, Streaming, Sharing, Stealing: Big Data and the Future of Entertainment (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2016).  
42 Joe Mandese, “TV’s Next Big Show is Shaping Up to Be Media-Buying Workflow,” MediaPost, July 6, 
2017. https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/303951/tvs-next-big-show-is-shaping-up-to-be-
media-buyin.html. Emphasis added. 
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By taking the administrative and logistical elements of information, communication, and 
commerce as seriously in an investigation of new media and convergence as we do texts, personal 
electronics, and private consumption, we cast the emergence of digital advertising in a different 
historical light. We also gain a clearer view of profound developments that have been 
incompletely acknowledged. As a concentrated expression of ambitions underlying the media-
marketing complex, advanced advertising provides a useful object for focusing in on a broader 
suite of historical developments which I will refer to as a calculative evolution in advertising and 
marketing.  
The Creative Revolution and the Calculative Evolution 
As mentioned earlier, the late 1950s mark the start of advertising’s “creative revolution.” But at 
almost the exact moment when commercial artists like Bill Bernbach began to redefine the public 
image of Madison Avenue, advertising and media industries embarked also on a different 
trajectory, a calculative evolution, in which individuals and organizations leveraged, redesigned, 
or invented an impressive array of technical and administrative capacities for improving control, 
efficiency, and predictability in the processes of selling the American people. Even as the 
symbols and stories produced by the ad industry seemed to disavow the “scientific” sales 
techniques and organizational values that had prevailed in the first half of the twentieth century, 
advertising was being consolidated within a comprehensive and integrated approach to marketing 
services. This actually deepened agencies’ commitment to managing consumer demand and 
motivated them to assemble and mobilize any analytical weapons that might help them advance 
this sales effort more systematically. Advertisers and their agencies embraced computerized data 
processing, networked communications, and statistical techniques to manage an increasingly 
complex media environment and to advance toward ambitions of calculation and control.  
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Through this development, many tactics, mindsets, and metrics from direct marketing—
and, more generally, from operations research, systems engineering, cybernetics and surveillance, 
and financial management—were brought toward the center of the entire advertising system, 
elaborating the media-buying and research functions in the process. Turow cogently analyzes the 
social implications of advertisers’ and media organizations’ efforts to “search out and exploit 
[ever finer] differences between consumers.”43 Such segmentation strategies are one part of what 
I see as a more general effort to use information-processing technologies to identify and exploit 
ever finer profit opportunities throughout the many processes involved in producing consumers. 
As an intensification of historical developments, related also to the expanded importance of 
information, communication, and commercial surveillance throughout a networked market 
system, this calculative evolution has provided conditions for digital advertising and marketing to 
take shape and to claim a crucial role in the development and future of data-driven capitalism.  
If the creative and the calculative advanced mostly on separate tracks after the late 1950s, 
a defining feature of our current moment, and the significance of developments in the 1990s 
toward this eventuality, lies is the recombination of these forces. The creative revolution posited 
individuality and difference as core values, creating a dynamic engine for consumerism.44 After 
an uneven struggle to operationalize those values within marketing and audience manufacture, the 
commercial shaping of online and mobile media represents the accommodation of individuality 
and difference within the frame of measurement, calculation, and meaningful rational action. In 
other words, databases, personal technologies, pervasive and precise tracking, and the analytical 
capacities to activate more and more data in making rapid discriminating judgments are all part of 
a calculative infrastructure. That infrastructure supports marketers’ efforts to account for 
                                                          
43 Turow, Breaking Up America, 4. 
44 Frank, The Conquest of Cool; Joseph Heath, “The Structure of Hip Consumerism,” Philosophy & Social 
Criticism 27, no. 6 (November 2001): 1-17. 
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uniqueness of experience, moments of creative expression, and subtle distinctions among 
identities and lifestyles, and to capitalize on a consumer culture animated by these values. The 
digital media environment has, in no small part, been engineered to enclose more of daily life 
within the boundaries of accounting and calculation—to operationalize individuality and mobility 
as the bases for marketing and audience manufacture.45 
Contemporary Relevance 
Recent and ongoing developments provide a strong warrant for this study. Apart from historical 
interest, it is relevant to current public issues. The calculative evolution of advertising and 
marketing has been part of, and often an engine for, developments in the mediation of social life 
that have had profound and, in some cases, quite monstrous consequences.  
By integrating behavioral science and big data, marketers have built formidable 
technologies of social discrimination and control. Behavioral data science has developed 
reciprocally with the structure of digital media environments. Today, information provision, 
social services, and other essential aspects of citizenship and cultural participation are very often 
mediated by devices and platforms that afford pervasive monitoring and analysis of users’ 
behaviors, as well as algorithmic manipulation of content or interfaces to enhance strategic 
advantages for the organizations that own, operate, or sponsor parcels of those environments.46 
                                                          
45 For a related but broader discussion of “digital enclosure,” see Mark Andrejevic, “Surveillance and the 
Digital Enclosure,” The Communication Review 10, no. 4 (2007): 295-317. Similarly, Brodmerkel and 
Carah write about how branding in an age of interactivity and consumer participation revolves around 
“building infrastructure that makes cultural life computable.” Brand Machines, Sensory Media and 
Calculative Culture, 143. 
46 See, e.g., Mark Andrejevic, iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2007); Nick Couldry and Joseph Turow, “Advertising, Big Data and the 
Clearance of the Public Realm: Marketers’ New Approaches to the Content Subsidy,” International 
Journal of Communication 8 (2014): 1710-1726; Astrid Mager, “Algorithmic Ideology: How Capitalist 
Society Shapes Search Engines,” Information, Communication & Society 15, no. 5 (June 2012):769-787; 
Jean-Christophe Plantin, Carl Lagoze, Paul N. Edwards, and Christian Sandvig, “Infrastructure Studies 
Meet Platforms Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook,” New Media & Society 20, no. 1 (January 
2018): 293-210; Zuboff, “Surveillance Capitalism.” 
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Consolidating and leveraging data resources—both data themselves and the tools, techniques, and 
know-how involved in generating and exploiting them—has become indispensable to profit-
strategies for marketers and companies across economic sectors. Despite claims that consumers 
have been empowered by the diffusion of information-retrieval and data-processing technologies, 
the massive and granular patterning of personal habits has yielded asymmetries that put 
individuals at a substantial disadvantage.47 As Callon and Muniesa write, “Facing the consumer 
are a multitude of professionals armed with computers, studying his or her movements and 
calculating margins down to the last cent or gram.”48 The eager embrace of neuroscience by 
marketers leaves little doubt that data power, and the broader field of behavioral influence, tilts 
decidedly toward corporate and state actors.49 
Mutual transformations in advertising, commercial media, and information technologies 
have been motivated by a desire to become more discriminating and calculating in recognizing 
profit opportunities. Efforts to leverage data and technology toward this purpose have reinforced 
the authority of quantitative and computational judgement, shaped the architecture of media and 
market settings, affected the circulation of ideas and stories in public spheres, and legitimized a 
paradigm of persuasion that exploits cognitive and habitual vulnerabilities.50 That the visions of 
                                                          
47 Vincent Manzerolle and Sandra Smeltzer, “Consumer Databases, Neoliberalism, and the Commercial 
Mediation of Identity: A Medium Theory Analysis,” Surveillance & Society 8, no. 3 (2011): 323-337; 
Matthew Crain, “The Limits of Transparency: Data Brokers and Commodification,” New Media & Society 
20, no. 1 (January 2018): 88-104; danah boyd and Kate Crawford, “Critical Questions for Big Data: 
Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon,” Information, Communication & 
Society 15, no. 5 (June 2012): 662-679; Mark Andrejevic, “The Big Data Divide,” International Journal of 
Communication 8 (2011): 1673-1689; Darren M. Stevenson, “Data, Trust, and Transparency in 
Personalized Advertising,” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2016. 
48 Callon and Musiesa, “Peripheral Vision,” 1238. 
49 Selena Nemorin and Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., “Exploring Neuromarketing and its Reliance on Remote 
Sensing: Social and Ethical Concerns,” International Journal of Communication 11 (2017): 4824-4844; 
Anthony Nadler and Lee McGuigan, “Captains of Habit Formation: Marketers’ Emerging Models of the 
Consumer Mind,” in Explorations in Critical Studies in Advertising, eds. James F. Hamilton, Robert Bodle, 
and Ezequiel Korin (New York: Routledge, 2016), 124-137. 
50 Ryan Calo, “Digital Market Manipulation,” George Washington Law Review 82, no. 4 (August 2014): 
995-1051; Seeta Peña Gagadharan, Virginia Eubanks, and Solon Barocas, eds., Data and Discrimination: 
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development discussed herein are filtered, in large part, through managerial, engineering, and 
behavioristic ways of seeing the world indicates the priorities at stake and the room for 
negotiating complex social issues. Few normative propositions are offered, except an 
unquestioned commitment to efficiency and economic growth. Yet some of the dangers are 
becoming clear. For example, critics have observed how the incentives prevailing in industries 
that traffic in clicks, likes, shares, and other indices of attentive behavior can encourage and 
amplify antisocial forms of interaction. The proliferation of disinformation, propaganda, and 
hateful invectives on social media (and elsewhere) has made it hard to ignore the troubling 
externalities of a business built to generate and valorize evidence of audience attention.51 Even 
beyond the structural tendency for commercial journalism to court sensationalism, the recasting 
of advertising as an engineering problem to be solved through automation and data processing has 
further evacuated the civic mandate from news media. As content is decoupled from the sale of 
audience impressions, and as ad tech intermediaries siphon as much as half of publishers’ 
advertising revenues,52 the hollowing out of news organizations has accelerated from an already 
precipitous decline. Considering advertising’s transition from a creative industry into a data-
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driven business, one pundit called the implications of this shift “deeply sinister – not only for the 
consumer but for democracy itself.”53 
An historical perspective provides important insights into our current situation. I hope 
that by examining how we arrived at this point, we might gain a fuller understanding of the 
dynamics at the heart of these developments and find firmer ground from which to proceed 
toward a more just vision for societies saturated with information and digital technologies. As 
Dallas Smythe insisted, the industrial production of consciousness provides an entirely inadequate 
basis for achieving something like “fully human life.”54 
Summary of the Arguments 
To summarize so far, in this dissertation I will develop three main lines of argument. First, I will 
show that selling the American people has always involved intensive demand for information, 
data processing, and communication facilities. This challenges the assumed contrast between 
“legacy” and “new” media, and it forces us to revise our historical understanding of when and 
how the “math men” presided over the merger of behavioral and data sciences that typifies 
today’s personalized and algorithmic media environments.  
Secondly, I argue that demand for data and communication resources, to confront 
administrative burdens and to work toward the goal of verifying return on investment, helped 
catalyze developments in the capture and analysis of information which have shaped and been 
shaped by the rise of digital media. Elements that huddle around data-driven capitalism—
including surveillance, automation, and predictive analytics—contributed to and benefited from 
efforts to increase control, efficiency, and rationality in marketing and audience manufacture. To 
meet various challenges and aspirations, actors appropriated information technologies and often 
                                                          
53 Leslie, “The Death of Don Draper.” 
54 Smythe, Dependency Road. 
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framed their trajectories within mindsets and strategies that have had lasting effects, even if those 
trajectories have been followed more gradually than advocates hoped. “Advanced advertising” is 
nothing if not a set of constructs for imagining and understanding the commercial potential of 
new technologies. 
Finally, I argue that advanced advertising is one part of an unnoticed—or at least 
unnamed—transformation of advertising and marketing that I am calling a calculative evolution. 
This intervention amends the received history of advertising by demonstrating that the period 
typically identified with a revolutionary flowering of creativity, beginning in the late 1950s, is 
also a key moment when new ways of using and thinking about information and computing 
catalyzed a parallel but generally diametric tendency toward quantification, calculation, and 
administration. These latter developments have been no less transformative than the better-known 
creative revolution, especially in relation to the digital infrastructures supporting economic, 
cultural, and political life in the twenty-first century.  
The calculative evolution is complex, entangled with other historical dynamics, and less 
cohesive than a single term seems to suggest. Still, the name gives us some traction for 
investigating and making sense of a bundle of transitions in the political economy of media and 
technology across the second half of the twentieth century and up to the present. As computer 
processing, information technologies, and networked communications were incorporated into 
advertising and media buying, efforts to imagine and engineer these four “advanced” 
affordances—automation, personalization, interactive shopping, and accountability—have 
contributed to structural adjustments in media and marketing environments. The reorganization of 
the technologies, institutions, and platforms that mediate reality around surveillance, predictive 
analytics, and a data-driven orientation is a legacy of this history that stretches back into an 
analog, broadcasting world so often dismissed by analysts today.  
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Chapter Layout 
In the next chapter, I try to flesh out the notion of advertising’s calculative evolution by tracing its 
historical contours and stipulating some characteristic dynamics. I use this chapter to survey 
relevant literature and to describe the methods and analytical tools employed to collect and 
interpret my evidence.  
 The four subsequent chapters attend to the set of affordances that constitute advanced 
advertising. These ideas and developments have been interwoven, so to some extent they are all 
threaded throughout every chapter. But I will try to organize each chapter as an archaeology of an 
affordance, situating one of the potential abilities, and the actors and activities orbiting it, as the 
center of gravity. This narrative approach means that the chronology will overlap at times; but, I 
believe this is the most evocative way to present my argument, and I have ordered the chapters so 
that the main threads of each story follow in historical sequence. Probing the histories of these 
affordances helps us not only apprehend the state of the art today; it also provides a window into 
the underlying values and ambitions that have motivated participants in marketing and audience 
manufacture to design or make use of increasingly sophisticated capabilities for generating, 
processing, and coordinating flows of information and commerce.  
Chapter Two historicizes programmability—efforts to automate and optimize media 
planning and buying. Since the late 1950s, a variety of tools and techniques have been developed 
and put into practice to accelerate transactions, to improve data management, to expand the range 
of phenomena that can be accounted for in predicting and evaluating marketing outcomes, and 
ultimately to encourage “friction-free” informational and commercial flows. Programmatic 
advertising did not emerge from the inherent properties of digital, online media; programmability 
is a capacity that had to be recognized and engineered into existence, both technically and 
administratively, and the 1950s and 1960s mark a critical inflection point in this development. 
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Turow’s The Daily You is perhaps the only critical work to broach the computerization of 
advertising and media buying in more than a few words. Chapter Two digs deeper into this 
history.55 
In the next chapter, “Addressing the American Person,” I examine the development of 
institutions and infrastructures necessary for producing an audience of one. Along with more 
flexible manufacturing and distribution systems, the appropriation of computerized data 
processing and the emergence of consumer segmentation as an influential marketing paradigm 
combined to intensify efforts to zero in on specific persons expected to be valuable and receptive 
to advertisers’ persuasions. The gradual movement toward targeting individual viewers, or 
addressability, is detailed through an historical analysis of spot cable advertising—that is, 
advertisements inserted by local cable systems. As with attempts to automate media buying, the 
organizational development of household-level addressable advertising within spot cable has been 
slow and frustrating, but also revealing of deep-seated ambitions to increase efficiency and 
control. The focus of the chapter is on efforts by the sales organizations representing cable 
operators to market hyper-targeted audiences to national advertisers. Readers should recognize 
the key features of this mission—interconnection and interoperability across systems, granular 
data about uniquely identifiable subscribers, and infrastructure services for coordinating this 
complex marketplace—as resembling the salient features supporting the commercialization of the 
internet.56 
Another defining feature of the commercial internet is its interactive marketplaces. 
Chapter Four explores how shoppability has been used to frame the future of information and 
entertainment systems since the emergence of cable television. Electronic commerce has settled 
                                                          
55 Turow, The Daily You, 30-32. 
56 For a thoughtful study that looks at how “infrastructure services” facilitated the commercialization of the 
internet, see Crain, “The Revolution Will be Commercialized.”  
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around internet-enabled devices and applications today; but, for 30 years, home shopping was 
imagined as the future domain of interactive TV. This chapter documents efforts to engineer 
interactive and, more specifically, transactive capabilities into the technologies and business 
models supporting video entertainment. Shoppability, as much as any of the affordances at issue, 
exemplifies what Vincent Mosco calls “pushbutton fantasies,” discursive constructions which, 
“explicitly or not, seek to occupy the image space that people turn to when they think about what 
the new information technology means.”57 The prospect of “selling Jennifer Aniston’s sweater” 
encapsulates the pinnacle of this dream—that viewers could instantly purchase the items 
appearing in television shows and advertisements by clicking their remote controls. Looking 
historically at the discursive construction of shoppability as an affordance of media convergence, 
we see how hopes and expectations about ubiquitous connectivity to electronic marketplaces have 
been operative in decisions about how to build, finance, and regulate information infrastructures 
in the U.S.   
With interactive shoppability, advertisers can insert messages designed to stimulate 
desire for a product or service into an environment that allows for that desire to be expressed 
immediately as a purchase. Among its other benefits, this represents the potential for marketers to 
determine the effectiveness of their efforts. Chapter Five takes up directly this theme of 
accountability, perhaps the most important and frequently recurring of the advanced affordances. 
The quest for accountability—for tethering advertising services to verifiable sales impact—
intensified considerably since the 1950s, both reflecting and shaping technological and 
organizational changes. This chapter examines recent efforts to integrate set-top box data with 
records of shopping behavior to “close the loop” between ad exposure and purchase activity. 
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Calculating return on advertising investment is, in many ways, the ultimate and overarching goal 
that motivates much of the strategy and action discussed throughout this dissertation. As this and 
other chapters show, attempts to determine attribution precisely call into action vast 
sociotechnical arrangements for collecting, processing, and analyzing information from a 
staggering number of sources. While fraught with higher rates of fraud, uncertainty, and 
charlatanism than many in advertising and media industries would care to admit, the potential to 
account for ROI—to replace risk with deterministic confidence—is a seemingly irresistible force 
drawing a dominant and growing share of digital commerce toward Google, Facebook, Amazon, 
and a few other companies capable of tracking people across (almost) the entire purchasing 
process.58 This is the dream of perfect control, efficiency, and predictability at its data-driven 
zenith. It is the sales effort reimagined as an automatic sales engine. The final body chapter, 
“Data-Driven Television,” confirms that this dream has nestled into the center of the media and 
marketing universe. 
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Chapter One – Outline of a Calculative Evolution: A Review of Theory, 
History, and Methods 
 
 
This is, in many ways, a history of the future. My study revolves around the imagination, 
articulation, and engineering of a set of interrelated affordances, or potential abilities, for refining 
the production and sale of audiences and consumer data, and for developing more calculated 
approaches to persuasion. I try to understand the restructuring of advertising and media within 
mutually shaping dynamics of commerce, culture, and technology.  
Throughout the past sixty years, advertisers have enrolled computers and other 
information technologies within their designs for sophisticated and systematic ways of knowing, 
classifying, and influencing consumer behavior. Beginning with the introduction of computerized 
data processing and communication in the 1950s and 1960s, and accelerating with the recognition 
soon after that cable television services could channel the convergence of entertainment, 
commerce, and telecommunications, ways of thinking about advertising and audience 
construction shifted toward putting as much stock in direct marketing and mathematical planning 
as in creative brand-building. Gradually and in concert with other social developments, more and 
more of our mediated environments have been recast around marketers’ visions of an advertising 
system centered on automation, personalization, instant shopping, and expansive collection and 
analysis of data about media usage and buying habits. Unfortunately, due to a dearth of historical 
scholarship on administrative uses of computers and information in advertising, and a tendency in 
contemporary work to associate transformations in commercial media with an internet revolution 
that began in the mid-1990s, the deep roots of data-driven marketing and the often-reciprocal 
relationship between advertising and new technologies have remained obscure.  
This chapter serves three purposes: it introduces the conceptual tools I use to build my 
argument; it defines more clearly what I am calling a calculative evolution, including a sketch of 
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its historical contours; and it details my research methods. The review of theory and methods are 
straightforward. The historical portion may be unorthodox. It focuses mostly on secondary 
sources, but also integrates primary evidence. This historical review is important for 
demonstrating the interconnected dynamics of advertising’s evolution, and for establishing a 
broad context to frame the more detailed historical chapters that follow.   
Situating Affordances 
Imagination, anxiety, hope, and hype have been conspicuous elements in shaping technologies.1 
Historians have confirmed as much in the development of broadcasting, cable, and the internet.2 
Analyzing advanced advertising through the lens of affordances, imaginaries, and ambitions is 
consistent with these approaches to historicizing media. Advanced advertising warrants analysis 
not only because it looms large in discussions about the state of media today, but also because it 
has been an aspirational concept, representing a concentrated expression of the organizing logic 
underlying commercial media. It is defined by perceptions of the technological and commercial 
potentials for a networked digital media environment.  
                                                          
1 Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological 
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Science 40, no. 4 (August 2010): 525-548; David Beer, “Envisioning the Power of Data Analytics,” 
Information, Communication & Society 21, no. 3 (2018): 465-479. 
2 Susan Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
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Digital Media in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Patrick R. Parsons, Blue 
Skies: A History of Cable Television (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2008); Thomas Streeter, 
“The Cable Fable Revisited: Discourse, Policy, and the Making of Cable Television,” Critical Studies in 
Mass Communication 4, no. 2 (June 1987): 174-200; Thomas Streeter, “The Internet as a Structure of 
Feeling: 1992-1996,” Internet Histories 1, nos. 1-2 (2017): 79-89; Robin Mansell, Imagining the Internet: 
Communication, Innovation, and Governance (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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The concept of affordances was part of an “ecological approach” to psychology proposed 
by James Gibson, who defined affordances as the possibilities an environment seems to offer an 
actor, “what it provides or furnishes either for good or ill.”3 Gibson suggested that when actors 
perceive resources, they began by recognizing opportunities for action. Not to be confused with 
the intrinsic materiality, or material agency, of a technology, affordances exist in a relation 
between that materiality and the human agencies that interpret the possibilities it enables or 
delimits. Paul Leonardi conveys this relational view succinctly: 
Technologies have material properties, but those material properties afford different 
possibilities for action based on the contexts in which they are used…Affordances are 
unique to the particular ways in which an actor perceives materiality…Because people 
come to materiality with diverse goals, they perceive a technology as affording distinct 
possibilities for action…[A]ffordances arise when a person interprets a technology 
through his or her goals for action.4 
 
Defined this way, the notion of affordances provides a useful tool for analyzing how situated 
actors perceive and construct the significance of new information technologies through their 
needs, priorities, and ambitions. Recently scholars have even referred to “imagined affordances,” 
emphasizing the often forward-looking and hopeful orientation for identifying or designing a 
technology’s potential.5 I want also to move from an individualistic orientation, and instead 
situate technology within social and political-economic relations. As Shoshana Zuboff writes, 
“The logic of [capital] accumulation organizes perceptions and shapes the expression of 
technological affordances at their roots…Technologies are constituted by unique affordances, but 
                                                          
3 James J. Gibson, “The Theory of Affordances,” in The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception 
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1979), 127. For more recent work on affordances, see Ian 
Hutchby, “Technologies, Texts and Affordances,” Sociology 35, no. 2 (May 2001): 441-456; Paul M. 
Leonardi, “Theoretical Foundations for the Study of Sociomateriality,” Information and Organization 23, 
no. 1 (April 2013): 59-76; Peter Nagy and Gina Neff, “Imagined Affordance: Reconstructing a Keyword 
for Communication Theory,” Social Media + Society (July-December 2015): 1-9; Adrien Shaw, “Encoding 
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4 Paul M. Leonardi, “When Flexible Routines Meet Flexible Technologies: Affordance, Constraint, and the 
Imbrication of Human and Material Agencies,” MIS Quarterly 35, no. 1 (March 2011), 153. 
5 Nagy and Neff, “Imagined Affordance.” 
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the development and expression of those affordances are shaped by the institutional logics in 
which technologies are designed, implemented, and used.”6  
Consistent with these ideas, I interpret the historical evidence I collected using tools from 
the social shaping/construction of technology (SST/SCOT). This is a field of historical sociology 
that demonstrates, among other things, how the meanings and uses made of almost any 
technology are negotiated in processes of “heterogenous engineering,” involving not just 
technical matters, but also styles of management, cultural and economic visions, normative 
assumptions or prescriptions, and political battles.7 This perspective helps reinforce that 
affordances do not just reflect material properties of a technology, and certainly they are not 
neutral and value-free. Affordances emerge from how actors perceive the world, both as it is and 
as it could be; and new technologies can become physical and discursive resources for building 
(or denying) the possible futures actors envision.8  
I want to emphasize further—as adherents to SST/SCOT do sometimes, but not always—
that the entanglement of social and technological matters presses in both directions. 
Technological systems, as Thomas Hughes puts it, are “socially constructed and society 
shaping.”9 I observe a process of change that unfolds in these two parts, involving the social 
construction of technologies and affordances, and the reciprocal shaping of social worlds. At 
                                                          
6 Shoshana Zuboff, “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization,” 
Journal of Information Technology 30, no. 1 (March 2015), 77, 85.  
7 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, “Introductory Essay: The Social Shaping of Technology,” in The 
Social Shaping of Technology, 2nd edition, eds. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Buckingham, UK: 
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Search Engines,” Information, Communication & Society 15, no. 5 (June 2012):769-787. 
8 For an insightful example that resonates with my own study, see Caitlin Zaloom, “Markets and Machines: 
Work in the Technological Sensoryscapes of Finance,” American Quarterly 58, no. 3 (September 2006): 
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9 Thomas P. Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,” in The Social Construction of 
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times, then, I will find it useful to refer to a political economy of technology, to indicate that 
technological developments are both imprinted by and imprinted upon institutional relations of 
power. In my historical research I find actors designing or appropriating technological capacities 
within existing ways of seeing the world, and then reimagining what is possible, and 
reformulating goals and strategies, in relation to those new resources and any organizations and 
practices built or adjusted around them. When actors reimagined possibilities for action, in the 
cases I studied, this was often expressed as the perception of an opportunity to advance toward 
aspirations that already existed, to some extent, within the institutional logic of ad-supported 
media. In other words, advertising and media industries accommodated new technologies to 
existing priorities and ambitions, and they also accommodated their priorities to the potentials 
attributed to new technologies. Programmability, addressability, shoppability, and accountability 
were all constructed as technological and commercial possibilities that both reflected and 
reshaped strategic dynamics involved in selling the American people.  
These four affordances are the defining features of digital and online advertising. But as 
much as this research is about cutting-edge developments, it is more focused on how those edges 
were sharpened over time. In his study of the managerial revolution in American capitalism, 
Alfred Chandler writes, “Most histories have to begin before the beginning. This is particularly 
true for one that focuses on institutional innovation.”10 At the start of a long discussion about the 
topic at issue here, Paul Woidke told me similarly, “To try to understand advanced advertising 
without understanding television from the 1950s and the 1960s is sort of a fool’s mission, because 
the background is very important to what happened and how cable developed.”11 This study is 
organized, therefore, as a sort of archaeology of these affordances, examining how certain 
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(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1977), 13. 
11 Interview with Paul Woidke, February 9, 2018. 
36 
 
 
possibilities were “recognized” and attached to new information technologies and business 
processes long before they came to anchor internet-based advertising and marketing.  
While data-driven or algorithmic ideologies and practices are abundantly evident today, 
how we arrived at this state of affairs it is not understood as well as it could be. In explaining the 
authority of quantitative reasoning in modern society, Theodore Porter demonstrates that this 
“trust in numbers” developed through historical processes, involving not just technologies, 
techniques, and theories, but also the social and cultural architecture within which numbers have 
been made stable, legible, and useful for planning and action.12 The calculative evolution by 
which advertising and marketing have been reconfigured into what we recognize today is both a 
result of and a vessel for the increasing centrality of data and quantification in economic and 
social life. As a logic of calculation has expanded in and through our media systems and personal 
technologies, more of ordinary experience has been subjected to bureaucratic, statistical, and 
engineering ways of seeing, valuing, and managing resources. Advertising was hardly alone in 
this process, and it built upon earlier developments.13 But this study shows how the 
commodification of audiences, and related designs to know, predict, and influence consumer 
behavior, contributed to this shift, beginning well before the rise of the internet. Efforts to 
commodify audience attention have helped to shape new media just as much as those efforts have 
been shaped by new media. 
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Commodifying Attention 
Few people anymore are surprised to hear that “if you don’t pay for the product, you are the 
product.” But seldom is it specified how the sausage it made. I will argue that, in fact, these 
details provide an opportunity to analyze a set of developments that connects the production of 
audiences and consumers to broader transitions in the culture and political economy of capitalism. 
This study helps us specify the relationships and processes comprising the widely discussed 
“marketplace,” “industry,” or “economy” of attention.  
Attention is described as a “newly important scarce resource” that sits at the center of 
value-creation today, especially, but not exclusively, in media and technology sectors.14 As Tim 
Wu suggests in The Attention Merchants, “the game of harvesting human attention and reselling 
it to advertisers has become a major part of our economy.”15 There can be no doubt that human 
attention is among the most valuable resources in existence, and industries that traffic in attention 
occupy privileged positions in the global economy. But attention does not exist naturally as 
saleable property.16 To have value in exchange it must be made into a tangible, discrete 
commodity. At a sociological level, media intervene crucially in allocations of human time, 
attention, and energy; in industrial terms, media systems deal in commodified information 
designed to represent those things—evidence of audience attention. This distinction might seem 
small, but it is important to understand that what is sold here is not a pure natural resource that 
exists independently of the platforms, devices, or media that attract our attention and the 
processes for “harvesting” and formatting that attention as something that can be priced and sold 
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in routine transactions. Evidence of attention is engineered, and it is shaped by the sociotechnical 
arrangements for generating, packaging, and exchanging it as an informational commodity.  
A well-worn adage, often attributed to Peter Drucker, says, “You can’t manage what you 
can’t measure.”17 If attention is indeed a critical resource, then the technologies and organizations 
we encounter throughout this story not only manage this resource but help render it 
manageable—making it visible, countable, and controllable. This suggests that we can regard 
issues of audience commodification within the very long history of information technology in the 
administration of economics, politics, and culture.18 Dwayne Winseck recently warned political 
economists against leaning too heavily on ideas about the audience commodity because of 
financial declines in many “free” ad-supported media, like newspapers.19 By demonstrating that 
audience commodification is fundamentally about the institutions and infrastructures supporting 
systematic efforts to 1) generate and circulate data about media users and 2) observe, analyze, and 
influence consumer behavior, I show that this perspective is actually crucial for understanding 
both historical and contemporary developments. From this point of departure, we can begin to see 
that not only is the audience commodity still a useful heuristic for thinking about the digital 
media environment, but it also provides a way toward profound questions and insights regarding 
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information and technology in society, and, particularly, a shift toward a more data-driven form 
of capitalism.20  
Introducing a Calculative Evolution 
The “creative revolution” in advertising describes a shift whereby new idioms, iconographies, and 
tropes of hip consumerism reshaped the profession and cultural resonance of advertising in 
America, turning away from administrative and scientific values that had prevailed up to the 
1960s.21 Without denying this development and its significance, I argue that it needs to be 
understood against a concurrent development I am calling a “calculative evolution” in advertising 
and marketing. As Turow points out, “lavishing attention on what trade parlance calls the 
‘creative’ side of the business leaves out essential aspects of advertising’s social role.”22 By 
approaching advertising not as the production of commercial messages and campaigns, but 
instead as a set of relationships that integrates advertisers, agencies, media companies, and market 
researchers around efforts to accelerate and track the circulation of commodities, we see this 
history in a different light. Not only do administration and science—and the attendant values of 
efficiency, control, and predictability—not receded in stature, but they become more integral to 
the marketing complex in a political economy pervaded increasingly by information, knowledge, 
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and communication.23 Just by recognizing the media planning and buying functions, and their 
reorganization around new means of processing and circulating data since the 1950s, we are 
forced to reach different conclusions than the received history offers about the balance between 
creative and calculative forces. 
I am not suggesting that the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a uniform 
progression toward more rational economic action. But I am convinced that a bundle of 
interrelated developments has mutually shaped and been shaped by the role of information and 
communication technologies throughout the sales effort in capitalism. While the full realities are 
messier than a single term can capture, the notion of a calculative evolution, I argue, provides a 
useful tool for making sense of these developments and situating today’s algorithmic and big-
data-driven configurations within a longer historical arc. 
Before providing a sketch of key historical benchmarks, I want to introduce some 
defining features of this transformation as I understand it. Three general and constitutive 
dynamics stand out. By no means have these dynamics won universal supremacy, nor has 
creativity been eclipsed in full; but they have been powerful vectors across a range of settings. 
First, the calculative evolution involves pressure to eradicate the incalculable. This is a form of 
rationalization and datafication aimed at reducing, to the extent possible, all relevant variables to 
standardized and usually quantitative data that can be calculated to yield predictions, risks, or 
probabilities, expressed with some degree of mathematical confidence. The tendency here is 
toward eliminating subjective human involvement that could introduce friction or uncertainty into 
commercial activity. Eradicating the incalculable is part of broader social processes by which 
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institutions make resources legible for purposes of control, and statistical reasoning has become a 
trusted and powerful form of administrative judgment.24  
Importantly, and on the other side of the coin, eradicating the incalculable has not only 
meant discounting parts of reality that escape quantification. It also has involved efforts to expand 
capacities for rendering the world as quantifiable data, such that less and less of reality exists 
beyond the scope of measurement, accounting, and calculation. “By enhancing the inventory of 
relations and events to be taken into account,” Michel Callon posits, “marketing tools promote 
calculations which constantly involve more and more elements and relations.”25 The 
reconstruction of media and marketing environments around surveillance, and the complementary 
project of building organizational and analytical capacities to make the collected data useful, is 
perhaps the most prominent expression of this dynamic.  
The second and complementary pressure is toward using information technology to 
identify and exploit profit opportunities that were too fine to apprehend or too fleeting to pursue 
using only human faculties and analog means for processing informational and commercial flows. 
Consumer segmentation, just-in-time production, and high-speed commodities trading are related 
and largely co-extensive developments in the domains of marketing, supply-chain management, 
and finance. This is not only a matter of crunching numbers and plumbing databases more 
quickly and thoroughly than before. It also involves breaking apart relationships and practices 
that seem to harbor inefficiencies or irrationalities. In other words, it is an orientation for 
recognizing value and opportunity, even if they fall outside of traditional productive processes for 
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a firm or industry. The delegation of decision-making to machines and algorithms is conspicuous 
in both the first two facets of the calculative evolution.26 
The third dynamic—most specific to audience manufacture—is the effort to verify and 
maximize returns on advertising investment, using techniques that combine surveillance, 
predictive modeling and analytics, and behavioral science. John Wanamaker is typically credited 
with expressing the concern that an unidentifiable portion of advertising expenditure is wasted, 
producing no discernable profit. In a nutshell, the calculative evolution of advertising has been a 
gradual, but still-incomplete project of using information technology to set Wanamaker’s mind at 
ease.  
An Historical Context for Advertising’s Calculative Evolution 
A variety of interrelated forces and conditions both stimulated and responded to this 
transformation in advertising and commercial media. I aim to situate this shift—commonly 
associated with the internet and big data—within a longer history of technological and social 
change. To draw out the mix of change and continuity that leads me to call this an evolution, I 
will make a partial inventory of key developments. The following functions as a literature review, 
but also as an attempt to stake out the contours of advertising’s calculative evolution, and so it 
includes evidence from primary research that advances my argument. 
Modern advertising emerged in the late nineteenth century in tandem with a reformation 
of the United States’ material culture—that is, the networks and associations through which 
individuals acquired and used the goods, services, and symbolic resources needed for maintaining 
their bodies, identities, and relationships.27 With new energy, transportation, and communications 
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infrastructures mutually shaping a reorganization of production, distribution, and consumption, 
more and more people used wages to buy branded commodities that were manufactured for and 
circulated in nationally integrated markets. Efforts to align purchasing habits with the volume and 
velocity of this expanding industrial system contributed to what Nick Dyer-Witheford calls “a 
massive project of social engineering—the creation of a consumer society.”28 This project both 
required and generated information, communication capabilities, and new commercial 
institutions.29 
Mass retailers came to handle a growing portion of the consumer trade in the cities at the 
forefront of a “new American culture.”30 Among other implications, the problem of establishing 
trust in relatively impersonal transactions between large merchants and mobile customers buying 
on credit catalyzed the expansion of a system for commercial surveillance. Personal credit 
facilitated the rise of consumer capitalism and at the same time enrolled millions of Americans 
into relationships with institutions and systems for identifying individuals and monitoring their 
purchasing habits.31 Historian Josh Lauer shows that “the systematic recordkeeping necessitated 
by mass credit” had already by the early decades of the twentieth century “produced vast 
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reservoirs of valuable information,” which retailers used to analyze buying behaviors and 
personalize solicitations to customers.32 
Credit was just one of many avenues by which scientific management techniques 
designed to discipline production processes were gradually incorporated into tactics for 
rationalizing consumption. Methods and organizations for surveying consumers, analyzing 
product choice and usage, and processing customers through retail spaces emerged as part of 
diverse efforts to make purchasing-behaviors, and markets in general, more knowable, 
predictable, and controllable.33 Personal information generated through commercial activities 
became both a valuable commodity and an input for managing the production and marketing of 
other commodities.34  
Brands and retailers enlisted mass media to promote their businesses and to instruct the 
public about consumption habits. Constructing media systems around commercial sponsorship 
generated demand for information about how people encountered advertisers’ messages and how 
exposure to those messages correlated with shopping, voting, or other activities.35 Pressure to 
create evidence of audience attention deepened with broadcasting, as reception of radiated 
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frequencies was even harder to estimate reliably than circulations of print media. Television’s 
production costs and its institutionally engineered economics of scarcity further fueled demand 
for data to justify advertisers’ enormous expenditures and the rents extracted by networks.36 As an 
executive from the Ted Bates agency reflected, “Television produced an explosion of information 
which has required a whole new breed of media men. It generated new universes of research, and 
each medium produced a blizzard of research to counter the deadly thrust.”37  
From the outset, then, audience manufacture and efforts to systematically manage 
consumption have together been generative of strategies and instruments for observing, 
analyzing, predicting, and hopefully influencing the behaviors of individuals and publics. 
Referring to an “information industry” that grew concurrently with the commercialization of 
broadcasting, one historian of audience research writes, “The single largest category of data 
provided by the information industry was research on the marketing of products, including the 
use of the various advertising media to accelerate sales.”38 That firms such as CBS, Curtis 
Publishing, and the A.C. Nielsen company attempted to audit households’ pantries to help 
advertisers draw inferences about how their expenditures contributed to sales gives some 
indication of the extent to which market researchers were penetrating the domestic sphere already 
in the first half of the twentieth century.39 (And the failures to maintain and replicate these sorts 
of services at a viable cost indicates the technical and administrative difficulty of apprehending 
and taming such complex phenomena.)  
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The middle of the twentieth century witnessed an intensification of the twin tendencies to 
integrate marketing across all industrial activities and to marshal more scientific tools and 
techniques in marketing. Producing consumers and effective demand has always been intimately 
tied to the development of mass media. “The chief historical basis for advertising,” Dan Schiller 
writes, “is the pan-corporate need to harness consumption to production.”40 The potential problem 
of excess productive capacity had been seized upon, even before the end of World War II, to 
argue for the rapid development of television as a marketing technology. An RCA executive told 
an audience of advertisers in 1944, “We believe that television is the only tool that can increase 
consumer purchasing of all products to a point that is sufficient to produce a satisfactory national 
income…Television has the power to create in the minds of the people a greater desire for 
merchandise than they have for their hoarded cash.”41 Five years later, Stanley B. Resor, the 
president of J. Walter Thompson, warned similarly, “The achievements of American mass 
production would fail of their own weight without the mass marketing machinery which 
advertising supplies.”42  
As the post-war recovery in the U.S. reactivated industrial capacity for civilian 
production, a huge volume of goods needed to find buyers. America’s material culture was being 
remade again through developments in suburban planning, shopping malls, plastics, domestic 
appliances, and new expectations about style and disposability.43 Over the course of the 1950s, 
advertisers sought to promote habits and expand markets that would absorb industrial outputs and 
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sustain economic growth.44 U.S. advertising spending increased from $2.875 billion in 1945 to 
$9.194 billion in 1955, and it reached $15.255 billion a decade later.45 This period oversaw the 
emergence of what John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney call a “qualitatively new phase 
of consumer capitalism,” organized around the tripartite relationship among advertisers, agencies, 
and media companies, as well as a broader field of “corporate marketing” that encompassed the 
researching and engineering of consumer behavior, product designs, and sales strategies.46 
Beyond just brokering the procurement of media space or time and crafting sales messages to fill 
it, the advertising industry began to embrace a fuller “marketing concept” that positioned 
agencies as stewards of a client’s business and of the U.S. economy in general. AT&T’s vice 
president for public relations attached an ideological valence to the sales effort, insisting that 
“marketing…must constantly demonstrate to the nation and the world at large that it plays a vital 
role in our free society and, indeed, that a free market is one of the principal elements of that 
society.”47 Utilizing corporate marketing and ad-supported media as “means of surplus 
absorption,” the sales effort was a leading force driving new types of surveillance and control, 
gradually adding “impetus…to the communications revolution, associated with the development 
of computers, digital technology, and the Internet.”48 
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The growing use of computers helped advertisers seek advantages by discerning and 
capitalizing upon finer distinctions among consumer populations. Soon after its articulation in the 
mid-1950s, the principle of market segmentation became orthodoxy in American consumer 
capitalism.49 Both stimulating mass consumption and sorting consumers into increasingly detailed 
categories created demand for the services provided by advertising agencies. “By embracing 
segmented markets,” Lizabeth Cohen writes, “advertisers and market researchers made 
themselves even more indispensable, as manufacturers and retailers required more sophisticated 
guidance to sell to a splintered purchasing public than to an undifferentiated one.”50 More precise 
and calculating approaches to defining and soliciting consumers advanced reciprocally with 
intricate means of data analysis, including statistical techniques for variable clustering and factor 
analysis that still power database marketing today.51 According to Foster and McChesney, 
“Marketing evolved quickly in its period of greatest advance in the 1950s into a highly organized 
system of customer surveillance, targeting propaganda, and psychological manipulation of 
populations.”52 By the early 1960s, Leo Bogart could call social science research “an accepted 
and integral part of the American marketing system.” As proof, he pointed out that, “Vast sums 
are expended to study the attitudes, preferences, and choices of consumers, and these studies have 
become increasingly relied upon by business managements in their decision making.”53 
The advertising enterprise was also adapting to new opportunities and challenges in 
media industries. With the transition in television toward participating sponsorship, in which 
advertisers paid for slots in a schedule of programming produced under control of the networks, 
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advertisers needed to dedicate more resources to selecting and procuring inventory from an 
expanded range of options and pricing possibilities. The supply side also needed to cultivate 
abilities to manage and sell inventory effectively. With TV’s shift to the spot format, Adam 
Arvidsson notes, “the medium generated an increasing pressure for audience segmentation, and 
hence more detailed research.”54 It is common today to hear laments about fragmentation as a 
recent blight; but media buyers were keenly aware by the mid-1960s that mass audiences were 
being divided, or “fractionalized,” and they expected television programming would become 
more customized.55 If we start from the perspective of audience manufacture, we recognize 
ongoing trends as intensifications of much longer processes whereby media buying and selling 
had to accommodate the complexities that resulted from not just an expanding menu of stations 
and channels but also an institutional restructuring of how the inventory within each venue would 
be packaged and exchanged. 
Media planning and buying functions were significantly elevated in importance and 
sophistication across the second half of the twentieth century.56 As audiences redistributed 
themselves across new media options, marketers could no longer assume that indiscriminate TV 
spending would guarantee to put their messages in front of a satisfactory portion of potential 
consumers. Allocating a media budget became a much more calculating endeavor. Already by 
1959 an agency research director recognized that advertising was responding to rising complexity 
and the high cost of TV by cultivating more specialized skills and building capacities for “better 
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thinking and more analytic judgement.” Agencies were also contending with “an avalanche of 
new research techniques,” such as motivational research and operations research.57     
Half a century before such promises were repackaged as “Big Data,” replacing subjective 
hunches with data-driven probabilities was the purview of operations research, a field of 
mathematical and engineering sciences that migrated from military applications into the corporate 
world in the 1950s. Quantitative information became a key resource for “optimizing” operations 
within and across complex organizations. Media planning and buying seemed like favorable 
applications for algorithmic techniques, such as linear programming mathematics, designed to 
guide decision-makers in choosing among a vast array of options.58 As we will see in the next 
chapter, the investments in electronic computers and innovative communications facilities 
complemented these developments. Dedicated computer installations made it economically 
feasible for media and market researchers to use methods of statistical inference that exceeded 
what human computers could calculate with adequate speed and accuracy. A media executive at 
the Young & Rubicam agency boasted in 1964 that its computer “enables us to thoroughly 
analyze infinitely more information than was ever possible before and to manipulate it 
speedily.”59 The use of computers not only expanded and accelerated information flows, but it 
also let advertisers see customers and markets in new ways. For example, a member of the 
research department at J. Walter Thompson explained that leasing an RCA 301 computer system 
would allow the agency to use “powerful methods of analyzing research findings,” such as 
multivariate regression and factor analysis.60 To repurpose James Carey’s statement about the 
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telegraph, the computer “was not only a new tool of commerce but also a thing to think with, an 
agency for the alteration of ideas.”61  
Ways of thinking about information in society changed dramatically in this period—
perhaps both responding to and encouraging ongoing developments. Theorists of an Information 
Economy or Post-Industrial Society recognized information and communications as the bases of a 
wholesale transformation of social and economic life.62 Mirrored closely by recent 
characterizations of data as the “new oil” powering the global economy, prominent intellectuals 
such as Daniel Bell argued that information was becoming the primary source of value in 
technologically-advanced capitalist economies.63 In a recent examination of how the prevailing 
“imaginary” of an information society has shaped conditions of possibility for constructing digital 
worlds, Robin Mansell explains that this influential mindset was committed to “particular norms 
and values about how the world is, or should be, organized.” She continues, 
These norms and values are seen as consistent with the supposed benefits of 
technological progress, the primacy of market exchange as the optimal way to solve the 
problems of resource allocation, and the perception that it is only a matter of time before 
everyone benefits from the evolution of the communication system…Visions of the 
ubiquity of these technological solutions are emblematic of their proponents’ hopes for an 
information society built upon a technologically-supported, rational, and calculable life.64 
 
The notion that the U.S. economy and workforce would be driven by knowledge work fit 
neatly with a further integration of advertising and marketing functions into the center of 
production processes, from designing products, packages, and sales plans, to furnishing the 
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symbolic or cultural content of commodities—what has come to be called “immaterial labor.”65 
The commodification of information and knowledge, and the mobilizing of these as factors in 
production and planning, further altered the nature of services provided by ad agencies, 
management consultancies, and other stewards of consumer capitalism.  
With the networking of the global political economy, advertisers, agencies, and media 
organizations enjoyed (and struggled to manage) an expanding array of information resources. 
Along with more granular and accessible census data, the assignment of zip codes in the 1960s 
facilitated efforts to sort consumers into geo-demographic clusters, most famously in Claritas 
Corporation’s “lifestyle segments.”66 Computerized systems for tracking warehouse withdrawals, 
recording retail sales, and controlling inventories made information about the circulation of 
commodities easier to generate, store, and transmit. Manufacturers and merchants reorganized 
packaging, sales processing, and supply-chain management around universal product codes and 
optical barcode scanning in the 1970s.67 Expansion of bank-issued credit cards and loyalty 
rewards programs lubricated consumer spending while also extending the infrastructures for 
monitoring, profiling, and evaluating consumers.68 As noted above, a system of payments that 
hinged on the credibility of a purchaser forged a tight informational link among shopping, 
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identity, and classification. “Without this infrastructure,” Lauer argues, “the modern credit 
economy and today’s digital commerce would be inconceivable.”69 
Together these constituted enormous and (sometimes loosely) coordinated efforts to track 
products and people. Such developments depended on and stimulated demand for computing, 
communications, and database resources. Procter & Gamble’s manager of information services, 
who oversaw a massive market research department, appreciated the opportunities available in 
the mid-1980s: “Over the past five years, new ways of reading consumer behavior have emerged, 
and most are electronic; that will continue. That provides people who study consumer behavior an 
immense, rich new database.”70 Reflecting critically almost a decade later, Oscar Gandy 
characterized these electronic means of monitoring people and triaging them into categories of 
differential value as technologies of social control. They increased “the ability of organized 
interests, whether they are selling shoes, toothpaste, or political platforms, to identify, isolate, and 
communicate differently with individuals in order to increase their influence over how consumers 
make selections among these options.”71  
The initiative undertaken in the 1950s to divide the mass market into lifestyle and 
psychographic segments had, by the 1980s, been reiterated as an effort by marketers to identify 
and carefully manage relationships with their most lucrative customers. As an elaboration of 
systematic “customer control” efforts dating back to the 1930s, so-called “customer relationship 
management” relied on databases to record, to the extent possible, every interaction with 
identifiable individuals and to make quick, programmatic decisions about how to engage them 
with different marketing communications and quality of service, depending on knowledge of their 
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habits and their projected value to the firm.72 With interactive media and new forms of self-
service contributing to an increase in the measurable—and mutable—touchpoints between 
companies and individuals, a “one-to-one” communication environment became a holy grail to 
which marketers aspired.73 While this objective has been achieved unevenly, marketers have 
continued to invest in the capacity to ruthlessly distinguish a valuable “target” customer from one 
representing a “waste” of company resources.74 Endorsing the imperative to build holistic profiles 
of existing and potential customers, a textbook co-authored by an editor of the Journal of 
Advertising Research declared it axiomatic for advertising executives that “insight about 
consumers is the currency that trumps all others.”75 Today, with the near-ubiquity of computer-
based sensors in our personal devices and throughout the public and private spaces we inhabit, 
opportunities to collect information about individuals and populations, and to use that information 
to try to influence behaviors, continually surpass existing precedents.76 
An overarching ambition here, especially in relation to the affordances of flexible digital 
environments, is “dynamic” control of marketplaces. Systems running algorithms against 
databases of information about past and probable behaviors can automatically and almost 
instantaneously calculate the “optimal” product offer, message strategy, and even price to be 
shown to an individual or type of consumer. The theory, for proponents, is that dynamically 
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altering commercial venues based on information about consumers can both augment markets’ 
allocative function—of matching supply to demand—and maximize efficiencies, by pricing items 
exactly according to each buyer’s willingness to pay. While this rationale may accurately describe 
many use cases, frequent revelations of discriminatory pricing that disadvantage individuals for 
unexpected reasons or, worse, that reinforce stratification across different social groups, raise 
questions about whose interests are “optimized” by a dynamic, calculative marketing 
environment.77 Electronic computers and, now, mobile media have been enlisted within the 
marketing complex to refine and accelerate these already cybernetic dimensions of capitalism, a 
system driven by commodification and accumulation, rather than equality.78 
In parallel with the electronic networking of marketplaces, major changes internal to the 
advertising industry weighed in on the balance between creativity and calculation. In 1960, 
Marion Harper Jr., the head of McCann-Erickson, formed the Interpublic Group of Companies 
(IPG), integrating multiple marketing services within a single conglomerate. According to Leo 
Bogart, Harper was the first advertising executive to posit “accountability” as a core value.79 “The 
whole idea of accountability is the wave of the future—even a wave of the present,” Harper said 
in 1962.80 Harper proposed to link agency compensation to sales outcomes—an arrangement 
which would be enabled, in his view, by the increased availability and quality of information 
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about media use and shopping behaviors.81 It is crucial to note that this arrangement implies a 
deepening entanglement of advertising services with the overall operations of client firms and the 
broader sales effort. Harper was a key figure in institutionalizing marketing communications and 
thus broadening the purview of “advertising” beyond paid placement of commercial messages, 
toward comprehensive services for managing the circulation of commodities. IPG deliberately 
fastened its “integrated marketing communications” philosophy to what it saw as an “information 
revolution.”82  
The economic downturn begun in the 1970s intensified the demand for accountability. 
“After the creative revolution of the 1960s,” Advertising Age points out, “the pendulum swung 
back to more serious, hard-sell advertising. Advertisers wanted efficient, effective, empirical 
campaigns, based on computer-generated research.”83 Furthermore, by the end of the 1960s a 
handful of advertising agencies had become publicly traded companies, responsible to 
shareholders.84 Later, in 1978, IPG merged McCann-Erickson with a London-based agency, 
inaugurating in full the reorganization of advertising agencies within diversified, global holding 
companies.85 The trend of consolidating advertising, public relations, and market research firms 
within massive, transnational networks continued throughout the following decades, and the 
growth of these enterprises proceeded along with demand and supply in ICTs. In its 1986 Annual 
Report, Saatchi & Saatchi, a major agency driving this process, gloated about how consolidation 
afforded “superior media-buying clout and better media-buying systems,” as well as greater 
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appropriations for research. More generally, the report claimed, “Power of scale in 
advertising…means improved global information systems, increased technological resources and 
increased access to a broad range of communications and consulting experience.”86  
Consolidation helped to further cement calculation and accountability as central corporate 
values, prioritized above creative brand-building. The financial engineer at Saatchi & Saatchi, 
Martin Sorrell, later went on to form WPP into the largest of the marketing holding companies. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, WPP, as much as any of its ilk, fostered and capitalized on the 
growth of so-called “below-the-line” agencies that concentrated on direct marketing and sales 
promotion. The specialized skills honed by these firms were well-suited to ongoing changes in 
commerce and technology. These agencies were proficient in accounting, and the results of their 
efforts, such as direct-mail campaigns, were far easier to reckon than were broadcast 
expenditures. Importantly, “the below-the-line agencies were inevitably wedded to consumer and 
customer data, and technological and social developments were going to assure that data became 
more plentiful and powerful.”87  
Sorrell stands out as an icon of a general emphasis on financial management that helped 
remake the ad industry along a shareholder-value perspective. The restructuring of agencies since 
the 1960s has meant tight accounting protocols and pressure to meet profit targets. As 
management consultants and corporate procurement bureaus gained more influence in American 
business over the next decades, data resources became increasingly important tools in the hunt for 
cost savings. And as mergers and acquisitions reshaped the advertising landscape, the need to 
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“service large debts” left agencies and their parent companies seeking “the most efficient ways to 
execute the process of media analysis and placement.”88  
These shifts spurred efforts to refine the media buying function—first to isolate it as a 
specialized function, independent of creative planning and execution, and then to turn it from a 
cost into a profit center by exacting efficiencies in procuring audiences.89 Well before Web 
advertising and “programmatic” (i.e., automated and data-driven) means for buying individual 
viewer impressions, we can see an impulse toward decoupling content from advertising 
opportunities. At a 1982 meeting of the American Association of Advertising Agencies (4A’s), an 
analyst from Drexel, Burhnam & Lambert, an investment bank (and criminal organization) that 
helped corporate raiders seize companies and wring out every drop of profit, advised agencies to 
ignore the quality of TV programs and focus instead on buying cost-efficient audiences, since 
“the weakest network may provide a more advantageous cost-per-thousand.”90 Distilling the spirit 
of this trajectory, an executive from Time Warner’s Turner division said recently, “Agencies, by 
their nature, were set up for the last 40 or 50 years to buy like machines.”91  
Both the restructuring of the global ad industry and the consequent shifts in media buying 
can be seen as part of a broader trend toward “financialization,” whereby the engineering of 
profitable investment opportunities and the mediation of economic activity by transaction brokers 
have become major elements in the political economy of capitalism.92 A recent observer, and a 
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defender of creativity in advertising, situates Martin Sorrell’s contribution within this wider trend 
toward calculation:  
Largely following his inspiration, Madison Avenue has failed to achieve anything like a 
proper balance between fiscal strength and responsibility and creative brilliance, coming 
down firmly on the side of the former. The latter has invariably been the whipping boy 
with advertising holding companies increasingly coming to resemble the very 
corporations they serve. The digital era has further emboldened all to gravitate toward the 
enumerable as opposed to the inspirational.93 
 
The “enumerable” is, indeed, the pole of gravity in advertising. Companies designing and 
furnishing what Matthew Crain calls “infrastructure services” for digital advertising seem intent 
on building a machinic assemblage to approach an ideal or optimized marketplace: a transactional 
architecture for supporting frictionless flows and rapid—almost instantaneous—calculative 
action. Contrasting the quantitative “ad business” of today’s “math men” with the creative and 
brand-focused “ad industry” of yesterday’s “mad men,” one author and strategist explains, “The 
ad business is obsessed with data science, and distrusts the messy stuff of story, image and 
idea…[I]t seeks to identify the precise moment that a consumer needs something so that it can 
trigger a sale.” Data-driven, automated media buying, he posits, has become the means by which 
“every scintilla of attention is transformed into money.”94  
Anthropologist Caitlin Zaloom identifies a similar dynamic in her study of how the 
practices and materials structuring electronic futures trading have been designed to manifest 
economic principles of efficiency and rationality.95 Her work presents interesting parallels to 
mine, as both projects examine changes in the technologies for coordinating, processing, and 
representing a market for informational and future-based commodities. In fact, an article in the 
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Harvard Business Review describes the emergence of programmatic advertising as “a change akin 
to what happened in the capital markets, as trading shifted from open-outcry exchanges to trading 
on fully automated exchanges.”96 As with finance and futures trading, the goal of algorithmic 
media buying is not new: to use computing power and data resources to identify and exploit profit 
opportunities that are inaccessible to, or obscured by, human beings and their subjective, social 
entanglements. The calculative evolution is, in large part, about eradicating the incalculable. 
The point I wish to make is that the development of infrastructure services to build 
markets and coordinate exchange, as well as the appropriation of technologies to realize 
efficiencies throughout these transactions, have been persistent and structuring dynamics in 
audience manufacture. Advertising service providers, responding to marketers’ demands, have 
leveraged certain affordances of the internet’s data communication protocols to construct a 
business model built around pervasive consumer surveillance and precise behavioral targeting.97 
What I assert in this dissertation is that, in many ways, these innovations were shaped by 
pressures, values, demands, and ambitions that have been manifested in selling the American 
people at least throughout the second half of the twentieth century, and in some ways since the 
late-1800s. As Inger Stole suggests, “The surreptitious collection of data on consumers to make it 
possible to better manipulate them is not a product of the internet; it is deeply embedded in the 
very nature of modern advertising.”98 The architects of online advertising are only the latest 
contributors to the evolution of these technical and administrative infrastructures for generating, 
processing, and coordinating flows of information and commerce. The computerization of the ad 
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industry has been a messy, uneven, but persistent effort to help John Wanamaker sleep soundly at 
night. 
I want to be clear that efforts to subject advertising, marketing, and consumer behavior to 
calculation and control have not been all-encompassing or uniformly successful. Many ventures 
have perished along this path, and it is not at all certain that the survivors reliably deliver what 
they promise. Despite promotional rhetoric, eradicating the incalculable remains a painfully 
elusive dream. Consider, for instance, that some critics use the pejorative term “program-manual” 
to point out the still-substantial human resources needed to execute programmatic advertising.99 
We should also remember that the disclosures documented throughout this dissertation may be 
selective and strategic, meant to promote a company, sector, or class of service. As the former 
director of media research at DDB Needham told me, in reference to the enthusiastic uptake of 
big-data science in advertising agencies, one consistent force shaping agencies’ services is the 
desire “to look smart for your client” and be unique from competitors.100 This observation adds 
support to Michael Schudson’s claim that advertisers’ embrace of psychology has tended to be 
“ad hoc and opportunistic.”101 Putting it bluntly, one ad sales executive described many 
apparently scientific advertising techniques as “complete bullshit.”102  
But, as I will be at pains to show, these efforts have real consequences. Zaloom explains 
that while the work of designing systems to approximate economic ideals is never complete or 
perfect, “the long-standing and ever-changing project of creating purely economic spaces is not 
merely a fantasy. The drive to improve the conditions of economic action leads to the making and 
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remaking of new technologies, reformed rules, creative calculative practices, and emergent 
classes of professionals who bring the market into being.”103 However dubious and self-serving 
the science may be, the pursuit of calculation—leveraging information technologies—has been a 
consistent and forceful vector in the evolution of the media-marketing complex, especially since 
the mid-twentieth century. Google and Facebook represent the high-water mark of a tide that has 
been rising for decades. The dream of eradicating the incalculable has been a significant force 
shaping media systems in society. 
Research Methods  
This dissertation examines how actors and organizations envisioned, discussed, and 
accommodated developments in information and communication technologies from the 1950s to 
the present. To understand continuity and change in advertising and media industries, I undertook 
three methods of investigation: documentary and textual analysis; ethnographic observation of 
industry events; and interviews with expert witnesses. Across these approaches, I endeavored to 
“listen in” on conversations about and among the actors relevant to the phenomena under 
examination.104  
The documentary/textual analysis revolved primarily around industry trade press 
materials. These sources are useful for charting chronology and accessing otherwise unavailable 
empirical data about industries and organizations.105 As venues for “managed self-disclosures,” 
these publications also provide data about how actors frame matters of concerns, position 
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themselves, and envision opportunities and challenges across time.106 I collected articles first with 
broad searches in key publications and, then, through a snowball protocol, as I discovered 
relevant events and actors. This research focused particularly on Broadcasting/Broadcasting & 
Cable and Advertising Age, the establishment journals in their respective industries, as well as 
more specialized outlets, including Multichannel News, MediaPost, AdExchanger, and Adweek. 
Materials were retrieved from the Entertainment Magazine Archive and other electronically-
accessible databases. Additional documentary materials were consulted during a visit to the Cable 
Center’s Barco Library at the University of Denver, where I accessed, among other things, 
technology vendors’ product brochures and issues of Cable Avails, a magazine dedicated to the 
cable advertising business.  
A second corpus of evidence was collected through participant observation of industry 
conferences. From 2015 to 2017 I attended eight events that assembled programmers, cable and 
satellite operators, technologists, advertisers, media buyers, data service providers, and futurists 
to discuss video advertising. Sherry Ortner labeled this strategy “interface ethnography”—
observing occasions when usually-closed organizations present themselves publicly.107 
Frequently, the discussions at these events are forward-looking, addressing expectations, 
opportunities, and persistent problems to be solved. While much of this forecasting is speculative 
and strategic, it provides evidence of the themes around which industry discourse and attention 
gravitate. The events also provided chances to develop relationships with expert informants.  
The third aspect of my research involved semi-structured interviews with participants in 
the industries under investigation. I conducted 16 interviews, ranging from 30 minutes to more 
than 5 hours (across three sessions), with people who have experience and knowledge of key 
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facets in advanced advertising—media planning, buying, and research, advertising sales, data and 
analytics services, and cable and advertising technology. Appendix A provides a complete list of 
interviewees and observed events.  
All three of these approaches have strengths and limitations. First, it would be a mistake 
to accept as fact all that is presented in trade publications and industry events, which operate, in 
part, as promotional vehicles. However, two advantages of analyzing these discursive sites are: 1) 
these are spaces in which speakers and writers often assume an audience of insiders who share 
purpose and vision; and 2) these publications and events tell stories about how industry actors 
imagine and want to position themselves. Since part of my objective is to capture the industrial 
logics at work in the construction of technological affordances, these documents and materials 
provide vital evidence, even if we should always be careful in how we interpret what any actor 
chooses to disclose. 
The processes involved in the calculative evolution, and in advanced advertising 
specifically, encompass a multitude of actors across industries and sectors. For this study, I 
concentrated on following those actors most centrally involved in audience manufacture. 
Advertisers—that is the producers or distributors of branded goods and services—are a constant 
force throughout the developments detailed herein. The agencies servicing those advertisers’ 
needs, and particularly the bureaus that handle the planning and buying of media time and space, 
are another major constituency, and the central focus of Chapter Two. The supply side of the 
audience marketplace is represented in my study mostly by sales organizations working within or 
on behalf of exhibitors. These actors headline Chapter Three, about addressable advertising. 
Audience and market researchers are present throughout the whole study, but they are at the front 
of the picture in Chapter Five. Equipment makers and software vendors in the ad tech universe 
are another key group involved across many of the aspects at issue in the study. Importantly, all 
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this activity unfolds within the structuring presence (or absence) of government and regulation. In 
its present form, this study may not give adequate attention to issues of law, policy, and formal 
politics. Moving forward, I hope to make further investigations into the extent to which the 
specifics of these domains need to take a greater position in the story I am trying to tell. The 
liberalization of telecommunications and the regulation of data collection strike me as the most 
important elements, and they will be touched upon occasionally. 
A Spot of Departure 
This dissertation approaches the history of advanced advertising through a relative backwater—
what is called “spot” advertising. In contrast to network advertising bought from distributors like 
NBC and ESPN, the spot market refers to audience inventory controlled by exhibitors—broadcast 
stations and multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs)—and sold either by local 
sales staffs or by sales firms (or “reps”) that represent exhibitors in transactions with the agencies 
that buy media for national or regional brands (see Appendix B). Spot advertising is rarely taken 
seriously in studies of media and culture. Decidedly less glamorous than network advertising, it is 
usually ignored in critical discussions about advertising—though, as I will show, it has provided a 
technical and organizational basis for attempting advanced techniques, including household 
addressability. It is not surprising that spot cable has been dismissed, given that even cable 
operators have regarded it as profitable but ultimately inconsequential to the core of their 
business. Spot broadcast, which cast the dye for spot cable, is harder to ignore; taken together, 
local and national spot spending have rivaled or topped network TV spending. But, again, it has 
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been relegated behind the glossier image advertising that has elevated promotional 
communication to a special place in American culture.108  
Recent and ongoing developments have forced critical researchers to reexamine the tools 
we use to analyze advertising and commercial media. One increasingly urgent conclusion from 
this reflection is that the semiotic approaches developed for understanding the socio-cultural 
significance of advertising need to be complemented by efforts to focus on the less-symbolic but, 
perhaps, equally powerful means by which advertising and commercial media facilitate social 
control. As we peel back the veil hiding digital advertising technologies from public view, it 
becomes impossible to ignore marketers’ efforts to observe, identify, profile, and influence 
consumers’ behavioral and cognitive habits.109 It is necessary, then, to engage with the logistical 
and calculative apparatus that support these efforts at both technical and administrative levels. An 
examination of spot advertising shows that such an apparatus has long been in development at the 
margins, out of view to analysts concentrating only on the symbols, images, and stories that 
register more obviously as “culture” than the tools for generating, processing, and coordinating 
flows of information and commerce.110 
Recovering these neglected dimensions of spot advertising reveals a missing chapter in 
the history of digital marketing. A closer look at spot and cable ad-buying surfaces a set of tools, 
strategies, and mindsets for coping with and capitalizing on informational resources. Spot 
advertising might seem simple and mundane, but the process, particularly in cable, depends on a 
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complex network of relationships and technologies, both for marketing available inventory 
(“avails”) to advertisers and for coordinating message insertions in sophisticated ways. It involves 
storage, splicing, and server equipment; asset identification, retrieval, and routing protocols; 
signaling standards; accounting procedures; and other resource management techniques. I want to 
emphasize that these are also constituent elements of digital advertising. While network TV 
advertising used creative imagery and massive audience reach to build brands’ identities, spot TV 
tracks the gradual incorporation of direct marketing into video entertainment, and with that the 
paramount concerns of targeting the right consumer, verifying returns on investment, and 
exploiting efficiencies on an increasingly minute scale. The state of the art in selling the 
American people has been achieved by refining many elements confronted earlier by broadcasters 
and cable operators. 
To be clear, I am choosing to zoom in on spot advertising not because participants in this 
sector have been wholly successful at negotiating difficulties and seizing opportunities. The point 
is that this arena exhibits noticeably the strain of holding together a complex and logistically-
taxing market system, and therefore it also reveals more acute desires for refining that system to 
approximate economic values of efficiency, control, and rapid calculative action. The effort to 
advance advertising generated demand for information resources no less than it resulted from 
their existence. We begin our archaeology of affordances at a time when spot TV was about to 
skyrocket, and demands for new means of coordinating that market were reaching a fevered pitch.  
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Chapter Two – Automating the Audience Commodity: Data-Processing, 
Optimization, and the Unacknowledged Origins of Programmatic 
Advertising 
 
 
The era of the computer is upon us…Our communications future will be an extremely 
tight web of data exchange.  
 
– Lydia R. Reeve, media director, Foote, Cone & Belding—LA (1966)111 
 
When Billboard magazine announced that “an era of ‘Automation TV Buying’” had dawned on 
Madison Avenue, it predicted that “much of the guesswork and crystal gazing in TV” could be 
eliminated thanks to the “tremendous investment by the agencies and media firms” in expanding 
their capacities to manage information, process transactions, and integrate more complex 
variables into media planning and buying. Automation in advertising promised to do more than 
just streamline clerical functions. A vice president at the Ted Bates advertising agency welcomed 
a profound advancement in technique that would bring capabilities into better alignment with 
underlying priorities and ambitions: “Not only will we be able to buy TV faster and more 
accurately than ever, but we may soon be able to relate television buys to the sales of individual 
products of clients and come up with rapid data on the sales effectiveness of TV on every station 
or network in the country.” The article concluded with a comforting assurance that the 
“mechanization process” would augment rather than eliminate “the human aspect” of media 
buying. “No machine, all parties stressed, will ever replace sound judgement.”  
This notice was published in September of 1957.112 If you except that the “quick-
thinking, multi-memoried business machines” being described were mostly UNIVAC 120 
punched-card calculators, and that a Young & Rubicam executive marveled at the prospect of 
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utilizing “as many as 30 or 40 factors” in TV buying decisions (a modest set of parameters by the 
standards of big data), this report hardly looks out of place sixty years later.  
Programmatic advertising—the use of data and computer processing to automate and 
optimize aspects of media planning and buying—developed earlier and more gradually than 
conventional wisdom admits.113 A leading historian of how American businesses adopted digital 
computers acknowledges that advertising agencies were “some of the earliest users of the new 
technology.”114 Surprisingly, the history of electronic data processing and automation in the 
advertising industry is almost completely unknown. Excavating this past reveals that the 
foundation for data-driven, real-time audience buying was built across decades. The fossils of 
advertising’s evolution can be seen in the use of algorithms to allocate expenditures, in hardware 
and software for circulating information about available inventory, in trafficking and billing 
systems that coordinate orders, placements, and payments, in industry-wide efforts to 
interconnect computing facilities, and in organizational relationships designed to allow more data 
to be incorporated into media and marketing decisions. A consultant to the ad industry is ahead of 
scholars in recognizing that “big data” existed without a name for 50 years. “Computer power,” 
he writes, “has always made it possible for clever people to find and crunch consumer data and 
draw conclusions accordingly.”115 
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In this chapter I demonstrate that by the time a “creative revolution” transformed 
messaging and branding strategies in the 1960s, the advertising industry was already becoming 
more calculating and data-intensive. Though less iconic than the taste-making campaigns that 
elevated branding to new cultural heights, the computerization of advertising and media buying 
began earlier, persisted longer, and, arguably, influenced business and society no less profoundly 
than the creative revolution. This process involved gradual realignments around what now rank 
among the most salient characteristics of advertising, including an insatiable appetite for data and 
a deepening entanglement of mathematical, computer, and behavioral sciences. Across the second 
half of the last century, advertisers and marketers appropriated information technologies in hopes 
of systematically refining the business of influence and audience-making. 
To support this argument, I examine an inflection point in this evolution, finding 
precedents of modern “ad tech” in the adoption of electronic computer processing by advertising 
and media buying agencies, broadcasters and the sales organizations (“reps”) representing them, 
and media and market research firms, beginning in the mid-1950s. My analysis focuses on three 
main elements in advertising automation over the next two decades. These include efforts to: 1) 
“optimize” media spending using algorithms and predictive models; 2) accelerate and streamline 
administrative processes; and 3) establish “on-line” interconnections among buyers, sellers, and 
related service bureaus that would enable data to be circulated, and transactions to be executed, 
electronically and instantaneously. We see how the logistical complexities of spot TV buying, in 
the context of an increasing emphasis on speed, efficiency, and control-systems, precipitated 
mutually reinforcing developments in data-processing capacity and demand for data resources. 
Anxieties and skepticism about automation are discussed toward the end of the chapter.116  
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David Beer has argued recently that critical studies of big data need to examine how a 
data analytics industry “cultivates a particular type of vision of data and its possibilities.”117 The 
present chapter details an early episode in which data processing and algorithmic decision-
making were positioned within “imagined futures” in advertising. Media buyers and researchers 
constructed the meanings and uses of computers to advance their status within the industry, 
framing advertising problems in ways that called for mathematical and engineering solutions. The 
result was a sociotechnical reformatting of the advertising industry’s spaces of calculation. This 
history demonstrates that programmatic advertising was not a consequence of the internet; rather, 
the development of modern ad tech reflects the deeper-seated desires among advertisers and their 
agencies to optimize resource management, control information flows, accelerate the speed and 
precision of commercial activity, and move from uncertainty toward predictability in accounting 
for returns to advertising expenditures. This chapter uncovers some of the earliest designs for a 
machinic assemblage to sell the American people. 
The Creative and the Calculative 
As industrial values, efficiency and calculation were not new to advertising in the 1950s. Science 
and rationality have been always been pillars in modern advertising’s claims to cultural authority, 
and over the first half of the twentieth century they came to predominate in professional 
orthodoxy over the competing impulse toward what Jackson Lears calls the “carnivalesque.”118 
The best-known advertising professionals of the era held to the conviction that their purpose was 
to sell the client’s product. They believed that with research and discipline, their persuasive 
techniques could be codified as empirical laws and the effects of their efforts could be verified 
                                                          
117 David Beer, “Envisioning the Power of Data Analytics,” Information, Communication & Society 21, no. 
3 (2018), 466. 
118 Jackson Lears, Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America (New York: Basic 
Books, 1994). 
72 
 
 
with scientific certainty.119 For adherents to this mindset, creative fancy and other soft-sell 
elements that have come to typify brand advertising not only deviated from legitimate principles, 
but they seemed hopelessly dissociated from the goal of producing a measurable impact on 
sales.120 According to a 1947 article in Fortune about the J. Walter Thompson agency, whose 
president subscribed to both behaviorism and a managerial philosophy centered on science, 
efficiency, and control, “Thompson wants to sell its clients’ products, not make splashes with 
individual ads.”121  
Thomas Frank argues that in the 1960s, agencies abandoned this spirit and its 
organizational culture. “The authority of ‘science’ in advertising theory,” Frank writes, had been 
“diminished considerably by the mid-1960s.”122 Frank makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of how advertisements and management styles exerted forms of cultural power. 
But he limits his analysis mostly to the production of commercial messages, rather than 
approaching advertising as a set of relationships and processes that links together advertisers, 
agencies, media, and related organizations providing research and marketing services. By 
ignoring media buying and downplaying the broader integration of advertising and marketing (not 
to mention business uses of computing), Frank fails to recognize that the segmentation of 
consumer markets that helped catalyze advertising’s reorientation around individuality and 
difference was facilitated in practice by an intensification of research and calculative procedures. 
While a loosening of bureaucracy allowed for unorthodox creative expressions that tapped into 
the zeitgeist of the 1960s, to actually identify narrow audience segments and place commercial 
messages in front of the right people depended on enormous organizational efforts and a deep 
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commitment to systematic and data-driven planning. Agencies may have retreated from scientific 
approaches to preparing copy, but they moved decisively in the opposite direction in making and 
evaluating decisions about allocating advertisers’ dollars. As the Television Bureau of 
Advertising observed in a plea for more research on commercial effectiveness in 1961, “larger 
budgets, increased competition, [and] narrowing profit margins demand greater accuracy in 
recognizing and making each decision in this complex age of possibilities, and insist upon finer 
measures of this accuracy.”123 
Advertising Age recalls that unencumbered creative freedom did not even last a full 
decade: “In the late 1960s, when it became apparent that an economic recession was likely, 
marketers moved away from image advertising and toward research-backed, results driven 
strategy.”124 By 1967 a media buying and research director observed that, in his domain, “With 
the advent of more research the pendulum [had] swung again to reliance on ‘numbers.’”125 That 
same year the president of a marketing firm owned by Interpublic “predicted that selection of 
advertising media in the future would rely more heavily on the behavioral sciences.”126 The co-
designer of America’s first electronic computer even imagined that sometime between the 1980s 
and 2010s marketing planning would come to “be handled by a psychologist who is a 
psychologician of the computer age, fully capable of relating his knowledge of human behavior to 
the machine”—a prescient, if oddly worded forecast of today’s behavioral data scientists.127 Even 
earlier, it was reported, “Creative men are being asked to boil down a minute tv commercial to 30 
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seconds because of the computer’s search for ‘optimum efficiency’ of an ad budget.”128 A 
calculating mindset was not evacuated from the advertising industries, it simply permeated other 
areas—ones which gained considerably in power over the next two decades.129 No less a creative 
shop than Doyle Dane Bernbach reorganized its media operations in 1970, citing as one factor in 
the decision “the marriage of computer systems to media departments.”130 The leading trade 
publication for commercial television went so far as to posit, “The computer will be as important 
a tool in the business of broadcasting in the 1970’s as the transmitter.”131 
Without denying the significance of a creative revolution, I argue that we must 
understand the late-1950s and 1960s as an inflection point in an evolution toward calculation, 
efficiency, and control. Even as advertising’s place in the popular culture became aligned with 
creativity and hipness, the intensification of a quantitative logic within marketing and media 
buying slowly transformed the marketing complex in ways that steered the whole enterprise 
profoundly toward the goal of efficient and systematic behavioral influence that held sway when 
the computer arrived. The computer did not create the will to calculation in advertising so much 
as it presented new resources that could be adapted to that purpose. Under continued pressure 
from advertisers and the shareholders of the major advertising conglomerates, the institutions and 
infrastructures supporting and shaping the marketing complex were gradually reengineered to 
facilitate calculation, as much as to promote creativity.  
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Computing, Calculating, Optimizing 
An executive at J. Walter Thompson (JWT), perhaps the world’s leading advertising agency, 
described the computer in 1962 as “a new tool for the human mind, enlarging its possibilities just 
as the telescope and microscope did.”132 JWT was among the first agencies both to acquire a 
UNIVAC computer from Remington Rand and to announce plans to install a more advanced 
transistor-based data-processing system. Preparations for the latter equipment—which was leased 
from RCA, an agency client, in 1963—were overseen by JWT’s assistant treasurer, whose 
“primary job at Thompson [was] to study the flow of information and documents within 
departments, between departments, and to clients.”133 In addition to organizing routine accounting 
procedures, computerization sustained hopes about new possibilities for efficiently allocating 
advertising spending, forecasting sales trends, and conducting market and media research. 
Perhaps no application of data processing exited advertisers and agencies more than the potential 
to help them place ads in front of consumers more effectively and economically. 
By 1963 the director of media at JWT observed that the “computer” was often being 
invoked as a metonym for a suite of changes affecting media planning and buying. He claimed 
that computing, as a generic process, was one element in the larger sweep of “operations 
research.”134 Operations research is a mathematical science of efficiency; it describes uses of 
statistical tools, such as algorithms and predictive models, to help organizations approach optimal 
outcomes when confronting complex decisions. It is an example of the “intellectual technologies” 
for managing organizations and defining rational action which Daniel Bell expected to provide 
the bedrock for an information economy. Bell saw algorithms that substituted for “intuitive 
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judgement” being “embodied in an automatic machine or a computer program, or a set of 
instructions based on some statistical or mathematical formula,” effectively formalizing routine 
decision-making.135 This paradigm moved from military to corporate management in the 1950s, 
and by the mid-1960s a subfield of operations research dedicated to marketing and media 
planning accounted for dozens of scholarly articles. For JWT’s media director, operations 
research was, essentially, “a collective term covering all types of mathematical analyses of 
business problems: in our case, the problem of allocating media dollars in such a way as to 
maximize the return to the advertiser.”136 
Maximizing returns to an advertiser is the existential purpose and challenge for marketing 
communications. Toward this goal, ad agencies, media researchers, and information service 
bureaus programmed electronic computers to calculate “optimization models.” Expressing values 
of control and scientific precision, participants in the media-marketing complex hoped to 
engineer systems that could allocate resources with maximal efficiency. As a marketing professor 
explains, once the relevant data, assumptions, and parameters have been codified in forms that the 
computer can digest, “a mathematical algorithm is used to determine the ‘best’ possible media 
schedule.”137 
Examining discourses about how media buyers and sellers accommodated new data-
processing technologies into their operations illustrates that managing information and taming 
complexities were already pressing concerns in audience manufacture in the 1950s, and that 
visions of the future pointed toward computational techniques for systemically controlling, 
expanding, and accelerating informational and commercial flows. Some of the earliest efforts to 
automate and optimize media planning and buying reveal expectations and ambitions that have 
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been part of durable cognitive frameworks for how many actors have understood or imagined the 
potential of new information technologies. A closer look at the first halting steps toward 
optimization also provides a way into the history of computerization in advertising. 
“Electronic Brain for Timebuying” 
American Research Bureau (ARB), an audience measurement firm which later became a 
subsidiary of a leading computer vendor, trumpeted an early contribution to “automated 
timebuying” in 1959.138 ARB planned to install the newest UNIVAC model, institute a more 
comprehensive data collection protocol (nationwide, county-by-county TV ratings), and establish 
rapid communications channels with advertising agencies. Broadcasting reported that this new 
electronic system “will automatically lay out a complete tv campaign.” ARB’s president, James 
W. Seiler, claimed that combining this computing power with the company’s ambitious audience 
measurement system “will fulfill the timebuyer’s dream of a complete information service. It will 
give timebuyers precise sets of facts to use in placing television advertising.”139 With the “data 
delights” afforded by ARB’s “electronic brain,” to use Broadcasting’s terms, audience 
manufacture could approach economic theory’s ideal market setting: a system of rational, 
calculative action supported by full and perfect information. “Agencies,” Seiler promised, “will 
be able to buy spot tv on a completely logical basis.” Anticipation of the UNIVAC and the 
forthcoming data deluge left the new personnel recruited to work with these resources “indulging 
in statistical fantasies.”140 
By 1961, working with the agency Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn (BBDO), ARB 
and its parent company had “developed, tested and placed into pilot use [a] computer process for 
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selecting advertising media.”141 This optimization process used linear programming 
mathematics—an algorithmic approach for finding maximum or minimum outcomes—to sort 
through a set of important variables for media decisions. Those variables included a “detailed 
‘profile’ of the advertiser’s customers,” information about audiences for various media options, 
the availability and cost of commercial inventory, and the advertiser’s budget. “With this 
information,” one report explained, “the computer in minutes examines all possible 
combinations—which can run into the millions—[and] comes up with the one which, 
mathematically, best meets the advertiser’s requirements.”142 While trade sources show no 
mention of this specific service after just a few years, we can see that from the outset optimization 
was part of a more widely shared agenda for computerization. 
BBDO was a leading combatant in what Broadcasting called “a continuing battle on 
Madison Avenue to simplify by electronic means the highly complex and often highly subjective 
act of media selection.”143 BBDO began by hiring ARB’s parent company, CEIR, as an outside 
computer service, but it soon leased its own machine from Honeywell, a client of the agency, at a 
cost of $100,000. BBDO’s general manager boasted that the Honeywell installation “will mark 
the first case in advertising history where an advertising agency has totally integrated its 
marketing service operations with modern computer equipment.” The agency organized its 
computer usage around what it called SIMAD, the “system for the integration of marketing and 
advertising data,” which generated media plans using linear programming, and automated “bread 
and butter” functions, such as processing orders, contracts, and billings.144  
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BBDO was one of a growing number of agencies endeavoring to “use high-speed 
methods to improve the mathematical bases upon which media selection can be made.”145 By 
1963 a quarter of national television business was estimated to be “handled by so-called computer 
agencies.”146 A study released that year found that 16 advertising agencies were “equipped for 
automatic data processing,” of which three currently had dedicated electronic computers and 
eight more had installations scheduled for the near future. At least seven agencies, including 
D’Arcy, DDB, McCann-Erickson, and Ogilvy, Benson & Mather, procured data-processing 
services from outside bureaus.147 By another estimate, more than half of “the major agencies” 
were “using or experimenting with computers in media evaluation and selection,” as well as for 
routine administrative tasks.148 Broadcasting reported in June of 1964 that “agency computer 
usage has tripled” in the preceding 10 months.149 An IBM salesman observed two years later, 
“There’s hardly an agency billing more than $20 million annually that doesn’t have its own 
computer or use a computer service bureau.”150 Thirty agencies spent at least $20 million on 
broadcasting alone that year.151  
Along with BBDO, major agencies setting the pace in digital computerization included 
Young & Rubicam (Y&R), Leo Burnett, and JWT. In 1960 these firms ranked first (JWT), 
second (Y&R), fifth (BBDO), and seventh (Leo Burnett) in broadcast billings, accounting for 
$345 million in combined television spending.152 By 1966, they were the top four spenders, 
doling out more than $646 million on TV for their clients.153 They recognized the ability of the 
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computer to accelerate informational and commercial flows. A vice president at Y&R told an 
audience of broadcasters, “To us it has the positive advantage of doing tremendous quantities of 
analytical arithmetic with great speed and complete accuracy. It enables us to make better buys 
faster with fresher availabilities.”154 Y&R’s commitment to automation was perhaps the greatest 
of its early rivals. A study conducted in 1962 found it to be “the only agency making ‘media 
decisions’ through use of equipment.”155 Y&R declared itself “in a race to the moon with our 
competition.”156 This statement encapsulates the strategic escalation that gripped the industry. By 
the mid-1960s, consensus held that agencies both required computers but still operated them at a 
financial loss. The president of a station rep firm characterized the agency situation uncharitably: 
“At this point they can’t afford not to have them, they’re important in attracting new business, but 
many agencies have expensive hardware that’s being used for kindergarten purposes.”157  
Y&R’s equipment was undeniably expensive. The agency spent $1,000,000 to purchase a 
UNIVAC in 1960, and two years later it installed a cheaper IBM 1620, leased for $25,000 per 
year. By 1966 it was renting a Burroughs B5500 for $28,000 a month, under the supervision of a 
data and systems division created two years earlier.158 Y&R was also committed to graduating 
beyond kindergarten. It tried but soon abandoned linear programming, claiming the approach was 
incapable of contending with all the variables the firm considered relevant to media selection. 
Instead, Y&R adopted what it called a “High Assay Media Model,” developed in consultation 
with a professor at Columbia University who specialized in operations research. Basically, the 
high assay technique involved a set of iterative instructions, or algorithm, that told the planner 
how to spend an advertising budget. It was programmed to recommend maximum investment in 
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what was defined as the “best” option available before moving on to other options.159 The firm 
described the technique as analogous to “gold mining”: “Think of the mines as being different 
media, and the gold as sales prospects.”160 The high assay principle, then, was to mine all 
available gold from the choicest medium—that is, the most cost-efficient vehicle for meeting a 
target—and then move to the next best choice. Y&R’s director of data and systems explains, “the 
high-assay model goes as far as advising what markets to buy, what media to buy in them, how 
much of each to buy and when to buy.”161 The model would not go so far as to recommend a 
particular spot on a specific station.  
By the mid-1960s, more and more agencies were taking steps in this direction, imitating 
or extending the efforts of BBDO and Y&R. McCann-Erickson, for example, developed 
something called the “marketing communications investment decision analysis systems.” The 
agency described it as “a highly sophisticated and completely computerized system for 
comparative media analysis and allocation of advertising investment.” In an even grander effort, 
ten agencies, including Ted Bates, DDB, Ogilvy & Mather, Grey Advertising, and Leo Burnett, 
formed a consortium to share costs and resources in developing COMPASS, the “computer 
optimal media planning and selection system.” The technique reportedly combined elements of 
computer simulation (see below) and linear programming algorithms toward generating “a 
mathematical media model” capable of maximizing efficiencies—though it was expected to offer 
only quite broad recommendations about media plans.162  
A competing approach to linear programming and high assay was computer simulation. 
Simulation could not promise “mathematical optimization,” but it rapidly computed expected 
outcomes for alternative media plans, and since it did not require parameters and assumptions to 
                                                          
159 See Gensche, “Computer Models in Advertising Media Selection,” 416-418.  
160 “Y&R, BBDO Unleash Media Computerization,” 118. 
161 “Are Computers Worth What They Cost,” 44. 
162 “Are Computers Worth What They Cost,” 43. 
82 
 
 
be as tightly controlled as in optimization models, proponents claimed that the simulation 
approach represented reality more faithfully. An independent data service provider called 
Simulmatics Corp. attracted considerable attention for a “media-mix” model that generated a 
hypothetical but statistically representative “sample” of the U.S. population and its media habits. 
The company used this simulated sample to forecast the audience exposure that would be 
achieved by a given media plan. Unlike linear programming, which takes as inputs the budget, 
audience targets, viewership data, and availability and cost of ad slots and then outputs an optimal 
schedule, the Simulmatics model started with an array of possible schedules and evaluated their 
probable success in reaching viewers. The firm claimed that its service enabled advertisers to 
realize efficiencies of up to 30% in their media spending.163 The media-mix model was also 
designed to incorporate behavioral data that went beyond basic demographic classifiers, “For 
instance: What kind of car does each individual own and how old is it? How does he or she 
distribute purchases between supermarkets and small stores? Between grocery and drug-stores? 
Does he live in a hard-water or a soft-water area?”164 
James S. Coleman, a sociology professor at Johns Hopkins and a member of 
Simulmatics’ research board, predicted that computer simulation would afford more complex, 
sophisticated advertising campaigns, utilizing a selective mix of media vehicles and formats. 
Coleman envisioned electronic computer simulation precipitating a “revolution in the 
development of advertising and marketing techniques.”165 The company planned to eventually 
“shoot for the ultimate goal in advertising prediction: forecasting a campaign’s sales 
effectiveness.”166  
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Simulmatics found at least one customer in DuPont, but its media-mix service was not a 
success. The company had difficulty convincing agencies and clients that the habits assigned to 
its simulated population would accurately reflect reality, and nobody seemed willing to pay for 
national surveys to confirm its validity on an ongoing basis. “Perhaps,” one marketing scholar 
reflected, “it was too far ahead of its time and the data needed to support it.”167  
Although Simulmatics did not reach it, the dream of determining sales outcomes 
attributable to ad expenditures was shared throughout the industry, and these new developments 
stimulated hopes that it could be realized in the near future. In concluding a list of how the use of 
computers was changing the advertising business in the early 1960s, one journalist wrote, 
“Finally, and perhaps most important, computers are steering new attention to the old problem, 
the measurement of advertising effectiveness.”168 When Needham, Harper & Steers began using 
an RCA Spectra 70 later in the decade, a senior vice president at the company counted as an 
“important feature” of the system “the ability to compute almost instantaneously the correlation 
between audience delivery and sales on a market-by-market basis.”169  
Starting in the early 1960s, Marion Harper Jr. of Interpublic and McCann-Erickson 
proselytized “accountability” as a central value for advertising and marketing. He estimated that 
new tools and techniques for collecting and analyzing information about media and markets 
would allow advertisers to determine how their spending translated into sales. “It will now be 
possible, with the help of social sciences and mathematics,” Harper maintained, “to measure 
advertising as a single influence, isolated from all the many variables involved in carrying on a 
business.”170 A 1967 profile of Harper in the Journal of Marketing testifies to his conviction that 
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information technology could be used to analyze advertising’s contributions to the selling 
function:  
His success with clients is grounded in the belief that advertisers seek above all else an 
assurance that their advertising dollars are being spent wisely. Therefore, the Interpublic 
organization places a great deal of emphasis on scientific approaches to advertising 
problem solving…Interpublic has recently formed the Institute of Marketing 
Communications which serves as a center for publishing, seminars, and teaching as well 
as for research activities. The avowed purpose of the Institute is to harness the 
‘information revolution’ as applied to marketing communications. Marion Harper 
believes that there will be an increased emphasis on the use of the social and physical 
sciences in decision-making in marketing.171  
 
Already by this time Harper’s Interpublic Group (IPG) had convened an Applied Science 
Division (within a subsidiary called Marplan), which, according to its manager from the mid-
1960s, “brought together media researchers and operations researchers to create systems to 
improve the effectiveness of media decisions for the clients of all Interpublic agencies.”172 The 
expectation that computerization would advance advertising toward better targeting and efficacy 
was apparent in the view, ascribed to Harper and IPG, that “New technologies will lead to more 
precise definitions of markets and better alignments to specific objectives of advertising 
programs.”173 
Harper was not alone in his conviction that the uses of information technologies by social 
scientists and mathematicians could tether advertising to sales outcomes. In 1963, Y&R’s vice 
president admitted that while present systems and data needed to improve, computers and 
optimization models “force us to be much more scientific about ways in which we invest our 
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clients’ advertising dollars.”174 A year earlier, the president of the MacManus, John & Adams 
agency told the Association of National Advertisers (ANA), “All of us in advertising are going to 
have to justify and measure our efforts far better than we have been doing.”175 Anticipating a 
present-day preoccupation, he added, “The value-return of every dollar we spend must be 
justified as best we are able—and with all the scientific assistance we can command—against the 
supreme criteria of today’s industrial dollar.”176  
Pressure toward scientific standards of accountability was not just a result of 
technological improvement. Increased emphasis on marketing among major corporations, and 
efforts by agencies to attend to the full range of marketing services, brought advertising, media 
buying, and market research into tighter integration with industrial operations. Agencies found 
that in dealing with clients, “top management is paying more and more attention to the 
advertising function. The result is a growing demand for a more efficient and higher professional 
approach to every facet of the advertising and marketing process.”177 
These early discussions about computerized media buying reveal frameworks for 
thinking about advances in advertising that have gradually become central to the industry. 
Although the degree of accountability imagined above is still largely aspirational, these 
statements illustrate that from the outset of computerization actors were trying to appropriate new 
information technologies and bend them—at least discursively—to advertisers’ ambition of 
verifying return on investment. In contrast to claims that interest in data-driven advertising 
emerged with the arrival of the internet, we see clearly that advertisers and their agencies have 
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long been hungry for information that could help them market more effectively, and they have 
tried to develop methods for generating, managing, and leveraging that data.  
The stated goal of computerized media planning was to approach a mathematical science 
of optimization, capable of maximizing efficiencies, enabling predictability and better control, 
and ultimately confirming sales effectiveness. But ambition clearly outstripped ability. Skillful 
displays of “science” served, at least in part, in the art of attracting or impressing clients—
including the computer manufacturers themselves, who typically sold their systems to the 
agencies handling their accounts, and were becoming major advertisers in their own right, trying 
to outmaneuver competitors and define a new media technology in the public mind.178 For all the 
apparent sophistication of optimizers and simulation models, one had to squint hard to see them 
really delivering on their promises—though they have persisted as staple elements in the buying 
services rendered by most agencies. An operations researcher diagnosed vividly the problem, as 
he saw it, in 1962:  
what we are all lacking is a coherent, significant and indisputable mathematical theory of 
advertising response. Advertising is where chemistry was in the 14th century—in the 
alchemist’s cell, with the dried frogs-legs and the magical incantations…Without a 
quantitative mathematical theory to guide its application, a computer—except for trivial 
data-sorting and arithmetical operations—is useless. Frogs-legs and incantations are 
cheaper, and possibly just as effective.179 
 
In fact, “data-sorting and arithmetical operations” were hardly trivial to media buying and 
selling. While the visions detailed above helped set a path for the future, reflecting grand hopes 
and expectations, the buyers and sellers of TV audiences were actively appropriating computing 
technologies to confront more immediate priorities. Perhaps surprisingly, talk about automating 
mundane and routine operations reveals definite precedents of programmatic advertising, adding 
evidence to the claim that programmatic techniques have grown out of the consistent demand for 
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information, data-processing, and communications facilities in audience manufacture. As 
Matthew Crain demonstrates in his history of internet advertising, a major innovation through 
which companies like DoubleClick commercialized the Web was the provision of “infrastructure 
services” that coordinated marketplace activity.180 Looking back to the 1950s and 1960, we can 
see very similar sorts of efforts in spot TV. 
The next section considers two dimensions of how computers were used to process 
transactions: reductions in paperwork and clerical work, and the networked interconnection of 
buyers and sellers for electronic communication and computer-based buying. It starts by 
considering the problems facing buyers and sellers when computers arrived on the scene. 
Coordinating the Spot Market 
The commercial media environment was growing in scale and complexity in the middle of the 
century. In 1950 there were 107 commercial TV stations reporting revenues, which totaled just 
over $1 million; by 1965, the 588 stations broadcasting throughout the U.S. accounted for almost 
$2 billion in revenue.181 The number of sales organizations representing stations to national and 
regional advertisers more than doubled from 66 in 1950 to 130 in 1960.182 To this extensive 
development of the market was soon added new intensive challenges. The transition beginning in 
the 1950s toward participating sponsorship—or the “magazine concept” of sales—meant that 
advertising inventory was divided into smaller units and sold to a wider range of buyers.183 One 
study found that the number of prime-time programs on the three TV networks sponsored by 
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multiple advertisers rose from just 10 in the 1955-56 season to 57 in 1964-65.184 Although it is 
not usually recognized in discussions of audience fragmentation, the move to participating 
sponsorship is tantamount to increasing the number and diversity of products manufactured and 
exchanged. 
Already by 1957 television was considered “the most complex and paper-work ridden 
advertising media.”185 The television networks had invested in data-processing in the 1950s, 
mostly for routine accounting and billing functions.186 CBS claimed that clerical savings alone 
compensated for the $12,000 per month it spent to rent a UNIVAC system. But the networks 
looked forward to “harnessing [the] full capacity” of these machines, and they recognized them as 
essential administrative technologies for a maturing business. The need to manage information 
and coordinate transactions with advertisers clearly registered as pressing issues. “Large 
quantities of inventory segments are making the machine virtually a must in network billing and 
compensation control,” Broadcasting reported in 1966. “The computer’s advantages as a sales 
tool to pick and chose [sic] between increasingly fragmented network inventories for optimal 
sponsor benefit are clear.”187 Two years earlier, a sales director at NBC Television admitted, 
“Data Processing is a competitive way of life. Today’s executive must accept and understand 
it.”188 
While networks incorporated computers into office work, many observers saw greater 
potential for automation in the planning, buying, and selling of “more flexible media,” like spot 
TV.189 Purchasing spot TV presented the “most difficult media buying job,” in the opinion of one 
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agency executive.190 Even compared to network advertising, spot television was a challenging 
market, with decentralized actors, formidable paperwork, frequent errors, long-outstanding debts, 
and generally high transaction costs. Just ensuring that spots aired as planned, and then sorting 
out billing discrepancies when they didn’t, required frequent communications between buyers and 
sellers, including consultation of contracts and invoices printed in triplicate for agencies, reps, 
and stations. By the early 1960s sales rep firms could expect to allocate 7% of expenses to 
communications facilities, such as telephone and teletype, which could sum up to $300,000 for 
the large independent reps.191 The president of Data Communications Corporation, a technology 
supplier to the industry, hit upon a keen insight when he remarked that “the business information 
systems that most resemble the requirements of broadcast are those developed by the airline 
companies for reservations.”192 The managing and marketing of spot TV availabilities (“avails”) 
precipitated what one sales executive called a ”constant churning of information.”193 
Throughout the 1960s, the administrative burden of processing transactions in this market 
reached unprecedented levels, taxing the capacities of existing systems and protocols. National 
non-network TV time sales ballooned from $345 million in 1958 to an estimated $1.01 billion in 
1968.194 By 1970, and not for the first time, spot sales to national advertisers ($1.10 billion) and 
local advertisers ($589 million) together comprised more than half of television ad revenues 
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($3.24 billion).195 The volume of inventory managed annually by all TV stations was becoming 
overwhelming, estimated at roughly 23 million advertising spots in 1967, and as many as 30 
million in 1968.196 The vice president of media at Leo Burnett reported that his agency bought 
350,000 broadcast avails in 1962, of which 160,000 were TV spots; on a monthly basis, this trade 
generated 1,500 TV contracts and at least 6,000 pages of buying estimates.197  
As one source acknowledged, “The problem of accurate accounting between agencies, 
advertisers, stations and performers has increased in direct proportion to commercial volume, to 
the point where it is inadequately handled by procedures largely carried over from old radio 
days.”198 The sales side often had to wait 90-120 days to close accounts receivable, and agencies 
struggled to document errors and negotiate make-goods (i.e., compensation for failing to run an 
ad as scheduled or for failing to deliver the promised audience). The media manager at Benton & 
Bowles admitted that for a routine campaign, buying spots across 132 stations, the agency 
experienced discrepancies on 32% of its billings.199 Perhaps less reliably, a 1973 advertisement 
for firm marketing a range of transaction-processing services claimed that “the broadcast 
advertising industry is paying $50,000,000—mostly in unaccounted for expense—to reconcile 
discrepant paperwork and payments.”200 These sorts of difficulties left Broadcasting wondering 
to its readers: “Can automation organize the buying and selling of broadcast advertising? Nobody 
knows yet, but lots of people and hardware are at work on it.201 
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Leo Burnett was one of the earliest firms to assign electronic computers to the 
administrative problems of media buying and accounting, with special emphasis on spot TV. As 
early as 1955 Burnett “entered automation…to attack the paper problem.”202 The company 
installed an IBM RAMAC 305 in 1960,203 and less than two years later began leasing an IBM 
1401 system that “automate[d] much of the clerical functions of television and radio spot 
buying.” The computer provided a central facility for generating and printing station contracts, ad 
schedules, and invoices for clients. It was especially useful for calculating spot rates, factoring in 
discounts that applied at certain volume or frequency thresholds; without a machine that can store 
this information in memory and automatically adjust rates as necessary, estimating the relative 
costs of different schedules is a laborious process. Leo Burnett’s media director boasted, “in the 
old days we needed several weeks to prepare a detailed broadcast estimate for a client. Today it’s 
a matter of minutes or seconds for computation and printing by our programmed computer 
method.”204  
This application of data-processing technology reportedly halved the amount of 
“handwritten data” required of the agency’s buyers and estimators.205 The vice president of an 
agency managing $10 million in billings, concentrated mostly in spot broadcasting, claimed that 
the use of computers allowed his firm “to compress the entire buying procedure” into 11 working 
days, down from the 29 days typically required to process a transaction manually.206 Another 
smaller agency adapted a computerized system to better organize the information that represents 
the market to buyers, so as to make the relative value of each avail easier to recognize. “The 
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program we finally put together,” the agency’s general manager explained, “is designed to bypass 
the endless hours of manual computations and put in our buyers’ hands a simple ranking of 
television programs and radio time periods that fall in descending order from the most desirable 
to the least desirable for any given product.”207 Decision-making then becomes programmatic. 
Life-Blood Data 
The needs of clients drove agencies to invest in data-processing systems. For example, Y&R was 
one of fourteen agencies servicing accounts for Bristol-Myers, a leading marketer of 
pharmaceuticals and consumer packaged goods, whose $130 million advertising budget included 
roughly 300,000 TV spots in 1966. “Just to keep track of all the television time it buys, on all the 
stations it uses,” Fortune reported, “the company needs several computers. One, owned by Young 
& Rubicam, is the heart of a tele-type-linked network of agencies reporting on Bristol-Myers’ 
daily purchases of TV station time around the country.”208 And Bristol-Myers was hardly in a 
league all its own. Its $25.5 million in spot TV spending was only good enough for fifth on the 
list of top spot buyers in 1966—and just 1% ahead of sixth-place Lever Brothers.209 
Coordinating buying and selling processes around information and communication 
protocols was becoming an unavoidable necessity for the spot TV business during the 1960s—
even though advertisers’ complaints about spot TV’s “paperwork jungle” persisted into the 
1970s.210 When the H-R sales rep firm announced plans to implement an electronic data-
processing center, running on an IBM 1401, agencies celebrated the step toward integrating 
computer facilities across the demand and supply sides of the market. “The potential for 
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combining agency use of computers in processing spot availabilities and purchases with computer 
programs operated by rep firms would appear to be almost limitless,” Y&R’s vice president and 
director of computer applications declared. “The result should be greater efficiency, greater 
accuracy, and very importantly, greater speed in processing that highly perishable commodity—
spot availabilities.”211 A few years later, the vice president of the Katz Agency, another of the 
major station rep firms, “hailed the advent of the ‘machine’ and chided doubters as standing in 
the way of more efficient time buying and selling and more dollars for spot television and 
radio.”212 Given the potential to coordinate with greater speed and accuracy the processes of 
compiling, analyzing, and circulating information involved in spot buying and selling—including 
changes in available inventory, audience ratings, and other media or consumer data—BBDO’s 
media director expected that “In five years [from 1963], computer usage will be as common to 
good business as the typewriter.”213  
By 1966 H-R was spending $300,000 on yearly computer-program, -hardware, and -
staffing expenses, and it was poised to install a “third-generation” (integrated circuit) system, 
IBM’s 360. Its investment in data processing was designed specifically to accelerate and increase 
control over paperwork processing, and to centralize billing operations for the many stations it 
represented.214 Further illustrating the centrality of information flows to the spot TV business, the 
firm reorganized its corporate space “so that offices radiate out from the computer.” Not to be 
outdone, the rival Katz Agency planned that year to bolster its $100,000 annual outlay on 
computer-program development with another $400,000 for data-processing personnel.215 Before 
long, the Blair company joined the list of national rep firms that had “recently installed 
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immensely sophisticated systems for both radio and television which supply their salesman [sic] 
with dozens of availability, sales and demographic reports that, it would seem, all but eliminate 
the need to sit behind a book filling out forms.”216  
Broadcasting called H-R “a pioneer in computerizing the TV sales business,” but it was 
not the first rep firm to make use of electromechanical information technology. Peters, Griffin, 
Woodward (PGW) developed a system around UNIVAC punched cards in 1957 to meet the 
challenges of a growing spot TV and radio market. Information about availabilities, audience 
ratings, order confirmation, schedule changes, and a range of statistics about media markets 
constituted “life-blood matters” in the spot sales business.217 Echoing theories of an ideal market, 
PGW installed its “robot genius” to “meet the demands for complete and accurate information” at 
rapid speed. 218 The system was designed to provide this information to prospective buyers at a 
fraction of the time and effort previously required. PGW planned to “deliver availability reports 
in about one-sixth the time that it takes a trained secretary and salesman to do the same job.”219 
As a specific example, the company claimed its machine could print 100 lines of availabilities per 
minute, compared to the roughly 30 minutes needed to complete an average 15-line availability 
sheet.220 The IBM system used by H-R promised even greater improvements on manual data 
input and retrieval; its “random access” storage would “permit[ ] a search for information at 
fantastic speeds.”221  
Information has always been the “life-blood” circulating in the spot TV market, and from 
the 1950s onward computers were adapted to the demands expressed by buyers and sellers both 
for timely information and for resources to help them contend with so much data. A media 
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executive from Benton & Bowles was not alone in recognizing “the inherent complexity of the 
spot-TV business—particularly as it relates to the communication and paperwork processes 
among buyer, seller and station.” He also acknowledged these difficulties as critical to motivating 
technological and organizational change: “that complexity has helped spawn the development of 
outside buying services, electronic monitoring systems and firms specializing in computerized 
post-buying analysis, as well as the development of standardized availability forms, contracts, 
invoices and billing cycles.”222 Advertisers themselves found computers indispensable to 
circulating the information required by spot advertising, especially as they sought tighter 
integration across marketing functions. “As soon as we were established,” Gillette’s manager for 
media buying said of the company’s efforts to target spending geographically, “we became aware 
that we could not function effectively without an efficient computer system in the spot area, if 
only to contribute information to our division product managers and their agencies.”223 
One of the fascinating elements of this story is that the increasing supply of data-
processing power did not satisfy demands for information and its management. Instead, demand 
for and supply of data resources reinforced and reshaped each other.224 The expansion of major 
advertising agencies, for example, generated a need for data-processing and communications 
facilities to orchestrate standard operations at greater scale and speed, and these resources also 
opened possibilities for firms to supply clients with more diversified information-based services. 
When JWT ordered an RCA 301 computer system in 1962, its vice president of finance 
commented in the company’s newsletter on the significance of this investment in computing 
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capacity: “Recent new developments in equipment and approach have made it apparent that 
electronic data processing within JWT is not only feasible but is also, in view of our increased 
growth, essential for providing a range of information and services that is already or will soon 
become necessary in our business.”225 Advertising Age reported just three months after JWT’s 
announcement, “Mindful of the computer’s voracious appetite for data, advertisers are frantically 
beating the bushes for better information on who their customers are, and where and when they 
buy. Even dusty product warranty cards are being hauled out of warehouses and examined for 
possible information.”226  
As early as 1962 BBDO complained that its computer was “starving for more data” about 
audiences and advertising effects, and reportedly the agency was paying as much as $50,000 to 
cross-tabulate information from A.C. Nielsen and other market and media researchers.227 The vice 
president and director of marketing services at Foote, Cone & Belding admitted similarly that 
“the use of computers ‘has sparked an intensified demand’ for information in advertising and 
media.”228 In 1964, a representative from Leo Burnett claimed that the firm spent $250,000 
annually to buy “raw data” for research purposes, plus another $130,000 for the “‘machinery’ to 
process it.”229 Two years earlier, a media executive at Burnett told a gathering of the American 
Association of Advertising Agencies (4A’s), “we need far more and far more accurate media data 
than we are now getting. To be really useful in handling complex media problems, the machines 
need reliable information on the effectiveness of actual exposure of advertising to real individuals 
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in real households.”230 He spoke for agencies and advertisers generally in demanding information 
to fortify the “data banks” they built to guide media planning and buying decisions. Stations, rep 
firms, and media researchers all noted “the explosion in demographic data now demanded by ad 
agencies.” In just the second half of the 1960s, the columns of data reported in the syndicated 
ratings books issued by ARB expanded from 11 to 49.231 An executive at a leading rep firm 
recalls, “research that was being demanded by the advertiser and the agencies forced companies’ 
research departments to become more sophisticated. You needed more research to analyze the 
data available and to create new ways of measuring data.”232 
Not all parties welcomed the demand for data—namely the publishers and stations from 
whom agencies demanded it. “The data vacuum has hit some media right in their pocketbooks,” 
one journalist remarked.233 The president of a station ownership group complained at the 4A’s 
annual meeting, “No medium has provided its agencies and advertiser customers with as much 
‘buying’ information as broadcasters. We have researched ourselves almost to death, and your 
new electronic pets, the computers, threaten to finish us off.”234 Frustrated by the growing 
supremacy of ratings numbers in spot buying, the president of a marketing communications firm 
described his experience in terms worth quoting at length: 
There was a time, back in TV’s black-and-white days, when those of us in small agencies 
could buy TV time by hunch—by the seat of our pants, so to speak…How times have 
changed…[S]oon a new breed of cat emerged: the really ‘with it’ agency time buyers or 
account executives who had discovered the rating books and were infatuated with all 
those columns and abbreviations: HUT, DMA, LOH. Suddenly their conversation was 
filled with references to “target consumers” and “primary demographics.” And before 
they could buy time, they needed from the station representative a full-scale breakout: 
ratings, men reached, women reached, C-P-M per spot, C-P-M per schedule and so 
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on…And suddenly audience measurement surveys became the new toys of the time 
buyers. No buy was made without its being scientific…235 
 
Again, we find good reason to reject the notion that the substitution of data-based judgement for 
intuitive hunches is a recent phenomenon, unique to the age of “big data.” 
Formatting a Market 
As the foregoing suggests, the process of computerization placed demands not just on the volume 
of information but also on its format. “The computer age will ‘implore’ media to seek more data, 
and to make data uniform,” Advertising Age suggested.236 “Media, across the board, have been 
told bluntly to come up with more definitive, standardized data on their audiences.”237 Presaging 
problems of incommensurability and siloing that continue to plague automated, data-driven 
advertising, Broadcasting reported, “Lack of standard computer coding among segments of the 
advertising industry—agency, media and reps—is already seen as a deterrent to eventual 
computer integration of the advertising process.”238 Ideas about segmentation were likewise 
coupled with information technologies. In publicizing a 1963 report by the 4A’s, Broadcasting 
conveyed, “There was no question that the need for an attempt to set up a guide or standards for 
data on audience types has been hastened by the computer age.”239  
These developments revealed the conflicting pressures to collect more specialized, 
qualitative data, on the one hand, and to make that data conform to routine procedures and the 
abilities of computing machines, on the other. Demands for granular yet comparable audience 
data have been fairly persistent ever since, reaching a crescendo in recent years. Current 
initiatives to establish commensurable definitions and data sets for customized audience segments 
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must be seen as only the latest iteration of a longstanding effort to negotiate durable frameworks 
for targeting and accountability.240 One early institutional response to these challenges illustrates 
that the core of such activities is establishing infrastructure to format and coordinate marketplace 
activity—building sociotechnical scaffolding to enable rapid calculative action. 
In 1966, the Television Bureau of Advertising (TvB), a trade association representing 
commercial broadcasters, announced that it was budgeting $300,000 over the next five years for 
“liaison work” to help agencies, stations, and reps cohere around standardized information and 
communication protocols, which observers considered a necessary prerequisite for “industrywide 
integration of computerized buying and selling procedures.”241  The next year, TvB touted a 
“[b]lueprint for a uniform, computer-based system of spot television buying that could 
revolutionize the business.”242 The System of Spot (SOS) was designed to streamline 
administrative procedures and make spot TV easier to buy and sell. SOS introduced new paper 
forms which would create uniformity, reduce duplication of clerical work, and assign consistent 
codes for classifying actors, inventory units, and types of transactions. Most importantly, the 
forms were designed to format information and commerce in ways that would prepare the field 
for the “ultimate plan to computerize the buying and selling functions.”243 The manager of the 
project claimed that replacing the variety of forms and conventions in use across agencies, 
stations, and reps with common, codified procedures for requesting avails and confirming orders 
would rationalize the presentation of information—and, indeed, the representation of the market 
itself—to buyers and sellers. Formatted thusly, the information representing the market could be 
entered into, interpreted by, and exchanged among machines. Even as this initiative developed 
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slower than hoped, TvB continued to recognize that it was essentially trying to establish 
connectivity and eliminate friction from commercial and informational flows: “The idea is to 
make it easier for everyone to talk to one another. The goal: to make spot advertising easier to 
buy.”244 “Eventually,” one report confirmed, “the plan envisions a wired network linking 
agencies, reps and stations with a central computer into which orders would be fed and which 
would then make all the necessary calculations and automatically feed the information back to the 
agencies, reps and stations.”245  
Like the new columns in ratings books and, later, computer spreadsheets and software for 
managing inventory and expenditures, the System of Spot introduced new “calculative spaces”246 
for organizing market activity. As with so much of what is documented throughout this 
dissertation, information and communication technologies, including mundane implements like 
paper forms and alphanumeric codes for identifying elements in these transactions, were applied 
in the 1960s to lubricate commerce—to make it easier to buy and sell audiences. The TvB plan 
points toward two frontiers for advancing this mission that have since been engineered into 
programmatic advertising systems. We now consider the complementary projects of establishing 
interconnections to facilitate instant data exchange between buyers and sellers, and movements 
toward completely automated, machine-to-machine transactions  
Virtually Instantaneous: Networked Communication and Commerce 
Almost as soon as advertising agencies invested in computerization, some firms recognized the 
potential for networked data communications between media buyers and sellers. Leo Burnett 
began using IBM machines in December of 1960, and two years later Advertising Age reported 
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that “Burnett sees the day when leased lines will be used for simultaneous input and output of 
information between agencies and clients.”247 An executive from the agency mused in 1963, “I 
think it’s very reasonable to assume that the rep and the agency will directly tie-in into one 
another’s installations” in order to immediately access information about availabilities.248 By 
“linking” computer systems, he argued, the industry could automate “as much as possible the 
entire TV spot ordering, buying, billing, paying, reporting operations.”249  
Before the end of the decade some of the largest agencies had established direct data 
communication with rep firms via dedicated phone lines. The director of media and research at 
one agency explained how this altered daily routines: “Each evening the agency computer queries 
the reps’ computers for the latest availabilities in a given set of markets. Then, by tapes of ARB 
or Nielsen data, the agency computer can complete the rating and cost-per-thousand information 
the buyer requires. Each night a print-out is prepared and placed on the buyer’s desk for 
immediate action the next morning.” Compared with the chains of interactions previously 
required to obtain this information, he claimed, “this method employing computers is virtually 
instantaneous.”250 
Some commentators were careful not to get too swept up in futurism. Even strong 
proponents admitted that an “imaginary miracle machine” capable of automating the entire 
process of media buying was “not yet on the horizon” in the mid-1960s.251 Broadcasting observed 
in 1966, “The histories of companies born to supply the station-rep-agency triangle with 
automated central billing are replete with disappointments or, more to the point, failures.”252 Still, 
in spite of doubts, sober skepticism, and anxieties about human replacement, many observers 
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looked forward to a future in which more of media planning and buying would be handled 
entirely by programmed machines.  
For example, Dan O’Neill, president of the Advertising Data Processing Association and 
a researcher at McCann-Erickson, was one of what Broadcasting called “a growing school of 
media men who are trying to turn mechanical media selection into a more reliable science.” 
O’Neill predicted that “the mechanical revolution” would result in “fewer and larger rep houses 
in the future, all eventually working on an integrated real-time computerized system.” The 
“ultimate in computerized inventory control” imagined by others like O’Neill was “an on-line 
representation system [in which] all sales offices and stations would be connected by wire to a 
central computer, feeding sales information as quickly as it becomes known.” Foreshadowing 
much later developments in self-service dashboards and trading-desk software, the president at H-
R expected that by the early 1970s such a system would allow a salesman to “punch a keyboard at 
his desk with availability requirements and get an immediate visual response from the computer 
on a TV monitor.”253 Looking back on rep firms’ computer plans, Broadcasting reflected, “in 
general they tended to envision the machines as providing virtually instantaneous links to stations 
and agencies and serving as storehouses for avails that they rep could sell faster, in more quantity 
that ever before.”254 Discussing a similar “console” spot buying system that his agency would 
implement over the next few years, a vice president at Benton & Bowles looked forward from 
1967: “The computer will give the agency media buyer instant access to spot availabilities in 
every market. With a simple desk console he will be able to check availabilities and buy spots—
without ever using a pencil or picking up a phone.” By 1972, he expected, “the entire spot-buying 
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process—all the way from order, to conformation, to bill, to final payment—will be 
computerized.”255  
At a 1973 workshop convened by the ANA, participants continued to hope that 
computers could be used to create “a kind of stock-market approach” to buying spot TV.256 
Within a few months Broadcasting reported that the two leading providers of “on-line 
computerized information systems” to the commercial television industry had undertaken 
construction of a “three-way computer tie-in linking stations, ad agencies and rep firms.” Data 
Communications Corp. operated an on-line system for 67 radio and television stations, and 
Donovan Data Systems provided a comparable service to 14 of the top 20 ad agencies in the U.S. 
With the top three rep firms committed to participating, Broadcasting called it “the first step in an 
‘industry-wide common use of computers’ to handle national- and local-spot accounting ‘from 
the point of buy right through to the final payment of the invoice.’”257 By January of 1976, the 
Katz Agency, which was not in that group, claimed to be “the first independent station rep to 
operate [an] on-line availability-retrieval system,” which linked 12 sales offices to its New York 
computer facility.258 
In many ways, these were primitive attempts to establish the ad exchanges that 
interconnect supply- and demand-side platforms in the digital advertising ecosystem. The facility 
for speculating, or even confidently envisioning, a programmatic future should signal to us that 
even if the technical ability was still off in the distance, the desire and demand for information 
technologies that could manage more data at greater speeds and with mathematical precision 
existed at the dawn of the computer age. Generating, processing, and coordinating flows of 
information and commerce was, even then, the bedrock of audience manufacture, and in early 
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efforts to cope with mounting administrative pressures we glimpse the underlying dynamics that 
have continued to motivate developments toward automated and data-driven advertising. A media 
executive from Benton & Bowles testified succinctly to this point in describing his agency’s “on-
line computer system” in 1970: “The system has been built for the specific purpose of enabling us 
to handle more efficiently spot TV’s complexities.”259  
But as computing resources were appropriated to service existing demands, the 
expectations of what was possible changed. No doubt interested to see expanded use of his 
company’s products, a representative from RCA urged advertisers, agencies, and reps to take 
“initiative” in testing the computer’s capabilities. Suggesting that they dream up exotic questions 
to ask the new machines, he said, “computers can provide more answers than we have intelligent 
inquiries.”260 The implication, born out as researchers attempted more sophisticated forms of 
statistical inference, is that new technologies allowed for new ways of seeing, knowing, and 
managing the world. Practical consequences of this were experienced at the organizational level, 
as agencies such as Campbell-Ewald reoriented office spaces, shuffled personnel, and adjusted 
routines and responsibilities within and across corporate departments so as to “tie in with the hot 
computer system.”261 Executives at Needham, Harper & Steers noted similarly “the unlimited 
potentials of the computer for media research and planning.” The agency’s president declared the 
value of the computer to be constrained “only by the imagination of the people who plan its 
use.”262 Before concluding this chapter, we consider these people and how others reacted to their 
arrival. 
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Here Come the Math Men 
Marshall McLuhan began The Mechanical Bride (1951) with a startling observation about 
advertising and entertainment: “Ours is the first age in which many thousands of the best-trained 
minds have made it a full-time business to get inside the collective public mind. To get inside in 
order to manipulate, exploit, control is the object now.”263 A decade later, even more of the best-
educated people in America were enrolled in the marketing complex, and they had enlisted the 
service of the “mechanical brain.”   
Often today we hear about how “math men” are replacing advertising’s “mad men.” But 
this is not a new story. Early in the second half of the twentieth century, market research and 
positivistic social science became more tightly integrated, including in the area of media 
planning.264 By the 1960s, MIT professor Ithiel de Sola Pool was chairman of Simulmatics Corp., 
a company most famous for its involvement in the 1960 presidential election. Simulmatics’ 
“people machine” used mathematical simulations of voter behavior to help the Kennedy 
campaign make strategic decisions about how to communicate with parts of the electorate.265 As 
discussed above, Simlumatics also offered a “media-mix” product designed to instruct advertisers 
about how to spend their media budgets. A 1962 profile of Pool in Advertising Age cast him as 
the face of a cohort spurring the industry’s calculative evolution: “He is one of the new scholarly 
breed that has joined the advertising fraternity. It is composed of mathematicians, scientists and 
professors in the behavioral sciences who are attempting, with the help of computers to explore 
the great unknown areas in advertising.”266 Simulmatics’ media-mix was designed by a team that 
included a former director of economic and statistical services at CEIR, faculty from Columbia, 
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Yale, and Johns Hopkins, and a mathematician who developed a chess-playing computer program 
while working for IBM.267 
Of course, researchers were not new to advertising. John B. Watson, the “founder” of 
behavioral psychology, joined JWT in 1920, where the behaviorist project of predicting, 
conditioning, and controlling behavior found a generous welcome from an industry eager to both 
engineer consumer demand and present an image of scientific legitimacy.268 As a general matter 
in the development of modern advertising, “when difficulties in the coordination of selling and 
manufacturing began to develop” in the nineteenth century, “science was increasingly called upon 
to control the ‘human element’ in the distribution process.”269  
The forceful arrival of more mathematicians and behavioral scientists, then, was an 
intensification rather than an unprecedented development. Still, these experts brought special 
skills in new disciplines, and they portended fuller use of the computer’s capabilities. Noting the 
increasing demand within advertising and marketing industries for all manner of professional 
social scientists over the next two decades, Mattelart argues, “This qualitative shift in the 
recruitment of consultants and experts undoubtedly suggests a new phase in the attempt to 
penetrate the secrets of the black box [that is the ‘consumer’].”270   
Furthermore, the rise of calculation and optimization as core operational values signaled 
a transition in the nature of the media function, the composition of agency personnel, and power 
dynamics within the business that ultimately determined which sources of news and 
entertainment would be financed. Grey Advertising was one of many agencies to restructure its 
media department to keep “in step” with data-processing technology; it designated its spot buyers 
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specifically to become “specialists in using computerized data.”271 Independent service bureaus 
presented a particular threat to the status quo. “A small army of mathematicians and scientists has 
captured a share of agencies’ and advertisers’ media work,” one writer observed in 1962. “On the 
media front, salesmen are becoming statistically oriented or disgruntled or just plain 
‘bewildered.’” Already by then there was an expectation that “the ‘lush life of three-hour-
luncheons-and-cocktails’ may be over for some media salesmen, whose statistics are being 
increasingly scrutinized by computers.”272 The president of a leading rep firm admitted in 1969, 
“The old basis of buying on personality alone had 90-95% disappeared because of the increased 
demand for information.”273 An executive in RCA’s data-processing business suggested with that 
the ability to delegate spot-selection to computers, the “time buyer” would transition into 
something more like a “market analyst.”274 “A more sophisticated approach to media buying has 
been emerging for some time,” Broadcasting reported in 1970, “with the promise of more 
efficient budgets for advertisers and better utilization of the broadcast media.”275 
The institutional force of this shift is best expressed by the ascent of media buyers. 
Specialist media buying agencies began to emerge in the mid-1960s, promising clients campaign 
costs anywhere from 10% to 40% below what the media departments at full-service agencies 
delivered. By 1968 these “negotiator-buyer” companies were handling billings estimated to be as 
much as $225 million, with the overwhelming majority of that spending concentrated in spot 
TV.276 At the end of the decade, independent media buyers were managing 8% to 12% of national 
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spot spending, according to one estimate; and by the late 1980s, their share of spot TV buying 
was close to 30%.277 They figured into industry-wide changes in the media function. Ruthless 
negotiations toward maximizing cost-per-ratings-point became the default orientation, 
particularly in spot-buying, across both independent media services and within agencies’ own 
media departments.278 Even leading agencies, such as BBDO and DDB, availed themselves of 
these outside services, “often at the instigation of advertisers.”279 
Dedicated buying firms first courted clients by using bulk-buying to realize cost-
efficiencies, and by undercutting full-service agencies’ 15% commission on media spending. 
Gradually, though, these buyers repositioned their services. Placing less emphasis on their 
abilities to negotiate low prices, they promised customers the benefits of “scientific” techniques 
for “optimizing” advertising spending.280 Technical expertise became a hallmark of their role in 
the value chain, and thus a lever of influence in the media system. As electronic media and 
audiences underwent further “fractionalization” in the 1980s, the “multiplicity and complexity” of 
this marketplace deepened the reliance on specialized buyers, especially those with computer 
skills.281 By packaging their services partly around optimization, these firms—as well as the 
media departments within agencies—were catalysts encouraging more calculative practices and a 
more quantitative disposition. “The rise of the buying services,” Leo Bogart writes, “has 
quickened the demand for numbers to feed into the [computer] models.”282 Two media agency 
executives captured the prevailing spirit in 1976, predicting that for media buyers (and sellers), 
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“productivity and prosperity in the 1980’s will belong to those who can harness the technology of 
the computer.”283 Reflecting on the “era of data explosion” that followed in the 1980s, one 
researcher concluded that “the extent of computerization in media departments,” which outpaced 
other parts of agency operations, “suggests they are in the vanguard of change.”284 As these 
agencies were consolidated within global holding companies, claims to specialized knowledge, 
computing capabilities, and information resources further defined the media-buying mindset and 
vaulted the buying function into a position of “outsized importance” within communication 
systems.285  
There Goes Everyone Else? 
Despite considerable excitement and expectation surrounding computers, appreciation for these 
“high speed electronic wizards,” as the media manager at Benton & Bowles called them, was not 
universal.286 Responding to the demands of clients, and the needs of American business generally, 
ad agencies accommodated computers quickly. The supply side of the audience marketplace was 
more resistant. Reps worried that they might be eliminated entirely. In 1958 a vice president at 
the H-R rep firm cautioned against simply feeding ratings data into an electromechanical decision 
engine. “If we continue to play at the numbers game,” he warned, “we may all be replaced by a 
single Univac machine.”287 Although most doubted this eventuality, expert opinion was not 
always comforting. “While there are still a lot of problems to be solved,” a consultant to Leo 
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Burnett speculated, “it is only a matter of time before any piece of information about any 
advertising medium will be obtained instantaneously without having to go through a salesman 
intermediary. There will no longer be a need to have the media salesman per se on the other side 
of the desk.”288 Other “prophets” predicted similarly “the total eradication of repping in favor of 
rows of buttons and computer displays.”289  
Broadcasters were equally wary. As one observer said about the prospect of a centralized 
on-line exchange, “Stations aren’t going to put themselves at the mercy of the machine. They’d 
go bankrupt. And no good station manager lets all his inventory out of his control.”290 Throughout 
this history of automation, the supply side has feared and warned against a “nightmare of lowball 
rates submitted to reps by buying scavengers.”291 To this day, programmers guard their inventory 
fiercely, and nearly all programmatic advertising in premium video environments trades in 
private marketplaces, rather than the open auctions more typical of display and search 
advertising.292  
But automation anxieties went deeper, it seemed. Station managers exhibited 
“psychological resistance” to computers. Fearing “they would lose their jobs or be reduced to 
mechanical handmaidens,” they “weren’t quite prepared to turn over the nuts and bolts of their 
livelihood to a piece of blinking hardware.”293 An ad for the Cosmos Broadcasting Corporation 
made a further plea for humanity: “In these days of audience delivery based on computer-
analyzed demographics, cloned programs, media buying untouched by human minds, computer-
controlled this and automatic by-the-numbers that, we’d like to express a few thoughts about the 
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human equation…Computers are our tools, but until we find one that can say ‘ouch’ or ‘wow’ 
we’ll keep striving to build warm human relationships with all those to whom we hold ourselves 
responsible.”294 The tone of this copy suggests that by the end of the 1970s “human relationships” 
were perceived to be under assault from automation, if not already subjugated.  
These themes did turn up in discussions on the buy-side, including skepticism about the 
actual capacities of computers and anxieties about whether “that monster in the air conditioned 
room” would make personnel redundant.295 Reacting against a swelling tide of numeracy already 
in 1961, a Y&R executive complained, ‘The moment we bet our all on one-tenth of a rating point 
or on a five-cent difference in cost-per-thousand, then we have departed from reality.”296 Overall, 
though, the tenor among agencies was more sanguine, and these conversations usually ended with 
a reassurance that human judgment could never be eradicated.297 For example, when someone 
from Grey Advertising’s TV research department was asked if the computer would replace media 
buyers, she replied, “Not until they can make one that thinks. It’s still a machine. It will probably 
be a terrific step forward but it can’t know all the intricate problems or the details of coverage or 
all the other things a timebuyer must know.”298 Indeed, there were efforts to reinforce the 
legitimacy of automation. Y&R circulated an instructional pamphlet, “How the Elephant Bought 
His Spots,” to educate readers about how its computer helped the agency make decisions. The 
machine “does not supersede a media buyer’s judgement,” the pamphlet promised readers; 
instead, it supplements buyers with “its ability to do tremendous quantities of analytical 
arithmetic with unparalleled speed and chilling accuracy.”299 An economics professor at 
                                                          
294 “Cosmos Broadcasting Corporation” [advertisement], Broadcasting, January 1, 1979, 20-21. 
295 Heady, 88. 
296 “Media Buying: With or Without the Numbers?” 56. 
297 E.g., “People Not Computers, Make Agency Buying Decisions,” Broadcasting, October 5, 1964, 40; 
“The Computer and the Buyers and Sellers of of [sic] Broadcast Time,” 44-46. 
298 Electronic Brain for Timebuying,” 31. 
299 “Buying by Computer,” Broadcasting, August 12, 1963, 30. 
112 
 
 
Princeton University added authority to such claims, maintaining that the computer could be an 
invaluable tool, but “ultimate decisions and judgements will always remain in human hands.” 
“Unemployment does not threaten the media planner,” he added, “because the machine can never 
replace him—it can only act as an efficient assistant in his decision processes.”300  
Conventional thinking held that computing machines would liberate these knowledge 
workers from the drudgery of clerical chores and tedious calculations, allowing them to 
concentrate their time and energy on more creative, higher-order labors—a rationale that has been 
remarkably durable.301 “The computer is an expediting tool to improve human decision-making in 
advertising, not replace it,” Broadcasting declared in 1963.302 Of course, with agencies’ financial 
managers always welcoming savings on salaries, these reassurances seemed too loud and 
confident to be believable. And more than a few reports confirm that agencies made substantial 
cuts to “low-skill” staffers, even as they were compelled to hire personnel trained in the use of 
computers.303  
It was deeply ironic that the language used to describe computers as convenience 
technologies sparing workers from “drudgery” mirrored the appeals made to sell homemakers on 
electrical appliances and preprocessed cooking and cleaning products.304 Although trade press 
coverage does not confront the issue in full, a gendered dimension inflects anxieties about 
automation and job-loss. When Y&R and BBDO “unleash[ed] media computerization,” 
Advertising Age reported, “Both agencies denied rumors that computers will take over media 
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men’s jobs. ‘Only statistical-type positions will be affected.’”305 While “media men” may be an 
artifact of the idiom, it is conspicuous here since those “statistical-type positions” were far more 
likely to be staffed by women.306  
Both the gendered nature of the labor redundancies owing to automation, as well as the 
fascinating shift in perceptions of automated media buying and selling—from deep skepticism 
and anxiety to today’s exuberance for anything that eliminates subjectivity from programmatic 
advertising—are important areas for further investigation. Throughout this evolution of 
advertising, a key dynamic, it seems, is the tension between managerial efforts to eradicate the 
incalculable human element from rational economic activity and the resistance of workers to 
being eradicated from their jobs. 
Conclusion 
What we see in the discourse of the late 1950s and 1960s are attempts to work out and define the 
affordances of computers and other information-processing technologies for advertising and 
media buying. Actors positioned those affordances in relation both to the challenges of routine 
business operations and to potential opportunities for advancement toward grander, evolutionary 
ambitions. While the introduction of new technologies and techniques excited imaginations and 
stretched conceptions of what could be possible, the affordances attributed to these resources had 
a basis in existing conditions, demands, and motivating values. Specifically, they reflected and 
extended the need to manage complex flows of information and commerce, as well as the dreams 
of reducing judgments to mathematical probabilities, approaching optimal allocative decisions, 
and verifying advertising’s effect on sales. During this period, the media-marketing complex 
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began to appropriate digital computers within its technical and administrative infrastructures, and 
to articulate their functions to the priorities and processes of selling the American people. The 
materiality and organization of media planning, buying, and selling were adjusted to new 
resources for expanding, accelerating, and reformatting calculation. 
As in other areas of the U.S. economy, computerization was tentative at first and then 
increased as the technology became better understood and more affordable. 307 Although many of 
the early visions escaped immediate realization, the discourse analyzed in this chapter helped 
shape the meanings and expectations surrounding information technology and calculative 
techniques. These visions provided conceptual frames for imagining advancement in advertising 
and audience manufacture. They also constructed the uses of computers in ways that reinforced 
the authority of operations that were suitable for or supportive of mathematical optimization. The 
fact that current debates echo so many of the statements revealed in this historical research 
suggests that programmatic advertising belongs to a longer arc of development in the 
appropriation and use of information technologies to pursue numerical precision, efficiency, and 
control in producing consumers and commodity audiences. Efforts to eradicate the incalculable, 
exploit new profit opportunities, and verify ROI are not recent trends in advertising, but rather 
engines driving developments over the past 60 years. 
While advertisers were getting more creative about how they reached out to prospective 
customers, appealing to irony and individuality, they were also getting more calculating about 
how they constructed the public. Computers and databases helped them become more 
discriminating in deciding who they should try to reach and how certain groups and individuals 
could be classified, evaluated, and targeted. The next chapter looks at how advertisers and ad 
sales organizations continued to leverage ICTs and data resources toward improving efficiency—
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this time by dividing the consumer population into smaller and more precisely defined units. To 
eliminate waste, organizations selling cable audiences tried to package specific households so that 
advertisers could exclusively engage the people they deemed valuable.  
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Chapter Three – Addressing the American Person: Designs for Producing an 
Audience of One 
 
 
Imagine a world where you’re connected to your target audience at home, or on the go, 
across devices, maximizing return on video advertising by serving ads to the right 
consumers on the right screen at the right time. Delivering your brand message at scale, 
across the nation, with no waste, now at a device level. This isn’t science fiction. This is 
AT&T AdWorks. Taking addressable advertising further than ever before. Welcome to 
the point of more return.”  
 
– AT&T AdWorks promotional video308 
 
In a generous appraisal of foresight, business historian Margaret Graham posits, “With the advent 
of the transistor it was possible to foresee the arrival of truly individualized (or at least 
customized) information, and with that a resulting fragmentation of the collective experience.”309 
Considerable effort was needed to make way for that “arrival.” This chapter examines the 
maneuverings of a faction within the welcoming committee, and their migration from obscurity to 
the center of advertising and commercial media. It is about efforts to reshape audience 
manufacture around the targeting of individual consumers. With advertisers using computers to 
become more discriminating about how to buy attention and influence people, and with ideas 
about an “information society” penetrating visions for the future of mediated commerce, cable 
television became a bridge toward a direct marketing world. The next chapter looks at interactive 
merchandising via cable. This chapter shows how people recognized the new media environment 
as offering opportunities to move beyond segmentation, toward individualization. 
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A “Death Knell” for Demographics? 
Marketers have always used demographics as a proxy for information they wanted but could not 
easily acquire or exploit. Like audience ratings, and market research generally, demographics 
exist to tame complexity so that strategic actors can “know” and orient themselves toward the 
realities in which they operate.310 Technologies for collecting and analyzing data have both 
responded to and urged forward marketers’ efforts to sort customers into finer segments.311 
Working with data brokers, technology vendors, and other partners, marketers have sought 
increasingly detailed predications about correlations between observed attributes and probable 
purchasing behaviors. But even as these developments brought demographics into sharper focus 
within industrial discourse and strategy, they invited speculation about an approaching horizon 
where demographics might become less useful, even obsolete.  
Already by 1994 an article in Advertising Age wondered whether industry pressure 
toward more precise behavioral targeting signaled the “death knell” for age and sex 
demographics. The vice president and group supervisor of communications and information 
services at Young & Rubicam put it bluntly: “When you come right down to it, talking about a 
demo like women 25 to 54 means absolutely nothing…Yes, women buy a lot of products, but 
different women buy different products. Our job is to figure out which women buy our clients’ 
products and target them.” Some on the supply side promised to deliver the capabilities these 
buyers wanted. Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI), then the largest cable operator, was “promoting 
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the concept of ‘cream zones’ that will enable advertisers to reach only the households they want: 
single-parent families, Cadillac owners, frequent fliers or any other consumer profile.” The 
company’s corporate director of ad sales captured the spirit of direct marketing, boasting, “The 
universe will be as few as one and as many as an advertiser would like.”312 
These were not new ambitions. Far from it. Since at least the 1960s marketers had 
discussed and invested in more sophisticated techniques for segmenting consumer populations—
by classifying psychographic attributes, analyzing geographic clustering of lifestyle groups, and 
collecting and integrating data from more sites of observation to gain comprehensive portraits of 
individual consumers.313 These efforts derived from several factors, including a recognition that 
understanding, predicting, and influencing how individuals behave in marketplaces required 
marketers to contend with personal characteristics that spilled across the simplistic categories of 
“age” and “sex.” The “death knell” heard in the 1990s was, in fact, an echo of noises sounded 
three decades before. As early as 1967 Broadcasting reported, “Demographic measurements 
currently used to define audiences are becoming less and less meaningful as the ‘life styles’ of 
people are becoming more and more diverse.” The proposed remedy—as in the 1990s—was to 
understand audiences “in behavioral as well as demographic terms.”314 
An interest in disaggregating mass audiences into more unique lifestyle categories and 
behavioral profiles has been a part of marketing thought for more than half a century. But to 
operationalize within the processes of audience manufacture definitions of consumers that are 
more complex and less standardized presents serious administrative challenges. Even as 
Advertising Age contemplated a post-demographic future in the 1990s, David Poltrack, the senior 
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vice-president of research and planning at CBS, pointed out that demographics provided a 
“currency” for media buying. “This is essentially a commodity marketplace,” he said, “and in a 
commodity marketplace, you need something to base your pricing on.”315 Despite extensive 
efforts to refine targeting in the past 25 years, demographics have not died. As recently as 2017, 
the president of North American operations at IPG’s media agency, Magna Global, complained 
that media buyers devote an “inordinate amount of time” to defining precise, custom target 
audiences for their advertising clients, “and then ultimately, when we go to market, we end up 
buying a Nielsen age/sex demo, adults 18-49. It’s entirely disingenuous to the front part of the 
process.”316 He is hardly alone in expressing frustration with established business protocols that 
have required data-derived audience segments to be “translated” into a less precise currency for 
“deal-making.”317 To conform to standard procedures for packaging audiences, one source told 
me, the media buyer sacrifices “a tremendous amount of fidelity” from the targeting prescribed 
by the agency’s media planners.318 Like Poltrack’s rejoinder to forecasters, these testimonies alert 
us to the important fact that audience manufacture is enmeshed within an institutional and 
infrastructural fabric that has tended to resist change. Indeed, a central contradiction in audience 
manufacture involves the ambition to collect more granular information and target more exactly, 
on the one hand, and the difficulties (and costs) of incorporating detail and precision into 
commercial routines, on the other hand. It is not totally surprising, then, that industry actors still 
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look forward to a one-to-one future in television, and still grouse about the limitations of 
demographics and ratings.  
“Welcome to the Point of More Return” 
Not for the first time, practitioners and pundits today claim that the advertising industry has 
arrived at a watershed moment in its pursuit of the individual. Recently, the head of global data 
partnerships at IBM’s Watson Advertising division—which provides services rooted in artificial 
intelligence and big-data analytics—linked individual-level targeting to the state of the art for 
managing information. He suggests that the settlement around broad targeting criteria like age 
and sex reflected the properties of the administrative technologies used historically in commercial 
media industries. He frames the issue in terms sufficiently intriguing to warrant extended 
quotation: 
I think demographics are a kind of historical artifact. The way media was distributed, the 
way analytics functioned—up until recently, essentially, on paper—demanded a way to 
simplify information, to separate who you want to reach versus who you don’t want to 
reach and assign value to those that will likely buy your product, and not waste your 
money by going after people that don’t. And demographics provided a very uniform, very 
stable, very consistent way to wrap people’s investment in nice bundles and then deploy 
them…But now that technology and infrastructure allow us to really have [a] high 
resolution [profile] of the individual, really understand how the individual functions—
what they buy, where they go, what their interests are, what media they’re consuming—
there really is no need for that kind of generalization at the demographic level. 
 
He is suggesting that demographics provided a way of coping with the limited capacities 
of existing technologies—like paper forms—to manage all the data about individual behaviors 
that could be relevant for marketing. He goes on to argue that big-data analytics afford the 
opportunity to advance beyond rationalization, incorporating more information into calculations 
about whom to target and how:  
[N]ow we can try to at least calculate the value of the individual and what that represents 
for a marketer at a moment in time and at a place. And, so, the demographic 
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simplification of the complexity of the real world, I would say, is not necessary anymore 
because we have other means to get to that value for the marketer.319 
 
In other words, demographic categories substituted conveniently for an abundance of information 
that could not be effectively collected, managed, and incorporated into business processes. If, in 
the past, advertisers had to pare away information that was unsuitable for computation, he argues 
that today the capacities for analyzing data have advanced to a point where there is nothing that 
cannot be counted and calculated.  
In many ways this opinion is typical of the breathless enthusiasm for behavioral targeting 
one finds in industrial discourses. But the characterization of demographics and audience 
aggregation as “artifacts” of the available technologies for managing information and commerce 
is more provocative than most prognostications. It acknowledges the centrality of data processing 
and communication in audience manufacture, and it casts back-end, administrative infrastructures 
in a role no less important than technologies for distributing and accessing content. Setting aside 
its deterministic undertones, we can use this idea to point our compass toward an investigation of 
the historical processes by which the capability to target individual consumers has been designed 
and constructed.  
This chapter examines efforts to develop institutions and infrastructures for producing 
and selling an audience of one. We will see that addressable advertising did not emerge, naturally 
and new-born, from the internet’s architecture for routing communications to a specified 
recipient. Achieving the one-to-one future, as it was once called, has an older legacy than online 
advertising, and it has involved the assembly and refinement of organizational as well as 
technological capacities. To understand this historical process, we return to the informational and 
commercial flows in the spot advertising market. Once again, it is a story about how the 
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advertising industry has appropriated information technologies to transact more easily and 
efficiently. And, once again, it is at least as much a tale of evolution, driven by dynamics and 
tensions at the heart of the media-marketing complex, as one of an abrupt and exogenous 
disruption. 
The Long History of Waste Management  
Advertisers have always been concerned about wasting money to solicit people who contribute 
nothing to sales. “The idea [for addressable advertising] definitely comes from Wanamaker,” 
Tracey Scheppach told me, “and that goes back 100 years.” 320 Half a century later, the theory of 
market segmentation arrived just as major advertising agencies were reorganizing operations 
around the affordances of digital computers. Discrimination, precision, and speed were hallmarks 
of how media planners and buyers understood the potential of electronic data processing. 
Segmentation and computerization made obvious allies. Capturing the hope surrounding this 
pairing, Advertising Age began its coverage of a 1964 seminar organized by the Broadcast 
Advertising Club of Chicago with a headline reading, “Computers Open New Vistas in 
Pinpointing Audiences.”321 Twelve years later, two media executives recognized the “precision 
and control afforded by computers” as a boon both to the sellers of inventory and to buyers, who 
could better calculate the value of that inventory and “zero in on audiences that are the most 
lucrative prospects for their products.”322 The ability to apprehend and exploit finer differences—
and profit opportunities—became an irresistible force bending the trajectory of commercial 
media. 
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Looking back at the inflection point in advertising history discussed in the last chapter, 
we can see that automation and accountability were not the only “advanced” affordances 
recognized by advertisers and agencies. Proponents of linear programming algorithms, for 
example, appreciated that their optimization models could be designed to isolate preferred 
audience segments. “Linear programming aims its primary emphasis against the marketing 
concept and who buys the product, instead of delivering just any kind of people at the lowest 
cost,” wrote Herbert Maneloveg, BBDO’s media director. “By relating marketing profiles of the 
consumer to the media audience we now determine through the computer’s mathematical process 
how to maximize exposure opportunities against our best prospects. We can come out with a cost 
per thousand against those people likely to buy.”323 Anticipating developments that have 
intensified since then, Maneloveg identified targeting and efficiency as the media buyer’s twin 
priorities: “It’s not how much mass he buys, but how little waste. Linear programming helps 
show us how to minimize waste.”324  
These early discussions of computerized media buying reveal frameworks for thinking 
about advances in advertising technique that have gradually become central to the industry. 
Anticipating addressability, a media executive from Benton & Bowles inferred that computers 
allow marketers to “place emphasis on individuals, rather than households.”325 Perceiving the 
broader trend toward data-driven targeting, a contemporary observed, “the machines are simply 
another tool in a continual search to refine information as to who are the clients’ best prospects 
and which are the media that can best speak (and as exclusively as possible) to these 
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prospects.”326 Another agency executive said the “key” to extracting efficiencies from his 
company’s computer system was to “delineate product buyer profiles with extreme accuracy.”327 
Consistent with general dynamics in the calculative evolution, Seymour Banks, a vice president at 
Leo Burnett, explained that as his firm oriented more operations around its computer system, “we 
find it necessary to go into finer and finer detail on marketing strategy.”328 
In the same spirit, Banks pointed toward what is now called audience-based buying: “The 
reason why this computer work is so important is not merely to save paperwork—although this is 
obviously important. The real value to clients is that we’re regarding media as the means of 
reaching pre-designated marketing targets.”329 An early example of this strategy in action was 
reported by Broadcasting in 1966. Needham, Harper & Steers was trying to buy spots in a 
southern market to promote its client’s hair treatment. The agency had initially agreed to one 
station’s proposal of showing the company’s advertisement weekly in the local evening news—a 
reliable vehicle for reaching an audience. But the agency’s business was later won by a rival 
station represented by a sales firm that based its pitch on a computer-generated schedule. In 
contrast to the popular news program, the winning schedule “seemed on the surface to be a 
haphazard group of four spots.” The computer analysis apparently convinced the sponsor that this 
mix was better suited to meet its marketing objectives. This process of “switch-pitching”—
winning business from a competitor by better matching the customer’s needs—was not new to 
spot buying; what was novel about this case was that by crunching numbers mechanically and 
revealing hidden value in available inventory, the rep firm was able to win the pitch with a 
schedule that defied conventional wisdom. It illustrates an early effort to find audiences, 
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irrespective of the surrounding content.330 The chairman of the Television Bureau of Advertising 
articulated the general strategy with remarkable clarity the next year, when, as Broadcasting 
reported, “He urged advertisers…to buy the audience rather than the time period.”331 
By the 1970s the notion that advertisers were buying a demographically-defined audience 
rather than a time slot was understood and becoming institutionalized in the television business. 
Computers and calculative protocols contributed to this situation, as Erik Barnouw explains in the 
case of network advertising: “Negotiations between sponsor and network, via the sponsor’s 
advertising agency, now resembled transactions to deliver specific blocks of viewers…Gone were 
the days when sponsor decisions might derive from personal reactions to program…Hunches 
were out, science in. A sponsor did not even need to watch programs. He watched charts and 
computer terminals.”332  
This was the state of thinking in media and marketing when cable television began 
lurching toward maturity. As national advertisers in the U.S. looked for ways to profitably exploit 
minute distinctions among, and even within market segments, the mindset of targeting people 
based on differences in class, race, location, or other lifestyle categories, which could be 
multiplied through the use of database technology, exerted a structuring influence on the media 
system.333 But efforts to target individuals pressed against the limits of the satellite distribution 
system that delivered the same video stream to cable headends across the country. While 
networks like MTV, BET, and Bravo tailored programming to attract only desired consumers, 
these distributors had no technical means for targeting specific viewers. The potential ability to 
address a video message to an individual consumer resided with the cable operators who 
exhibited programs and ads. The move from segmentation to addressable advertising, therefore, 
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goes through cable operators and the spot cable market, and it involves the dual problems of 
isolating specific viewers and marketing those individuals to advertisers.  
The history of cable advertising reveals various actors groping toward the goal of placing 
the right ad in front of the right viewer—collecting and utilizing personal data throughout the 
process. The goal of addressable advertising confronted overlapping administrative and technical 
challenges. In particular it involved the building up of organizational capacity for packaging and 
selling cable inventory in ways that conformed to the routines and expectations of large brand 
marketers. This process manifested a contradiction between the size and standardization needed 
to appeal to these advertisers and their agencies, and the granularity and precision touted as 
cable’s direct marketing advantage. Navigating between mass marketing and direct marketing 
occasioned logistical dilemmas for the supply side of the market, which (like we saw in the 
previous chapter) enrolled ICTs in bureaucratic capacities. We work toward the present by 
considering how ambitions for addressable advertising intensified as the promise of new digital 
and interactive devices became a wishing well into which actors poured their hopes for the future. 
(Before proceeding, you may want to see Appendix C for a brief primer on spot cable.) 
A March Toward Addressable Advertising 
In many ways, addressability and cable advertising developed on parallel tracks, seldom 
intersecting until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Serious discussions about local cable advertising 
began around 1970, soon after the Federal Communications Commission proposed a number of 
rules regarding the development of cable television, including a mandate that systems with at 
least 3,500 subscribers (roughly 300 of the 2,500 systems in operation at the time) begin 
originating programming locally.334 Despite doubts that ad sales could cover program costs, 
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which by one operator’s estimate would require selling spots for anywhere from four to 20 times 
the price of a comparable radio ad, some observers saw a promising future, and a few firms 
prepared to act as sales reps to national and regional advertisers.335 By the middle of the decade, 
more than 600 cable systems were originating programming, and these operators reported median 
advertising sales of $7,500 in 1974, with the most lucrative systems claiming as much as 
$225,000.336  
Advertising agencies budgeted funds for cable only tentatively, in part because, as J. 
Walter Thompson discovered, there was “simply no way to evaluate efficiency.” The vice 
president of Compton Advertising listed two major reasons for national advertisers’ reluctance to 
invest in cable, one being “the abject lack of statistical information,” and other being 
administrative deficiencies that made buying difficult—chiefly, the lack of sale agents 
representing more than a single cable system. “Like the snake eating its own tail,” he warned, 
“the advertising budgets will not include consideration of cable till cable operators organize 
themselves better. And the latter will not organize into better ‘networked’ groups until they can 
see the big dollars coming their way.”337  
As a satellite-distribution system connected cable operations across the country, the early 
success of advertiser-supported networks both inspired optimism about advertising on local 
systems but also magnified the challenges of administering this market. According to one source, 
United Press International pioneered the practice of allowing operators to insert local 
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advertisements into commercial time on a nationally-delivered channel, as an incentive for 
operators to carry its news service. The UPI offering was short-lived, but CNN and others 
successfully replicated the strategy.338 By 1980, a leading vendor of ad-insertion equipment 
counted eleven networks offering local availabilities to cable operators, including ESPN, BET, 
and USA Network. Already there was an awareness that the “specialization” of cable 
programming “allows advertisers to ‘zero-in’ on a selected target audience.”339 But only about 15 
percent of cable systems were generating ad sales, and cable’s $60 million in total advertising 
revenues looked puny next to subscription income exceeding $2.5 billion.340 At just $8 million, 
spot advertising constituted about a third of one percent of those combined revenues. A sales 
manager at one of the first cable systems to build a successful advertising business put the 
incremental revenue he helped deliver into perspective, saying, “It takes my 35 people a whole 
year to get the same amount of revenue that the system gets in one month from subscription 
fees.”341 Advertising sales, therefore, ranked low among cable operators’ priorities. Stating the 
matter frankly, the chief financial officer at Warner Communications told managers from 
Warner’s cable division in the early 1980s that their local advertising revenue did not even 
register as a rounding error on the conglomerate’s balance sheet.342  
Making this market would take a lot of work. Gerry Levin of Time, Inc. urged the cable 
industry to commit to establishing bedrock organizational capacities to sustain a reliable business. 
He encouraged operators “to build the infrastructure simply to make advertising sales meaningful 
at the local level…This is going to take a few years,” he warned. “So anyone who has entered the 
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business with the notion that there will be a lot of advertising revenues early on its [sic] going to 
be disappointed.”343 By 1984, more than 800 cable systems had established “local advertising 
sales capabilities,” and this was a revenue source of increasing importance, with at least 30 
technology vendors claiming to “design and build commercial insertion equipment for the cable 
industry.”344 But, selling and inserting ads—especially from national sponsors—still proved more 
challenging than many had hoped. That year a financial analyst elaborated the “problems and 
potentials” for cable advertising, which he considered the “most important new cash flow source 
for the cable operator.” Among the problems—beyond cable operators’ reluctance to invest the 
$100,000 he estimated as necessary to install capital equipment, including ad-insertion 
technology and traffic and billing systems—the analyst noted barriers within the organizational 
culture: “selling advertising is not in the mainstream of ‘traditional’ cable operations. It requires a 
different technology, creates a different set of operating problems, requires a different 
mindset.”345 
The mindset at the heart of the cable business continued to see advertising as a petty 
adjunct to subscription. But over the course of the 1980s, a sales infrastructure emerged around 
the periphery, and with it a mindset fixed on extracting new value from available inventory. Larry 
Zipin was the corporate head of ad sales at Time Warner Cable. He explained the maturation of 
spot cable as being about refinements in packaging and selling audiences. 
Me and my peers at the other cable companies, we kept saying, again, “The inventory is 
finite at the macrolevel. But, how many different ways can we slice it?” Cuz, you know, 
if you sell a loaf of bread for a dollar, you get a dollar. If the bread has 50 slices and you 
can sell each slice for a dime, how much money are you making? Now, if I can slice the 
bread 50 [more] ways and sell each one for a nickel, how much am I making? … We kept 
slicing that loaf of bread and started making more and more money with the inventory we 
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already had. And that’s how [the] business goes from being a mom and pop shop to being 
a multi-billion-dollar enterprise.346 
 
But as we will see a bit later, slicing that inventory was no piece of cake. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The cartoon in this early advertisement for cable ad-insertion equipment gestures 
toward the complexities of the process and the importance of automation. Though spot cable was 
still in its infancy, the ad touches on logistical capacities that would become central to more 
sophisticated ways of serving ads, including remote control of interconnected operations, 
random-access sequencing of spots, and integration with automatic verification and billing 
systems. It might be a stretch too far to see this many-handed machine as an analogy for “digital” 
ad tech. (Cable Television Business, April 15, 1983, 32) 
 
Meanwhile, closer to the core subscription business, cable operators were developing 
addressable capabilities. As a technology for discriminating between households and devices that 
are or are not authorized to access certain products or services, addressability has a long history in 
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cable television. Addressable set-top converter boxes (STBs) and control systems were designed 
to administer “conditional access,” meaning that the central computer could recognize a specific 
device and determine if it was eligible to receive a given signal. “In an addressable system,” 
Broadcasting explained, “the headend and the home terminals are tied together by a computer,” 
which allows the operator to control the system remotely.347 As a 1983 advertisement from Zenith 
put it, the company’s addressable set-top converter let operators “‘talk’ to over one million 
individual subscribers from the headend.”348 Addressability provided a basis for packaging 
programming into tiers, for excluding non-subscribers from premium channels like HBO, and for 
enabling certain pay-per-view functions. It also meant that customer services could be initiated, 
altered, or discontinued with a few keystrokes at the headend instead of sending a technician on 
an expensive “truck roll” to a customer’s premises.  
By the 1980s, home terminals and the computer equipment for headend facilities were 
becoming more sophisticated and affordable. Operators could expect to pay approximately $135 
for an addressable converter box and $150,000 for the computer control system.349 While still a 
considerable expense for most operators, it was within reach of large multiple system operators 
(MSOs), and so addressable cable systems began to gain a “foothold.”350 The president of the 
Motion Picture Association of America, interested in the implications for pay-per-view, estimated 
that in 1983 about 500,000 homes were connected to addressable technology.351 By 1990, some 
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9.3 million addressable set-top boxes had been deployed.352 Homes equipped for addressable 
advertising are expected to number 70 million by 2019.353 
While addressability enabled a cable operator to identify and communicate exclusively 
with each set-top box from the headend, the idea of sending individually targeted video ads was 
not close to being accommodated by the capacity of the analog cable plant, since it would have 
required reserving dedicated channels for advertisements. That made no financial sense when 
state of the art systems had 54 to 66 channels, and most operators had 36 or fewer. Still, fairly 
early in this development, observers glimpsed portends of profound change.  
By the early-1970s, the cable industry recognized that home terminal equipment, 
networked to an operator’s central computers, could be the gateway to a suite of futuristic 
functions and services, including interactive (or “two-way”) communication, e-commerce, and 
market research.354 In a technical paper prepared for the National Cable Television Association 
(NCTA), the general manager of planning for Pioneer Corporation, a maker of cable system 
equipment, cast addressability as the foundation for a transformative process of media 
convergence. “At Pioneer,” he wrote in 1981, “we view ‘Addressable Control’ not as an end, but 
rather the start of a new beginning for cable…A first big step toward the marriage of computer, 
cable, and the consumer.” He went on, wondering, “Could it be that the computer technology 
called ‘Addressable Control’ will eventually breed such changes in our industry that some day 
‘cable television’ might even be a misnomer for the services we provide?”355 The next year, a 
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product brochure for Scientific-Atlanta’s addressable STB underscored the effort to engineer this 
convergence: “Scientific-Atlanta introduces the computer that thinks it’s a set-top terminal.”356 In 
describing a packet-switched network for two-way data communications, Paul Baran, one of the 
architects of the internet, suggested that cable operators’ need for “addressable converter 
capability to control pay TV delivery” would allow for new interactive services to “come along as 
a byproduct.”357 Although rarely acknowledged in scholarship, addressable cable systems 
represent an early and significant step in the introduction of networked computing devices—
reporting to a remote control center and integrated with a customer management database—into 
millions of American homes. 
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Figure 3.2 This 1982 promotion for Scientific-Atlanta’s 8500 addressable terminal, powered by 
microprocessors, informed the cable operator that it’s “central billing computer can ‘talk’ to the 
addressable 8500” by way of what it called an “Intelligent Control Unit.” (Courtesy of the Barco 
Library, the Cable Center) 
 
Direct marketing figured into the services cable operators and technology vendors 
imagined following from addressability, but targeted national advertising was not a priority. That 
would begin to change over the course of the decade. Spot cable was a modest but rapidly 
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growing business in the 1980s. Cable systems recorded gross advertising billings of $8 million in 
1980, $167 million in 1985, and $634 million in 1990. By 1995 billings exceeded $1.4 billion.358 
Spot advertising had become more important to a cable industry that saw new subscriptions 
approaching a plateau and that faced rate regulation of its main revenue source in 1992. With 
“advertising loom[ing] as among the most promising lines of business not touched by government 
oversight,” one cable sales manager from Atlanta said in 1993, “We’re going from the ugly 
stepchild of the cable industry to a group they’ll bow in reverence to.”359  
The most successful ad sales operations were generating up to $32 per subscriber per year 
at the start of the 1990s,360 and by the mid-1990s, spot advertising was contributing significant 
free cash flow straight to the bottom line. From 1990 to 1994, the yearly cash flow margin on ad 
sales across MSOs ranged from about 43 to 51 percent.361 At Time Warner Cable, it represented 
the third most important source of cash flow, behind subscription and consumer equipment, but 
ahead of pay-per-view.362 In 1996 one observer called local advertising “the fastest-growing 
portion of cable.”363 No less a figure than John Malone, the CEO of TCI, trumpeted the 
significance of advertising to cable systems, projecting its contribution as a percentage of TCI’s 
cable TV revenues to triple between 1993 and 1998.364 The next year, TCI reported a 27 percent 
increase in ad sales, and soon after it hired new staff as “part of a sweeping new emphasis on its 
advertising sales operations.”365 Industrywide spot revenues quadrupled during the 1990s, 
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finishing the decade at $2.667 billion. All this was set against a context in which cable’s share of 
audience viewing was rapidly approaching parity with broadcasting. 
Interest in engineering cable systems for addressable advertising increased with the 
maturation of the spot business and optimism about the computer-processing power of digital set-
top boxes that operators planned to install in subscribers’ homes. In 1989 General Instrument, 
which made set-top boxes for TCI and other operators, applied for a patent covering a “method 
and apparatus for providing demographically targeted television commercials” on cable systems 
through an addressable converter.366 In a contribution to the NCTA’s 1992 collection of 
Technical Papers, engineers at Cable Laboratories Inc. (CableLabs), a research consortium 
mandated to coordinate and advance developments in cable technology, characterized targeted 
advertising as a structural advantage cable enjoyed against emergent direct-to-home satellite 
services: “The cable industry is uniquely positioned to implement architecture which enables 
advertisers the ability to ‘precision market’ its [sic] products on the basis of geographic and 
demographic boundaries.”367 Bill Harvey, a veteran of advertising and media research, was 
among those recognizing this potential. In 1993, as CEO of Next Century Media, Harvey told 
Cable Avails magazine, “As soon as you add interactivity and addressability you’ve got a direct 
response medium…The ability to database and manage this subscriber base will move spot cable 
beyond traditional TV…Spot cable will become the most interesting medium out there.”368 
Harvey and other enthusiasts saw in digital set-top boxes the potential to customize spot cable 
commercials for specific viewers. “That’s the promise of advertising executives,” one journalist 
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wrote in 1996, “who say that new digital technology will not only let cable spot advertisers reach 
geographic zones but will someday create the cable equivalent of direct mail: individualized ads 
targeted to neighborhoods and households.” The media director at TBWA Chiat/Day warned, 
however, “It will take the commitment to invest in the technologies that allow us to deliver these 
ads to an individual household.”369 
This overview has been bookended by exhortations for “commitment” to building 
infrastructures on which a meaningful spot cable advertising business could be built. Considering 
the promises and expectations for a digitalized advertising system that were beginning to frame 
discussions about near-term and future capabilities, David Verklin, the corporate media director 
at Hal Riney & Partners, encapsulated the perspective of national buyers in 1992. “I think we’ll 
beat a path to their door,” he said of agencies’ interest in what cable systems may be able to offer, 
“but they’ve got to play by the same rules that we use to buy spot television.” 370 Stepping back 
from addressability for a moment, let’s take a closer look at how the spot cable business 
negotiated those rules and assembled itself into a billion-dollar sector of audience manufacture 
and a testing ground for ad tech and digital marketing strategy. 
Packaging Cable Audiences 
From the mid-1980s onward, actors involved in cable ad sales tried to build technical and 
administrative capacities that would help them appeal credibly to national advertisers, while also 
accentuating cable’s direct marketing capabilities. The demand side exerted continued pressure 
on cable operators to make their audiences easier to buy and measure. Cable experienced a set of 
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tensions similar to other media involved in selling the American people. On one hand, audience 
manufacture calls out for standards, protocols, and routines to facilitate transactions; on other the 
other hand, producing verified sales involves a thrust toward personalization and granularity that 
complicates the buying and selling of audiences. Cable was a vehicle for advancing the 
convergence of these two domains—the production of audiences and the production of sales. But 
to begin this movement required some conformity to prevailing norms and habits. Several 
industry-wide developments shaped the spot cable business in ways that provide insights about 
the broader evolution of targeted advertising. 
Getting to Know the Audience 
For starters, advertisers wanted evidence of audience attention by which they could account for 
their spending. In general, advertising agencies preferred to transact around the same metrics used 
in the market for broadcast audiences; but, near the margins of the business, some people were 
open to a certain amount of flexibility, on the belief that cable was by nature a medium for 
targeted rather than mass advertising. Even in the latter case, though, advertisers and agencies 
insisted in the mid-1980s that the “cable industry must supply more subscriber data,” including 
“thorough statistical profiles” of the people and communities served by their systems.371 The 
president of the Cabletelevision Advertising Bureau (CAB), a trade group representing the 
industry’s advertising interests, expected Nielsen ratings to persist as “the strongest currency in 
the television marketplace,” but, like others, he saw in cable an opportunity to move from a mass 
exposure paradigm toward an orientation that would privilege targeting and a sensitivity to 
results: “the challenge is to process and analyze audience data in a more precise relationship to 
marketing goals.”372  
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Even as broadcasters liked to remind advertisers of the deficiencies in cable audience 
measurement, it was recognized by many at the time that in the long run cable was in a superior 
position to generate data about its viewers.373 As early as 1982, a letter to the editor of 
Broadcasting insisted that set-top boxes—especially “intelligent” devices equipped with 
microprocessors—could be used to “poll” the entire cable system and measure precisely who was 
watching what. “Amazingly,” the author wrote, “such on-line, realtime data gathering capability 
is within reach of the industry using currently available technology.”374 Equipment vendors used 
this as a selling point in product catalogs. A 1992 brochure for Pioneer’s addressable technology 
products told cable operators, “Viewer Statistics – can be used as an advertising and marketing 
tool which allows you to take five global or individual ‘snapshots’ of the programming 
subscribers are viewing at a given instant in time.”375 Already by 1988 Pioneer’s marketing 
materials described these lists of “the programming every subscriber watched at a single instant in 
time” as “invaluable information for advertisers on subscriber viewing habits.”376 While at least 
one equipment-maker pointed out that viewer statistics would be reported anonymously in 
aggregate, a main component of addressable control systems was that they integrated software 
and databases for billing and other clerical functions, which linked a subscriber file to a specific 
set-top device. When General Instrument patented a technology for demographic targeting of TV 
ads, as mentioned above, it acknowledged the ability of addressable cable systems to identify and 
observe individuals. 
                                                          
373 See, for example, this exchange between a sales executive at ABC-TV and the vice president of research 
at Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Co. Walter Flynn, “A Broadcaster’s View of Cable Research,” 
Broadcasting, April 12, 1982, 26; Marshall Cohen, “Open Mike: He Who Hesitates…,” Broadcasting, May 
31, 1982, 19. 
374 “Open Mike: Computer Solution,” Broadcasting, June 14, 1982, 22, 26.  
375 “Pioneer M5P Addressable Controller System,” brochure (1993), n.p. Accessed at Barco Library. 
376 Pioneer, “The BA-6000,” brochure (1988). Accessed at Barco Library. The ability to take a “snapshot” 
of the channel each set-top box in a system is tuned to remains the basis for how addressable advertising 
software selects which ad to insert to a specific household. Interview with Bruce Anderson, February 20, 
2018. 
140 
 
 
Demographic data can be input by a viewer via a remote control, downloaded to a 
subscriber’s converter from a remote headend, or programmed into the converter at 
installation…Statistical data can be maintained concerning the number and identity of 
subscribers viewing specific commercials.377 
 
With new forms of user interactivity being imagined and built into cable systems, the 
flow of consumer data to operators and their advertising partners promised to cascade beyond any 
previous limit. “Every time a viewer presses a button to make a viewing choice,” Broadcasting 
reported in describing a venture financed in part by Coca-Cola, “demographic information is 
recorded and a custom-selected commercial can be shown to that viewer.”378 That venture, called 
ACTV, received a patent in 1986 for a method of creating profiles of users that would inform 
real-time selection of the content to be delivered over an interactive cable channel, including 
“tailored television commercials for particular subscribers.”379 Even apart from interactive 
services, cable operators were amassing enormous databases as a matter of course. When the 
largest national cable rep firm sold a 30% interest to three leading MSOs in 1988, its president 
boasted that the cable industry possessed “a lot of hidden assets.” As Broadcasting elaborated, 
“cable operators have gathered extensive information about their subscribers—demographics, 
likes and dislikes—through their everyday business.” These data resources, the rep firm’s 
president said, would enable cable operators to combine “the power of television with the 
effectiveness of print.”380 Bristling at criticisms of cable research in the early 1990s, the president 
of Cox Cable asked an agency executive, “Are you really ready for all the information we 
have?”381   
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With all this data, concerns about privacy began to surface. Perhaps surprisingly, viewed 
from our vantage point when media industries revolve in large part around surveillance and 
commodification of personal information, cable operators were cautious about wading into these 
waters. Not for ethical reasons necessarily, but rather because they and their lawyers were 
disinclined to jeopardize any part of a booming subscription business by trying to advance an 
advertising market that, relatively speaking, was worth a pittance to them. Still, one interviewee 
told me that by 1992 the CAB had invited him to investigate commercial applications of the data 
that could be collected by set-top boxes.382  
By the end of the decade, with several dramatic technological and cultural shifts, the 
wind was starting to change. The chief technologist at a firm called Invidi explained that the 
genesis of the company around 2000, which went on to become the leading provider of 
addressable ad technology to the television industry, was an effort to use STBs to figure out who 
was watching and how to advertise to them. “The original concept,” he told me, “was through 
monitoring behavior you could anonymously determine the likely age, gender, maybe even 
income and education level of the current viewer and use that information to target ads against. 
So, early on, we did a tremendous amount of machine learning research to come up with 
algorithms that actually could give you those kinds of guesses.”383 At the turn of the twenty-first 
century, ad tech companies were developing software to collect every interaction users had with 
cable service via the STB. By the mid-2000s, a company called Navic Networks (later bought by 
Microsoft) had this capability deployed in roughly 10 million homes across major providers 
(including Cox, Charter, and Time Warner Cable), automatically generating daily data reports 
about every subscriber’s activity. Among its other uses, this data was leveraged by spot ad sales 
staff in negotiations with advertisers and used for demographically-targeted interactive 
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advertising.384 Other firms, including Rentrak/ComScore and TiVo, as well as operators like 
Comcast, now collect and use set-top box data both for audience measurement and consumer 
targeting. Even Nielsen is looking toward a future in which set-top box data forms a major part of 
its TV ratings products; last year it began including set-top box data from Comcast and other 
operators in its local audience measurement, signaling that the “census level” data STBs can 
collect from the entire population of subscribers is becoming a part of industrial routines.385 The 
surveillance capacities of cable have come a long way toward what advertisers demanded and 
operators promised. 
Across the 1980s and into the 1990s we see cable MSOs recognizing a trajectory toward 
personalization and direct marketing, the utility of customer data for advertising purposes, and the 
advantages of their position, both as data-collector and gatekeeper of the direct connections into 
individual homes. Given these expectations, it seems ironic that the other major innovations in 
spot cable involved aggregating audiences to compete with broadcast stations. One might be 
confused at first to hear the president of the USA Network insist that cable “must reach a target 
audience with big enough numbers to make it important to advertisers.”386 This statement 
gestures, in fact, toward a central contradiction of individual addressability. To construct 
audiences of individuals efficiently requires a system to be scaled up until it embraces as much of 
a population as possible. Getting granular requires first becoming giant. The co-founder of 
DoubleClick, an online ad network and service company that was central to the 
commercialization of the Web, confirmed this challenge: “The great paradox with targeting ads is 
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that the more you are micro-targeting, the more reach you have to have.”387 As Fernando Bermejo 
explains, the internet combined the ironically complementary trends in advertising toward 
globalization and hyper-targeting.388 The cable business was engaging a similar balancing act, 
albeit within regional and domestic boundaries. One sales executive told me, “Until you could 
create a unified, consist, solid whole for a [cable] market, you couldn’t rationally divide it” for 
targeted ad sales.”389 Scale, here, is not just a matter of sheer size, but of interconnection and 
interoperability; marketing an audience of one benefits from operating in one integrated market. 
Three interrelated developments dealt with this problem, beginning in the 1980s: clustering, 
repping, and interconnection. The main thrust of these efforts was to coordinate the spot cable 
market around advertisers’ demands for a “one stop shop” for buying audiences. 
Clusters, Reps, and Interconnects 
Geographic specificity was both cable’s value proposition and its arch limitation. The pitch to a 
local grocer was simple: Why pay for all of Philadelphia when most of your customers live in 
Chestnut Hill? No one is going to cross the city to shop for sundries. For national marketers, 
though, buying local cable seemed expensive on a per-viewer basis, and to reach beyond the 
small territories covered by each cable headend meant dealing with scores of sales people and 
likely a range of incompatible traffic, billing, and insertion systems—creating what observers 
called “administrative headaches” and a “logistical nightmare.”390 Reflecting on the view from 
the 1980s, Paul Woidke told me, “if you said, ‘OK, I want the first spot in Sportscenter on the 80 
cable systems in Los Angeles,’ and they all agreed to reserve it for you, by the time you did the 
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80 negotiations, executed the 80 contracts, distributed 80 sets of content, reconciled 80 invoices, 
and wrote 80 checks, it cost you more than buying one spot on the CBS evening news. Because 
the execution costs were astronomical.”391 For TV buyers trained to maximize reach and 
minimize cost-per-thousand-viewers (CPM), local cable made little sense. 
Consistent with longstanding pressures from advertisers and agencies to reduce any 
barriers to commerce, DDB’s vice president of video technology and programming said in 1983, 
“Local cable advertising probably isn’t going to be a big business until you can buy local cable in 
virtually all cable systems across the country easily.”392 An executive from BBDO told 
Broadcasting a year later that media buyers “don’t have time” for a salesperson selling access to 
even the tens of thousands of viewers subscribed to a single cable system. “Without 
interconnected capabilities, [cable operators] will not get much of a reception from Madison 
Avenue.” The general manager of a firm representing cable operators across San Francisco 
agreed that “no advertisers will buy separately on 37 different systems.” Failing to coordinate into 
networked sales operations, he stressed, would leave cable operators “stuck with mom and pop 
shops and nickel and dime spots.”393 
As the typical ownership structure in the cable industry shifted decisively from “mom 
and pop” companies toward the multiple systems operators that dominate today, these MSOs 
sought the advantages accruing to “clustered” operations—owning adjacent systems across a city 
or region. Although the strategy was motivated far less by advertising interests than by other core 
priorities, such as centralizing management and customer service, clustering did increase scale 
and efficiency in ad sales. By the early 1980s, large cable outfits, such as Time Inc.’s ATC and 
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Westinghouse’s Group W Cable, recognized that clustering would allow an MSO in a given 
territory to become a “legitimate competitor” to newspapers, radio, and broadcast TV in the 
market for local advertising.394  
Courting national advertisers was a bigger challenge. In the late 1990s, Time Warner 
Cable estimated the percentage of spot cable sales to national buyers was still only around 11 
percent. However, the proportion of purchases executed through advertising agencies had 
doubled, from 30 percent to 67 percent, since the 1980s. TWC’s vice president of ad sales called 
this “a paradigm shift in cable advertising.”395 A contributing factor was that MSOs became 
increasingly invested in sales rep firms in the second half the 1980s, expanding their ability to 
transact with national and regional advertisers and their agencies. Cable reps emerged soon after 
local operators began inserting ads. In 1983, Cable Networks Inc. (CNI) generated about $4.5 
million in ad sales in the New York area, and four years later it was bought by Cablevision. CNI’s 
chief rival, National Cable Advertising (NCA), posted just over $7 million in revenues in 1987, 
and the next year three MSOs took an equity stake in the firm.396 NCA merged with the Katz’s 
Cable Media Corp. in 1995 to form National Cable Communications (NCC), which continues as 
the main organization representing cable operators to national advertisers. By the end of 1996, 
Comcast had joined the other MSOs as part owner, and the firm represented roughly 60% of 
cable systems in the U.S.397 When TCI took an equity stake in NCC in 1998, the latter’s 
marketing footprint covered 97 of the top 100 markets and included 82 percent of the cable 
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households receiving locally-inserted ads.398 By then, NCC and CNI represented about $350 
million in total billings.399  
The point of the rep firms, as one sales executives explained to me, was essentially to 
mimic the coverage area and buying protocols of a broadcast station.400 But MSOs and rep firms 
also demonstrated “an awareness about upgrading technology to develop more psycho-
demographic information.” Trumpeting cable’s direct marketing ambitions, the president of CNI 
declared, “It’s no longer cost per thousand. It’s cost per ZIP code.” 401 National cable reps were an 
organizational embodiment of the transition and translation between mass and targeted 
advertising. 
 A related and significant development was the interconnection of cable systems. As its 
name suggests, cable interconnection refers to the networking of cable systems. It is similar to 
clustering, but “interconnects” embraced systems operated by multiple companies. For 
advertising purposes, the idea was to expand coverage while consolidating sales within a single 
bureau, so that an advertiser could buy locally-inserted spots across all the cable systems in a city 
or region through one point of contact. In concert with sales reps, interconnect companies were, 
in part, a legal expediency for cable operators to compete collectively against local broadcasters 
without violating laws prohibiting collusive price fixing. The legal argument envisioned by the 
MSOs’ lawyers was that by forming an interconnect, they were, through this newly created third-
party firm, marketing a novel product that the local operators could not produce and sell on their 
own—a potential audience of all cable households within the network.402 The interconnect was 
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like a regional rep firm, and national rep firms represented these interconnects to advertisers and 
agencies in other parts of the country.  
Interconnects were described as being either “soft” or “hard.” In “soft” interconnects, 
tapes containing advertisements would be physically circulated (or “bicycled”) from system to 
system for simultaneous insertion into a network like ESPN. More significant were the “hard” 
interconnects, wherein systems were networked using microwave relays, shared satellite links, or 
coaxial and fiber optic cables.403 A central facility became a hub for processing transactions and 
distributing ad copy across the web of affiliates.  
Interconnects were established in major markets across the country, and they recorded 
growing ad billings in the early 1990s. By streamlining an ad buy that covered multiple cable 
systems with one sales order, invoice, and content delivery, complexity and transaction costs 
were reduced, and spot cable became closer in price to broadcast inventory. Perhaps the most 
innovative interconnect was Adlink, which formed in 1988 and eventually connected more than 
75 cable systems in Los Angeles and other parts of southern California. In partnership with the 
NCA rep firm, Adlink became the “exclusive national advertising rep” for L.A. and the adjacent 
markets of San Diego, Santa Barbara and Bakersfield. Adlink was owned by five cable operators 
and Prime Ticket, a regional sports service that had a transponder on the Satcom IV satellite, 
which it used, in the early years, to distribute ad spots to the interconnected systems.404 Adlink 
reported revenues of almost $30 million in 1995. While a tidy sum, that was, as one report put it, 
“only the proverbial crumbs that fall off the table” in the $1.2 billion TV ad market in L.A.405 
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Although Adlink built itself up to be like “the ninth TV station in Los Angeles,”406 by this time it 
was coming to understand local cable as being in competition for the nearly $5 billion spent on all 
media in L.A., including newspapers and direct mail. Its ambition was rewarded with surging 
gross revenues—$62 million in 1997 and $83 million in 1998.407 Later we will return to Adlink as 
a touchstone for discussing the role of interconnects in facilitating some of the first tentative steps 
toward addressable video advertising. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 (Source: “By the Numbers,” Cable Avails, February 1995, 1.) 
 
Digital Tech Before the Digital Transition 
There can be no denying the importance of digital technology in the elaboration of targeting 
advertising. Bruce Anderson described to me the realization he and others had when he was the 
managing director of digital television at Sarnoff Corporation in the early- and mid-1990s:  
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Once you packetize the video stream, it’s pretty obvious you don’t necessarily need to 
send the same information to every receiver. So, even back then, there were people 
starting to think about how you possibly do addressable or targeted advertising. The TV 
industry, pretty much since it started having paid advertising, was looking for ways to 
have specific audience segments see particular ads…[U]ltimately, what you’d love to do 
is be able to have a one-to-one conversation. So, DMAs [designated market areas] 
became chunks of cities, which became neighborhoods, which now, with the advent of 
true addressable advertising, is down to individual households…The switch to digital is 
really what accelerated the whole process.408 
 
Of course, the transition to digital television transmission was painfully slow.409 A decade before 
programming became digital, cable operators began integrating digital technologies into their 
backend advertising infrastructures. Our examination of how digital technologies were 
incorporated into cable advertising will focus on two key logistical functions: ad-insertion and 
trafficking.    
In 1992, representatives from CableLabs explained, “new technology platforms based on 
integrating compressed digital video mass storage systems and powerful communication network 
architectures should allow an infrastructure which supports future revenue growth for cable 
advertising sales.”410 The authors understood the importance of coordinating flows of information 
and commerce in the spot cable market, and they pointed toward the sorts of services that later 
emerged to facilitate advertising on the Web: “the purpose of creating this [digital commercial 
insertion] network is to promote the interconnection and interoperability of hardware and 
software which subsequently allows advertisers to buy local, regional, and national spot avails 
easily and conveniently.”411 They added, “the convergence of cost-effective computing plus the 
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use of cost-effective communication networks” could provide the “enabling architectures” for 
solving difficulties in trafficking, inserting, and verifying spot ads.412 
By then cable operators were actively discussing digital interconnection of systems, with 
these conversations catalyzed by broader developments in the liberalization of 
telecommunications markets, as well as continued pressure from advertisers and agencies to iron 
out seams in the spot cable business. Although details about the future were unclear, 
Broadcasting reported, “experts agree that multichannel, digital ad insertion is on the horizon.” 
Industry groups began to mobilize and coordinate collective efforts. The CAB convened a task 
force on the issue. Engineers solicited ideas for building “a national highway and reservation 
system” for routing ads to headends around the country, as well as the hardware “able to store and 
access thousands of spots for insertion” into an increasing number of channels.413  
When CableLabs invited engineers and technologists to submit designs for tools to 
manage digital ad-insertion, the consortium’s director of technical operations projects estimated 
that by using digital storage and insertion systems to increase capacity beyond the limits of 
videotape players, cable operators could boost their annual spot advertising revenues from $1.25 
per subscriber to as much as $25 per subscriber, on average.414 As Paul Woidke of Adlink 
explained in 1993, “In a tape-based insertion environment today, you require three to four tape 
decks for every insertion channel on which you want to do full random insertion—that is to say 
be able to hit every avail with a different spot.”415 With the number of cable networks exploding 
in the early 1990s, operators saw the opportunity and challenge of inserting on 30 or 40 channels. 
For a headend to manage “as few as four 30-second spots across even 30 channels (120 total 
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spots) per hour” was considered “cost- and space-prohibitive” in a videotape environment.416 A 
central server linked to affiliated systems, Woidke and others suggested, can take over the 
“command and control” function of routing ads into content streams. “Our focus on the digital 
revolution,” Woidke declared, “is simple, is straightforward, and is direct. It is to provide an 
immediate payback for our clients—that’s the advertising community—by providing a more 
efficient, and a more effective, and a more economical means of spot delivery in the cable 
universe.”417  
Interconnects in Detroit, New England, and elsewhere invested in digital ad-insertion 
infrastructures in the early and mid-1990s, and by 1996 New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago—
the largest interconnects—were in the process of “adopting systemwide server-based insertion 
systems.”418 Interconnects paid anywhere from $1 million to $10 million and up to install MPEG-
2 encoders/decoders, servers, and switching equipment and to integrate them across the headends 
for which they administered advertising business. Sony and Channelmatic, a leading tech vendor, 
provided the Chicago Interconnect with video serving and switching systems capable of storing 
2,500 30-second spots, inserting on 80 channels, and splitting the interconnect’s territory into five 
zones for targeting. The MPEG-2 system that Adlink procured from Digital Equipment Corp. to 
serve ads across its 57 headends, via T-1 fiber lines, cost $10 million, paid by the MSOs with 
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equity stakes in Adlink.419 Adlink’s central server facility distributed video files to smaller servers 
at each headend, capable of storing more than 300 30-second spots. 
Although cable systems did not yet transmit digital video to customers (and, in fact, at the 
cable headend the digital ad files had to be converted back into an analog signal), digital 
infrastructure on the back-end provided many benefits for the advertising business, including 
greater storage capacity, more flexibility in routing ads to affiliates and retrieving them for 
insertion, easier editing and splicing processes (with less picture degradation than analog tape 
reproduction), a more comprehensive and automated system for verifying that ads ran as 
promised, and the prospect of more precise targeting. Centralized digital video servers also 
helped cable operators reduce from days to hours the turnaround time needed to incorporate ad 
copy into the insertion lineup; and digital processes reduced the human resources required across 
spot cable buying and insertion, which were notoriously labor-intensive.420 As Broadcasting & 
Cable reported in 1996, “digitalization of interconnects, such as Adlink in Los Angeles, has 
removed many of the barriers and disadvantages that dissuade advertisers from choosing cable 
over broadcast.”421 For example, moving from satellite interconnection to dedicated T-1 lines 
meant a shift from three satellite feeds per week to affiliated headends to “a 24-hour-a-day 
dedicated bandwidth network.”422 
The arrival of digital servers at cable advertising interconnects was part of larger 
developments in server-based storage and retrieval of video assets. Most famously, Time Warner 
Cable spent a fortune on an ambitious project called the Full Service Network, which deployed an 
array of futuristic multimedia applications in 4,000 homes in Orlando in the mid-1990s. 
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Excessive hype and runaway costs blunted any public perceptions of success; but, TWC ended up 
actualizing, for the first time, video-on-demand (VOD). Digital compression and storage 
technologies, coupled with the installation of fiber optic cable infrastructure, contributed to a 
situation in which, according to Jim Chiddix, TWC’s top technologist at the time, “we had 
enough channel capacity in each neighborhood where the fiber went to deliver a different stream 
to each home. And that was really a revolutionary idea.” He went on to explain the scope of 
TWC’s expectations for the FSN when it launched in 1994: 
Time Warner was interested in other ways to use this same technology. This is before the 
Web. The internet existed primarily for email between college professors. And, so, we 
had a vision of using this kind of interactive television for things beyond movies on 
demand. And, so, in this trial we launched in Orlando, we had interactive 
applications…And one of the things we wanted to do was to deliver, to insert different 
commercials into the feeds for different homes. It was just sort of a germ of an idea; but, 
the same servers that we were using to deliver video on demand could also insert 
commercials on demand. And we didn’t take that idea very far; but we did play with it. 
We had a demo that showed it. 
 
“From a technology standpoint,” Chiddix told me, “video on demand and targeted ad-insertion 
are almost indistinguishable. You’re really doing the same thing. You’re switching a stream from 
a server to a given neighborhood and an individual set-top box in the home.” The difficulty was 
“building a business around those capabilities.”423 
On a more modest level, cable interconnects were trying to build this digital advertising 
business. Leveraging its digital infrastructure, Adlink took a pioneering approach to targeted 
advertising. Around 1995 Adlink introduced two products—Adtag and Adcopy—that allowed 
advertisers to tailor their messages to geographically (and therefore demographically) defined 
audiences within the Adlink footprint, covering about 57 cable headends and 2.3 million 
subscribers at that time. With Adtag, an advertiser appended to the end of an advertisement a bit 
of textual information with specific relevance to viewers in a particular geography—such as the 
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location of a merchant’s nearest retail outlet. Everyone in the Adlink footprint would see the ad, 
but the text at the end would be customized for different neighborhoods. Adcopy, by contrast, 
allowed advertisers to buy the whole interconnect but send different versions of creative 
messages throughout specified portions of Adlink’s network. As one trade press source explained, 
“Adlink advertiser Chevrolet might run an SUV commercial on cable systems in L.A’s beach 
communities and a spot for its Malibu model in less-upscale areas.”424   
As mentioned earlier, one of the tendencies in the calculative evolution is toward making 
marketplaces more dynamic, or responsive to new information. An early sophisticated use of 
neighborhood addressable advertising that expressed this idea was related to me by Paul Woidke 
from Adlink. In the late 1990s, he told me, a company marketing flowers initiated a campaign for 
which it classified the targetable zones in L.A. according to data it had about the expected 
willingness of customers in the respective regions to pay for a bouquet of flowers. It then sent 
different ad messages featuring different price offers to each zone. As the company evaluated 
subsequent sales in those areas, it altered the prices and messages advertised. This illustrates the 
principle of A/B testing that has become a hallmark of interactive marketing. 
Adlink made clear that it was bringing direct marketing to television.425 In an 
advertisement placed in Broadcasting & Cable in 1998, Adlink described its service as “the 
innovative approach to television advertising that will help you reach more of the audience you 
really care about—the customers most likely to buy your products…Now you can tailor the buy 
and your creative mix. Geographically, demographically and with one buy, one tape and invoice. 
It’s as close to direct marketing as the medium and the technology allow. It’s Targeted TV.”426 
Adlink’s director of marketing explained later that year, “We’re more than just local cable. We’re 
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delivering advertisers’ messages to the people most likely to respond to them. It’s the closest 
thing to addressable advertising being offered today.”427 “Our goal,” she added, “is to offer 
advertisers a technology platform, a research process and marketing applications.”428 
To call Adlink’s products “addressable” was a bit of an exaggeration. Adtag and Adcopy 
both worked on the principle of “zoning.” A market with dozens of headends, which had been 
aggregated for ad sales through the interconnect, would be again disaggregated into regions that 
could be classified by demographics, income, ethnicity, lifestyle categories, and so on. Zoning 
allowed advertisers to “send different commercials to different neighborhoods on the same 
channel at the same time, allowing them to customize their pitch to fit the demographic 
characteristics of audience segments within the same market.”429 In effect, zoning made good on 
cable’s promise of geographic targeting while also working within a sales infrastructure that 
bundled headends for market-wide scale and streamlined the buying and insertion processes 
through a single bureau. But zoned ads did not discriminate among households within the 
footprint of a headend; in other words, they could not target a specific set-top box. Moreover, an 
advertiser buying from Adlink had to buy a spot across the entire interconnect and then decide if 
and how to customize messages for different zones, and the advertiser paid the same CPM for the 
entire market. Zoning through the interconnects, therefore, involved a sort of tension between 
being able to tailor messages to different neighborhoods, but having to buy entire markets, and 
absorb the consequent waste, just like in the broadcast model. Still, zoning “was the rudimentary 
first step toward addressability.”430  
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Interconnects invested in abilities to better control the circulation, storage, and insertion 
of video advertisements. By now you might not be surprised to learn that this advancement 
planted the seed of a new (old) problem. As one reporter noted, “Digital insertion makes possible 
all sorts of initiatives, such as zoning and same-day insertion. But traffic and billing systems have 
to be able to keep up with new demands.”431 Traffic and billing, to repeat, refers to the process of 
scheduling an ad insertion, verifying that it ran, and managing payment. The more granular the 
targeting, the more complex the processes of trafficking and pricing those ads.  
Complexity was a scary word for a cable industry that started with very limited 
competency in the logistics of ad delivery. Larry Zipin recalls that in the early days of local cable, 
when an operator was inserting on just a handful of national cable networks, spot cable traffic 
systems often consisted of “two ladies in their 30s or 40s, a big white board, and erasable 
pens.”432 Paul Woidke remarked that even a white board would have been an extravagance for 
some operators in the 1980s.433 As the inventory and business grew, however, spot cable needed 
to develop means of administering transactions at greater volume and intricacy. Adding 
geographic zoning and customized ad delivery could multiply tenfold the number of avails 
managed by a cable operator, according to a CAB representative.434 One vendor of traffic and 
billing technologies tried to reckon the scale of the administrative challenges confronting targeted 
cable insertions: “If you’re running 30 networks, 30 zones at an average of 50 30-second spots a 
day on that, that’s 30x30x50 for one day. That turns out to be tens of thousands of spots that 
you’re running in one day.”435 The general manager of advertising a TWC system in San Antonio 
explained that his operation inserted on 40 cable channels, selling more than 3 million spots a 
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year. A broadcast station would more typically run roughly 120,000 spots, he estimated. “It’s not 
unusual for somebody to buy 5,000 spots a month from us.”436 Early on sales managers struggled 
to convince cable operators to invest in the insertion equipment needed to grow the business; 
now, having achieved greater insertion capacity, they needed new control systems to cope with 
their growth. Zipin’s recollections add color to how administrative challenges intensified in cable 
ad sales, far beyond what was required for spot broadcasting: 
[K]eep in mind, if you’re a local ABC station, your traffic system doesn’t have to be very 
complicated because you’re only trafficking on one station. And you’re trafficking, you 
know, two minutes an hour, you know, for 24 hours a day, for seven days a 
week…That’s logical, sequential—in a straight line. Ours is four-dimensional. And then 
it becomes 12-dimensional. And then it becomes 20-dimensional. So…[maybe] the cable 
company gets generous and gives us enough ad-insertion equipment to go on 20 
networks, and [now] I have two ladies in the traffic department who are ready to commit 
suicide. We literally have total chaos.437 
  
Understandably, cable operators faced pressures to invest more in their information 
systems. According to one estimate, the spot cable advertising business, with revenues of $1.25 
billion in 1994, spent roughly $3.2 million on information systems that year—much less than the 
2 to 4 percent of revenues spent on information systems by broadcasters.438 One trade journalist 
captured the exasperation of buyers and sellers in the late-1990s, writing, “Today, the complexity 
of avails planning, creating orders, moving tapes and counting spots would be comical if it 
weren’t so frustrating.” By 1997, NCC accounted for 66 percent of the national spot market, and 
the firm “was manually processing 8,000 to 10,000 paper affidavits per month.” Given the errors 
involved in administrating these transactions, one analysis concluded that cable operators were 
losing up to $4 on CPMs due to inefficiency.439 A cable sales executive from Chicago figured 
even in 1999 that the cost to “administer” transactions for local cable spots might be five times 
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higher than typical broadcast buys due to the paperwork alone.440 When TCI joined NCC in 1998, 
the rep firm “call[ed] for the MSOs to accelerate upgrades” in their advertising operations “to 
allow advertisers to take full advantage of evolving digital technologies and targeting.”441 Larry 
Zipin recognized that further refinement of backend operations was essential for achieving 
breakthroughs in precise targeting. “What’s keeping us from being able to go to specific 
neighborhood nodes and homes right now,” Zipin claimed, “is limitations in the trafficking, 
schedule and inventory software.”442  
Certainly, Zipin was pointing to part of the problem. But difficulties ran even deeper. The 
technical aspects of trafficking were generally understood, and they could be fixed if 
organizations committed to the job. What was harder to settle was a profound conflict about the 
business model, which would need to be resolved before anyone would feel moved to invest in 
better software. As Jim Chiddix told me, “the idea of actually sending different ads to different 
homes took decades really to gestate. And that was in fair measure because of the inertia of the 
advertising business.”443 Instituting targeted advertising required reconciliation of competing 
philosophies about how audiences should be sliced and priced. With respect to slicing, there are 
two general approaches to addressability. In one model, an avail is sold in full to a single 
advertiser who then customizes the ad copy for different parts of the population. In the other 
model, instead of selling an avail to one advertiser, any number of advertisers can buy 
“impressions” within that avail, so that rather than buying all of Center City Philadelphia, you 
buy just the households that fit certain parameters. The latter version has been much more 
promising and much less popular. This had less to do with technical limitations—although it is 
harder to traffic spots as the inventory is splintered—and more to do with concerns among 
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operators that by breaking up avails into targeted impressions and selling them on a more 
individualized basis they would risk being left with “remnant” inventory. In other words, the fear 
is that advertisers will buy only the desirable homes and the operator will be left with unsellable 
impressions within an avail. Software for automating the management of inventory seemed like a 
promising solution to this problem; but operators worried that this route, especially insofar as it 
pointed toward auctions and bidding, would drive down prices.444 Since avails almost always sold 
out, operators were not compelled to do anything except try to negotiate higher prices. 
Envisioning a rosy future in 2000, one agency’s convergence media director explained, 
“Addressable advertising is a win-win for the advertiser and the provider because the [multiple 
systems operators] can increase inventory and revenue and the advertiser will pay a higher CPM 
to reach a true target than they will to reach their target mixed in with a bunch of non-
prospects.”445 Reality turned out to be much thornier. In the opinion of Paul Woidke, battles over 
the pricing of targeted audiences delayed for years the introduction of addressable cable 
advertising.446 Setting aside transaction costs, the issue boils down to a dispute between buyers 
and sellers about waste. Sellers argued that because they could discriminate qualified consumers 
from the rest of the audience universe, advertisers should pay more for each viewer. Advertisers 
and their agencies countered that they were already paying an inflated price because of those 
wasted exposures, and so now they should continue paying the same CPM for the people they 
really wanted to reach in the first place. “[T]he two parties can’t agree whether there should be a 
premium or a discount,” Chet Kanojia told me. “That’s how far apart they were…The buyer 
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wants a discount because he wants to get rid of excess audience, and the seller wants a premium 
because he or she is enabling them to do targeting.”447   
According to a 2014 estimate, CPM rates for addressable television can range from $20 
to $500.448 By comparison, cable networks on average charge CPMs closer to $17 today. The 
solution from the supply side is to reckon costs not in terms of how many people are reached in 
total, but instead how many of the people reached are among an advertiser’s target audience. 
Proponents advocate for calculating effective CPM. The math, they say, reveals addressability to 
be more cost-effective.  
The technical details of insertion, trafficking, and pricing could fill another volume. 
Without wading further into the weeds, the point of bringing all this up is to demonstrate that 
local cable advertising presented challenges far beyond what networks and broadcast stations 
dealt with, in terms of volume and complexity. It also presaged some of the issues required to 
reconstruct the internet business around personalized advertising. As an interconnected network 
of networks, the internet allowed for a much less fractured technical environment, and one with 
basically no revenues or incumbencies put at risk by a new business model. But as the Web was 
beginning its commercialization, the cable industry tried more than ever to present itself as the 
leader in interactive and addressable advertising. 
Selling the Future 
In the first half of the 1990s, the advent of digital video servers, and their integration into 
advertising delivery, hastened the arrival of a distinct period in the development of addressable 
and interactive advertising. The prospect of marrying television advertising with direct marketing 
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became a clear ambition, and efforts intensified to build software, hardware, and business 
relationships to manifest it. Speculation about digital STBs poured gasoline on hype about the 
convergence of television and personal computers.  
Toward the end of the decade, addressable advertising was entering a new age of action 
and experiment. Interactive television firms, such as ACTV, OpenTV, and Wink implemented 
advertising and e-commerce products and, importantly, made apostles of a group of employees 
who went on to major positions in ad buying and selling. Perhaps most notably, Tracey 
Scheppach left Wink to become a media buyer at one of the leading holding companies, because 
she decided, “I’d rather be in a position at a big agency to pull through the innovation and kind of 
shape it. And, so, that’s what I did.”449  
Scheppach was not alone in trying to shape the direction of advertising technologies. In 
1994, Procter & Gamble’s CEO issued a famous battle cry to marketers, urging them to seize the 
opportunity to assert control over the direction of new interactive media, lest they be shut out. 
“Let’s grab all this new technology in our teeth once again,” he said, “and turn it into a bonanza 
for advertising.”450 Around 1998, TCI invited a group of blue-chip marketers, including Kraft and 
General Motors, to its offices in Denver, where it proposed that those companies give over $2 
million each to finance the development of addressable ad tech in return for local cable inventory. 
This summit came on the heels of an effort begun earlier in the decade by TCI to drum up interest 
among major advertisers and their agencies around addressable and interactive advertising. In 
1996 TCI hired a vice president of national ad sales and sent him to Madison Avenue. His 
mission was both to proselytize the interactive and addressable vision that John Malone and TCI 
had been articulating for years, and to solicit advertisers’ guidance about how such a system 
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could be built to their needs. Eventually, this national ad sales executive came to realize that most 
of the things he was promising, including the digital STBs designed for the job, existed only as 
blueprints (and dubious plans, at that). Reflecting on his mission years later, he concluded, “What 
I was selling was the future, against your competitor.” Most of the advertisers invited to Denver 
were not much interested in local cable avails. “But they were interested in the future of 
addressability and the future of interactivity.”451 
The future arrived very slowly, interrupted in part by TCI’s sale to AT&T. Despite being 
hyped as the bridge to a personalized multimedia future, the earliest digital boxes were nothing to 
marvel at. When companies like Visible World and Invidi began trying to engineer software to 
enable household addressability in the second half of the 1990s, Paul Woidke joked, “you had 
set-top boxes that had less capability than a transistor radio.”452 These devices had limited 
memory and the capacity to accommodate only a few crude binary categories for classifying the 
box and assigning its associated household to a marketing segment (e.g., apartment vs. house; 
kids vs. no kids; income above or below a defined threshold). Ad tech providers were competing 
against engineering priorities, such as the user interface and program guide, that facilitated cable 
operators’ core subscription business and promised better short-term returns and less risk than 
addressable advertising. General Instrument—the box-maker tasked with realizing TCI’s vision—
did not program its devices around an operating system that was at all hospitable to app 
developers. It also subjected potential software and middleware installations to a certification 
process that lasted weeks in the best cases.453 Building and deploying boxes capable of facilitating 
household addressability was, therefore, a far bigger challenge than boosters hinted. Not so much 
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because it wasn’t technically possible, but rather because it was not a priority for engineers and 
managers concerned respectively with the cable plant and subscription revenue.  
The sales organizations and the marketing community, of course, had different priorities, 
and their agendas were starting to come into focus as various groups envisioned the future of 
commercial media. Advertising Age reported in 1999, “The nation’s leading cable-systems 
operators are proposing a $100 million plan to make addressable and interactive advertising a 
seamless process for marketers.” Through NCC, its MSO owners—AT&T Broadband (TCI), 
Comcast, Cox, and Time Warner Cable—engaged in “talks with representatives of the ad 
industry about an ambitious plan that would allow marketers to easily target local ads to specific 
communities.” The plan involved national electronic interconnection for billing and trafficking, a 
national satellite distribution network, and the promise of addressable and interactive ads. The 
North American media director at Saatchi & Saatchi admitted, “This could indeed be a sea 
change in the way we do business.” The top ad sales executive for AT&T’s cable business said, 
“We think this is the future of a lot of advertising. It will move from passive advertising to more 
direct marketing.”454 
Eventually, after several delays, the first major trial of household addressable advertising 
was implemented in Aurora, Colorado in 2001.455 Although the results were promising, the 
protracted rollout of digital STBs denied operators and advertisers the scale they needed for a 
viable business. That remained the prevailing condition for a decade or so. In the interim, video-
on-demand allowed a new area for trying addressable ad delivery. While elements of the 
technology were conducive to targeted and dynamically-inserted advertisements, negotiating the 
rights among operators and programmers—as well as questions about how to reconcile VOD 
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impressions with the audience ratings currency—presented impediments to this potential. But by 
the late 2000s, a variety of companies—including Navic, Visible World, Invidi, BlackArrow, and 
others—had developed ad tech for using data and software in the set-top box to automate the 
trafficking and ad-decisioning processes needed to identify and serve a targeted ad to a specific 
household. And, as the cable plant became digital, operators able to fit 10 video streams into the 6 
MHz channel previously occupied by just one analog signal could realistically reserve bandwidth 
for addressable ads. Comcast launched a test in 4,000 homes in Huntsville, Alabama, in 2006. 
Another big trial in Baltimore (80,000), and the formation by the largest MSOs in the U.S. of a 
consortium dedicated to this vision, put wind in addressable advertising’s sales in 2008. Google 
looked to acquire TV ad tech and it tried to launch an advertising exchange, hosting bidding 
auctions for ad inventory on behalf of MVPDs. For a variety of reasons—including a financial 
crisis and reluctance to let Google have much access to anything but the lowest quality 
inventory—the business sputtered for the next five or six years. 
Jim Chiddix characterizes slow march toward addressable TV advertising in a way that 
corresponds to the conclusions one reaches from examining historical sources. Despite 
technological innovations and recognition of the potential at by early-1990s or sooner, 
the full advertising capability grew slowly. And, ironically, at the same time it was really 
booming on the internet with companies like DoubleClick and so forth. Because there 
you did have critical mass. Anybody who’s using the internet, potentially, could receive 
targeted advertising or targeted clickable advertising or whatever you wanted to create. 
Whereas in television you’re waiting for this universe of set-top boxes to grow, and for 
advertisers to change the way they thought about television advertising. Internet 
advertising…was a greenfield. So, you weren’t threatening any revenue. Any money you 
made was found money. And so, it was a much more fertile market for innovation.456  
 
Although the internet ad market sprinted ahead of addressable television, the rise of the spot cable 
business occasioned developments in tools and techniques for a variety of logistical functions that 
constitute the basic processes of buying, inserting, and tracking ads in online and mobile media. 
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These include managing avails, identifying ad assets, storing and serving digital video files, 
machine-to-machine communication for signaling when and where to insert a specific spot and 
confirming that it was inserted as planned, and controlling transmissions to and information 
collection from individually identifiable devices. 
In working through technical and administrative obstacles, and recognizing opportunities 
on the horizon, the cable ad business was a petri dish for engineering the evolution of targeted 
and data-driven advertising and marketing. As Paul Woidke admitted to me, “The way that we 
always envisioned advanced advertising being implemented in a TV environment—it’ll never be 
what we projected and forecast and hoped and struggled [for]… But it’ll be something different. 
It’ll be something different. And the amount of money isn’t going to diminish.”457 Tim Hanlon 
told me in 2017, “I think we’re only kind of scratching the surface of what’s possible.” He said 
the term addressable advertising “is a very basic, first-generation concept” based on a primitive 
set-top box architecture. As cloud-based computing power is allocated to making ad decisions 
and routing spots to individuals in real-time, the sky is the limit. 458 
Conclusion 
It is well-known that in the mid-1990s and beyond, advertisers intervened into the advancement 
of digital technologies and took advantage of changes in the administration and regulation of 
computing and telecommunications networks, reshaping the media environment around their 
vision for personalized marketing. What has not been examined in depth, and what this chapter 
has aimed to illuminate, is a set of developments that ushered in an era of personalization by 
establishing infrastructures for communicating with uniquely identifiable devices, assembling 
institutions for packaging and marketing more finely segmented audiences, and cementing 
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imaginaries about a one-to-one marketing future wherein efficacy would be increased, and waste 
virtually eliminated. These developments carried on from the computerization of advertising, 
media buying, and audience construction in the 1960s and intensified in the 1980s with the 
engineering of both addressable cable systems and a spot cable business that took market 
segmentation as an organizing principle from its inception. Even before the first banner ads 
appeared on websites in 1994, and before companies like DoubleClick began to organize the 
online ad market over the following years, the cable ad industry was leveraging computer-like 
set-top boxes, digital video servers, customer databases, command and control systems, and wired 
connections to individual households to become more exacting in its efforts to produce 
consumers. Despite delays and limitations, there can be little question that the history of spot 
cable advertising is also the history of how direct marketing pierced the heart of national brand 
advertising and the mediated environment that prevails today. Before the commercialization of 
the internet, advertisers, cable operators, and other actors—still answering to the ghost of John 
Wanamaker—moved haltingly but undeniably toward addressing the American person.  
The reason for detailing this history is to argue that the evolution of cable advertising has 
involved a tooling-up of technical and administrative infrastructures for producing, packaging, 
and exchanging audiences of individuals. Various actors confronted the challenges of 
coordinating a more personalized advertising business, and they tried to make sense of and 
legitimize the opportunities they recognized in technological change. An important point to take 
away is that targeted advertising depends not only on the technical capacity to address a 
transmission to a specific recipient, but equally on the administrative capacity to coordinate 
market activity around a personalized definition of “audience.” The supreme success of Facebook 
and Google owes to how they have built themselves into sophisticated logistical utilities for an 
advertising market with a far greater number of buyers and sellers, and much more detailed 
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definitions of target audiences than ever existed in broadcast television. Perhaps the key 
innovation of internet advertising, represented, for example, by DoubleClick’s Dynamic 
Advertising Reporting and Targeting system,459 is the automation of trafficking and billing 
functions. The online ad business blossomed around databases, algorithms, machine-to-machine 
communication, and identification and tracking technologies (e.g., cookies) that were developed 
to accommodate more variables in rapid decisions about ad placement, to route messages to 
specific recipients, and to observe this traffic (and hopefully eventual sales outcomes) more 
pervasively and precisely. On a smaller scale, this was what the sales organizations in the spot 
cable market were trying to accomplish. 
Previously, we observed that the process of introducing and reorganizing commercial 
activities around digital computers and automation capabilities both reflected and refracted ways 
of thinking about efficiency, control, and optimization. In this chapter we saw a commitment to 
reducing waste in advertising both framing and finding even more concentrated expression in 
discussions about the ability to target identifiable households with customized advertisements and 
marketing opportunities. The next chapter details another affordance attached to cable, 
broadband, and interactive technologies. Shoppability is the ability to buy items directly from 
advertisements and media content. It embodies some of the oldest and deepest impulses 
underlying commercial broadcasting. One pronounced and recurring theme in the history of 
electronic media in the U.S. is that the arrival of a “new” medium is accompanied by intensive 
excitement about its merchandising applications. The next chapter introduces these deep roots 
before focusing on the battle in the 1990s and 2000s to make television into a shoppable 
showroom—to turn the medium into a marketplace. 
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Chapter Four – Selling Jennifer Aniston’s Sweater: The Persistence of 
Shoppability in Framing Television’s Future 
 
“Consumers view a TV commercial and then simply press a button to buy a product—
this has been one of the oldest and most widely touted features of interactive 
advertising.”460 
 
This chapter presses forward with the idea that expectations about the commercial potential of 
new technologies have been imprinted in the policies, practices, and apparatus that make up 
industrial media systems. Following Patrick Parsons’s directive to examine the “hopes people 
have for technology,”461 I analyze the persistence of a prominent theme in discussions about the 
future of video entertainment: shoppability. “CBS founder William Paley once said that television 
was the ideal selling medium,” Robert McChesney and colleagues point out. “Left to Madison 
Avenue, the interactive digital world will be the ideal medium for closing the deal altogether.”462 
Examining this theme historically though discourses in and about cable television, advertising, 
electronics, and information technology industries, we see how ideas about cable’s potential, 
reflecting long-standing ambitions, shaped the digital media environment. 
“Shoppability” is a recent term of art in media industries, but the concept it captures—
that items featured in advertisements and entertainment are available for immediate purchase—
has surfaced throughout the history of commercial broadcasting. Pressures to connect advertising 
with sales and to exploit the marketing capacities of new media have motivated many attempts at 
engineering interactive and, more specifically, transactive television systems. This chapter 
examines efforts to imagine and implement the technological capability for viewers to use their 
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remote controls to buy the things they see when watching video content or accessing interactive 
applications through a TV set-top box (STB). The focus, in other words, is on the convergence of 
marketing communication and marketplace infrastructure within a single user touchpoint oriented 
around the entertainment services provided by cable companies and other multichannel video 
programming distributors (MVPDs). While shoppable applications have proliferated across 
internet-enabled devices, our preoccupation here is with forms of transactivity built into cable 
systems, STBs and, to a lesser extent, other “connected” technologies used for viewing television 
content—especially advertiser-supported material.  
To probe this marriage of entertainment and merchandising, this chapter dwells on an 
influential way of thinking about selling wardrobes and furnishings from narrative television 
programming, as well as the related goal of combining features of direct marketing and television 
advertising.463 In this vision’s fullest expression, viewers click their remotes to purchase almost 
anything appearing in or related to programs and advertisements; MVPDs bill customers via 
subscribers’ existing accounts and share in the sales revenue, along with intermediaries managing 
software, order processing and fulfillment, and product licensing. The strategy has been distilled 
in a deceptively inane slogan: “selling Jennifer Aniston’s sweater.” This theme has been a 
persistent and conspicuous part of how many people have envisioned the future of television and 
broadband services. This history invites us to consider how marketing strategies shape not only 
media texts, but also the infrastructures and platforms that set conditions of possibility for 
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programming, applications, and user engagement. Even failed ambitions can exert lasting 
influence on a media system’s development.464  
Shoppability as Affordance: Imagination, Potential, Strategy, Discourse 
Shoppable television of the type introduced above has been plagued by technical challenges, 
prohibitive costs, uninterested consumers, and ongoing cycles of hype and disappointment. 
Because of technological advantages, cultural differences, and less-entrenched institutional and 
infrastructural legacies, internet-based platforms and devices have been far superior to linear 
television as venues for presenting end-users with shoppable entertainment and advertising. 
Today, ads in most internet-enabled media environments—such as YouTube, Spotify, and 
Instagram—link directly to e-commerce opportunities. Uses of Internet Protocol (IP) for 
distributing premium video and enabling long-imagined forms of interactivity are part of a 
restructuring of roles, relationships, and commercial possibilities within media industries. But to 
understand the conditions that provided for a deepening entanglement of entertainment and 
electronic commerce, we must take a longer journey through broadcasting and cable television.  
In this spirit, I suggest that shoppability be regarded not just as a functionality, but as an 
imagined affordance—a commercial and technological potential that actors perceived, and tried 
to activate, in the convergence of television, computing, and telecommunications.465 Shoppability 
has been part of a story about possibilities; it is a way of imagining and taking advantage of what 
a set of sociotechnical resources can enable. That story has been revised strategically to meet 
challenges and opportunities, but its iterations cohere around hopeful visions of a transactive 
media future. The expectation of shoppable advertising and entertainment has been a tantalizing 
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prospect that has helped to frame the messy and ongoing development of digital infrastructures 
for televisual systems.  
From this perspective, shoppability belongs to the history of cable television as a “new 
medium,” which covers not only the introduction of community antenna television (CATV), but 
also the continuing redefinition of wired communications services within a broader ecology and 
political economy of media. When technologies are “new” or unsettled, and their meanings and 
prospects are uncertain, expectations and promises about their trajectories can have profound, if 
unpredictable, consequences.466 Stakeholders therefore leverage assets and opportunities toward 
establishing legitimacy for visions of development that favor their interests.467 As Tarleton 
Gillespie notes, firms and industries mobilize discursive strategies to “frame their services and 
technologies” in ways that help them pursue business objectives, secure regulatory privileges and 
protections, and “lay out a cultural imaginary within which their service makes sense.”468 As 
industries that are capital-intensive, structured by government policy, and articulated to financial 
speculation, cable and telecommunications are thoroughly interpenetrated with visions about the 
future of technology. Discourses centered around the complementary affordances of advanced 
advertising intensified during the development of cable television, reflecting shifting marketing 
strategies and cable operators’ competitive advantage of controlling a high-capacity, (potentially) 
two-way connection into an individual home. Shoppable television became an aspirational 
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waypoint that oriented ambitions and expectations about the commercial potential of media 
convergence. 
This chapter identifies early examples of this marketing logic, traces its contributions to 
the building of cable systems, demonstrates its continued salience for digital media, and then 
considers why the idea of shoppable television has survived decades of disappointment. Tracing 
the history of these strategies provides clues about how our communications systems have been 
shaped by the commitment of attention, imagination, energy, and capital toward developing 
shoppable media. At least two insights emerge: 1) the discursive construction of shoppability as 
an affordance of media convergence influenced corporate and cultural perceptions of broadband 
infrastructure and digital video and marketing technologies; and 2) as with addressability, 
strategies for using interactive television as a merchandising platform helped prepare the stage for 
a commercialized internet. For a launchpad, and a recurring point of contact, we look to one 
shoppable scheme that stands out as a powerful expression of marketers’ dreams. 
Industrial Logic and Lore 
An Interactive Storefront 
Generally, in the U.S., advertising and marketing have been prominent among the ambitions of 
stakeholders engineering television’s technologies and cultural forms. As Jonathan Gray puts it, 
“a commercial television industry is guided first and foremost by the desire to sell all manner of 
consumer goods and services.”469 New initiatives have proceeded by this logic. In the mid-1970s 
Raymond Williams recognized that within a commercial model of television, interactivity would 
                                                          
469 Jonathan Gray, Television Entertainment (New York: Routledge, 2008), 122. See, also, Eileen R. 
Meehan, Why TV is Not Our Fault (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2005); Lynn Spigel, Make Room for TV: 
Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Joseph 
Turow, Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New Media World (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997); Joseph Turow, Niche Envy: Marketing Discrimination in the Digital Age (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2006); Mark Andrejevic, Reality TV: The Work of Being Watched (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2004). 
173 
 
 
tend to be exploited for its marketing affordances. Despite the technical capacity to facilitate civic 
participation, Williams worried that two-way TV, in its historical-institutional configuration, 
would confront “reactive consumers” with quite limited prospects, such as “choosing an item 
from a shop display or from an advertisement.”470 After more than two decades of failures to 
establish a viable interactive television business, stakeholders in the 1990s seized on advances in 
technology and marketing strategy. Their maneuverings continue to validate Williams’s appraisal.  
In his bestselling book, The Road Ahead (1995), Bill Gates envisioned TV as an 
interactive catalogue from which viewers could buy anything appearing on-screen.471 Within 
three years, computer programmers at MIT’s Media Lab—one of whom was later put in charge of 
“direct-to-consumer retailing via iTV” at NBCUniversal—had designed a prototype for such 
interactive shopping, which they called HyperSoap.472 As Gates captured the imaginations of 
technologists and entrepreneurs, an analyst at an influential consultancy curried favor with 
marketers. In 2000, Josh Bernoff of Forrester Research predicted that television would embrace 
HyperSoap-style platforms “in which viewers can buy every item the actors are wearing or 
using.”473 HyperSoap’s name and format seemed to betray a gendered assumption that soap 
operas, as well as scripted sitcoms and dramas, would be felicitous venues for selling jewelry and 
apparel to female viewers emotionally invested in characters and storylines.474 Attaching a 
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personality to the idea, Bernoff planted a seed that continues to attract fertilizer: viewers could 
buy Jennifer Aniston’s sweater.475  
Selling the Friends-star’s sweater became a trope in industry parlance, setting a hopeful 
benchmark for interactive TV. Writers in the trade press continue to invoke it as a threshold 
marking the dawn of entertainment-based e-commerce.476 The idea is still summoned—
sometimes pejoratively—at industry meetings.477 The proposition has even been acknowledged 
by academic researchers testing new advertising techniques.478 While the plan to sell Jennifer 
Aniston’s sweater has disappointed expectations and been disavowed by its original proponent,479 
many marketers and analysts remain possessed of the idea that television should be a storefront 
for showcasing and selling merchandise associated with programming or ads.480 In this 
conviction, contemporary marketers preserve and extend a long-standing ambition underlying 
commercial media systems. As a recent observer puts it, “The idea of being able to cash in viewer 
demand for, say, the sweater Jennifer Aniston was wearing in Friends has been around longer 
than Friends.”481 
The Deep Roots of Shoppability 
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Commercial broadcasting in the U.S. has always been wedded, in some way, to marketing. 
National advertisers, recognizing radio’s potential as a “major selling medium,” produced some 
of the earliest programs as venues for introducing homemakers to branded domestic products.482 
Department stores were also a leading force in the commercialization in radio, establishing some 
of the first stations, orchestrating programming around merchandising priorities, pioneering 
advertising practices, and ultimately enlisting radio as part of the sales force.483 Some retailers 
promoted their inventories by broadcasting from the shop floor. One store reported that “listeners 
at home come in to see the things of which [host] Enid Bur has spoken, with the desire to buy 
already created.”484 As early as 1944, Macy’s brought this concept to television, scheduling Tele-
Shopping with Martha Manning (later renamed Macy’s Teleshopping) on DuMont’s WABD New 
York.485 Over the next two years, Gimbel’s of Philadelphia and Kaufmann’s department store in 
Pittsburgh commissioned short television productions, for in-store exhibition, to showcase 
merchandise such as women’s apparel.486 By 1949, WTAG Worcester described its product 
integration strategy as “Sell-A-Vision,” bragging that one sponsor “sold out its supply [of scented 
wrapping paper] in a matter of hours” after a broadcast.487 These ventures advanced the idea that 
what appears on-screen is for sale; but, the radiated flow of linear broadcasting did not allow for 
purchasing, and “intra-store television” was really a point-of-sale promotion. The construction of 
cable television would accelerate ambitions to make the medium itself into a marketplace.  
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Within two decades after CATV operations began distributing television signals by cable 
in the late-1940, entrepreneurs, analysts, and policymakers apprehended the prospect of 
delivering multiple services over an integrated wire infrastructure.488 Enthusiasts predicted 
sweeping changes in the production and consumption of information and entertainment, 
culminating in a “wired nation” wherein cable would accommodate a host of services, including 
news delivery, telephony, and home shopping.489 A 1966 article in U.S. News and World Report 
anticipated Raymond Williams’s aforementioned assessment, suggesting that “Merchants will use 
extra channels to display their wares more fully than they can on the usual spot commercial.” A 
“housewife,” the article continued, can “select a dress from the television screen, electronically 
place her order for the dress, and direct her bank to make the payment.”490 Two years later, much 
fanfare accompanied a demonstration of two-way functionality at the National Cable Television 
Association’s (NCTA) annual convention.491 Cable went through what became known as a “Blue 
Sky” period, in which lofty goals, expectations, and promises painted an optimistic future for the 
wired, information society. As Parsons explains, this era began in the mid-1960s, but, “in one 
form or another, Blue Sky thinking would shape the business through its next thirty-plus 
years.”492 
By the 1970s, the Federal Communications Commission proposed new rules permitting 
cable operators to import distant signals into the 100 largest U.S. markets, contingent on some 
stipulations, including a requirement that new systems build two-way capacity into their plant.493 
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These proposals spurred considerable prospecting.494 Perceiving limited demand for services that 
merely conveyed broadcasters’ outputs, analysts suggested that to penetrate large urban markets, 
and “[r]ealize the full potential of cable,” operators would need to offer interactive features that 
exploited the technology’s varied capacities, among which electronic shopping was consistently 
listed.495 At the 1971 NCTA convention, FCC Chairman Dean Burch warned cable operators that 
they could expect regulatory disfavor if they did not augment their importation and 
retransmission functions by offering innovative services and experimenting with “such two-way 
operations as shopping from the home.”496 
In 1971, a report from Rand Corporation admitted that remote shopping was “technically 
feasible” but not yet economically viable. Acknowledging that “Remote shopping would be 
attractive to advertisers eager to stimulate impulse buying,” the report’s author doubted that 
subscribers would share marketers’ enthusiasm for these services.497 Notwithstanding this caveat, 
the promise of interacting with consumers through the television urged substantial excitement and 
shaped the development of cable in the U.S.  
Industrial Prospecting and Predicaments 
Building a Business 
Soon after two-way functionality was demonstrated at the 1968 NCTA Convention, stakeholders 
began asserting visons for an interactive television business. Already by 1970, Teleprompter, 
Inc., the largest multiple system operator (MSO) at the time, recognized itself as a “broadband 
communications company.” Similarly, the vice president of Cox Cable urged the industry to 
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exploit television’s “unused capacity” by deploying shopping services and other applications.498 
Teleprompter’s president saw two-way services as a beachhead for cable operators to establish 
themselves in the data-transport and market research businesses, and he acknowledged “a 
tremendous opportunity for merchandising of goods.”499 This “opportunity” soon became part of 
the cable industry’s value proposition. In negotiating a franchise agreement with New York City, 
Teleprompter touted its development of “armchair shopping.”500 The next year, Telecable Inc. 
tested a home shopping application in Kansas City, featuring live presentations from a Sears, 
Roebuck store and using an advanced home terminal to let “the housewife…make choices on the 
spot by punching the appropriate buttons.”501 In 1973, Theta Cable and American Television & 
Communications tested interactive services, including shopping, in California and Florida, 
respectively.502 Warner Cable launched its pathbreaking QUBE system in 1977. Among other 
two-way features, QUBE let users “order merchandise displayed on the screen, and even pay for 
it—by punching out credit card number and other required information.”503 In 1979, a former 
NCTA president started a cable company to realize “the medium’s unfulfilled technological 
promises,” using interactive services, such as shopping, to expedite cable’s maturation as a 
general information infrastructure.504 Cox Cable followed suit by the early 1980s, designing 
Indax, a two-way data exchange system that facilitated banking and shopping.  
While these services were costly and slow to materialize, futuristic promises became 
strategic resources for cable operators. Interactive applications, with home shopping consistently 
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listed among them, were bargaining chips in pivotal franchise negotiations during cable’s urban 
expansion in the 1970s and 1980s. According to L.J. Davis, “Nothing, absolutely nothing, won 
the hearts and minds of the targeted cities like interactive television.”505 QUBE helped Warner 
Cable acquire franchises in several large markets, including Cincinnati, Dallas, Milwaukee, 
Pittsburgh, and Houston. Reporters identified Indax as a decisive factor in Cox’s winning bids in 
Omaha and New Orleans.506 Mile Hi Cablevision secured a franchise in Denver with a proposal 
that included “full interactive services, including home security, shopping, and banking.”507 And 
all six bidders for five franchise areas in Chicago promised interactive services, such as home 
shopping.508 Within just a few years, however, most cable prospecting proved to be more fanciful 
than feasible, with “beleaguered operators…trying to get out of agreements to provide 
extravagant services and facilities.”509 Watching cable companies postpone or abandon the 
interactive offerings touted during franchise negotiations, critics alleged that the main purpose of 
interactivity was bargaining leverage.510  
 Interactive ambitions thus helped to draw the map of cable service in the country, both by 
influencing franchising decisions that granted lasting incumbencies and by creating conditions for 
opportunistic MSOs to expand by absorbing overextended operations that had promised more 
than they could afford. Well-publicized misfires helped rein in speculation, and as the industry 
found its footing with satellite interconnection and a national policy set by Congress in 1984, 
cable become a reliable investment even without resorting to exotic imaginations. But by the end 
of the 1980s, a movement by telephone companies to market television services renewed 
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shoppability’s salience in the narrative of media convergence and its currency as a strategic asset 
in system-building.511 Following legal victories and favorable rulemaking, in which their 
lobbyists used the promise of interactive services to justify “deregulation,” telephone companies 
announced plans to build video distribution systems. While considered, by some, a ruse by the 
regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) to gain entry into the long-distance telephone 
market, these designs were elaborate, costly, and consequential.512  
GTE, the largest independent telephone operator (which became Verizon after its 
acquisition by Bell Atlantic), began testing a home shopping portal, called Main Street, in several 
markets in 1988 and then embarked on a plan to construct a fiber optic-coax infrastructure for 
interactive services in California.513 By 1994, GTE  had deployed Main Street near Boston and 
anticipated up to 7 million new customers for its interactive products over the next decade.514 
Ameritech won franchises throughout the Midwest and earmarked $29 billion over 15 years to 
build hybrid fiber-coax systems capable of supporting interactive shopping.515 As U.S. West 
developed an “interactive mall” showcasing merchandise from Virgin Records, Nordstrom, J.C. 
Penney, and Ford, the executive vice president of the venture distinguished it from traditional 
home shopping: “We are creating short-term television with an impact, and it is important to 
remember we’re in the business of direct marketing.” The company’s plan for “combin[ing] 
entertainment and electronic retailing” envisioned a future in which digital marketplaces would 
learn, predict, and cater recommendations to users’ viewing and shopping habits.516 Meanwhile, 
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Variety called Bell Atlantic “the most aggressive” entrant into television among the RBOCs, with 
its “Stargazer” system.517 The company planned to spend $15 billion between 1993 and 2000 to 
equip 8.75 million homes with five “killer applications,” including home shopping and direct-
response advertising.518 Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle, the database-software firm managing Bell 
Atlantic’s system, animated his vision in terms of frictionless impulse buying: “You’re sitting 
there watching the ABC News, an ad from Time Life comes on and suddenly you’ve got an 
opportunity to order the entire works of Nat King Cole on CD. One click of the button and it’s 
yours.”519  
Although these ventures ended mostly in retreat from video provision, in the discourses 
about them we see vivid impressions of the modern internet, including high-capacity servers that 
store digital video for on-demand retrieval, easily navigable retail portals, click-to-buy shopping, 
dataveillance, and behavioral ad-targeting. The efforts by telecoms to provide converged 
information and entertainment services, in which long-standing dreams of interactive television 
were routinely evoked, influenced the building, financing, administration, and regulation of 
America’s information infrastructure.  
To outdo telephone companies, exert a competitive advantage against fledgling direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS) businesses, and search for new billable services to skirt the rate 
regulations Congress imposed in 1992, cable MSOs invested billions in plant upgrades and 
plotted adventurous schemes. In 1993, Time Warner Cable (TWC) announced ambitious plans for 
its Full Service Network (FSN). As discussed in the previous chapter, FSN is best remembered as 
a very expensive demonstration of video-on-demand. But another widely publicized feature let 
viewers use the television to order from Pizza Hut and purchase from an “interactive digital 
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shopping mall.”520 TWC claimed to be transforming the television into a multimedia portal akin 
to what we would soon come to recognize as the Web. At the same time, in Omaha, Cox Cable 
implemented a large-scale test of an interactive offering that included home shopping.521 Even 
though these experiments inflicted financial wounds and exposed the gulf between rhetorical 
hype and the actual feasibility of these plans, Microsoft’s $1 billion investment in Comcast in 
1997 signaled that Bill Gates expected cable operators to build the interactive video systems he 
had imagined in The Road Ahead. Broadcasting & Cable regarded Gates’s financial blessing as 
visionary: “In the past 12 months, maybe in the history of cable, no other single event has done 
more to highlight the industry’s potential and endorse its technology.”522 The billionaire who 
hoped television could become a shoppable catalogue helped position cable as the backbone of 
the U.S. internet industry. 
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Figure 4.1 This promotional display for Time Warner Cable’s Full Service Network, exhibited in 
the equipment archive at the Cable Center’s Barco Library, reiterates the vision of convergence 
via interactive TV that surfaced in 1970s discussions of a “wired world.” (Photo by the author.) 
 
Even earlier, Microsoft had dedicated resources toward designing “software and network 
facilities for interactive television,” in partnership with Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI), the 
nation’s largest MSO for most of the 1980s and 1990s.523 While TCI’s dominance owed more to 
corporate maneuvering than technical sophistication, the company’s CEO is said to have “single-
handedly launched the start of the interactive age.”524 In 1992, John Malone announced his 
intention to provide customers 500 channels and advanced information services, “and for the next 
couple of years, the cable industry spun interactive dreams, visions of videos ordered at a whim, 
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electronic shopping, instant-response advertising, and paying bills with the click of a button.”525 
Later on, in trade-press coverage of TCI’s digital cable offering, we find affordances and 
expectations that had been discursively constructed decades earlier continuing to frame the future 
of entertainment and information services: 
It is simultaneously a step back to the much-ballyhooed interactive TV and a leap 
forward into the world of digital bits…Digital cable represents the beginning of the cable 
industry’s ability to exploit the full power of its bandwidth by opening up the coaxial 
pipeline to any kind of traffic…Moreover, that traffic can travel in both ways, easing the 
way for faster impulse buys, interactive games and Web-like features.526 
 
Still, despite Malone’s rhetoric, enthusiasm outpaced the translation of these ambitions into 
reality. One major bottleneck was the electronic equipment for bringing a digital revolution into 
customers’ homes.  
Building a Better Box 
Providing shoppable services required upgrades to “next generation” set-top boxes. STBs 
emerged in the late-1960s as converters that enabled TV sets to tune cable transmissions from 
frequencies outside VHF and UHF bands. They became important instruments of control when 
subscription channels, tiered services, and pay-per-view offerings required cable operators to 
scramble signals and discriminate among customers, using “addressable” systems controlled by 
computers at the operators’ headend facilities. By the early-1970s, the cable industry recognized 
home terminal equipment as the means for furnishing interactive services, such as “point-to-point 
merchandising,” and venture capitalists began to exhibit a conspicuous interest in cable 
hardware.527 Anticipation of the possibilities presented by addressable and two-way-capable 
STBs simmered for the next two decades, before boiling in the 1990s, when advances in digital 
technologies seemed to promise the arrival of a long-awaited interactive future. The potential for 
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interactive direct marketing seemed to promise revolutionary change.528 As a product brochure 
from leading box-maker General Instrument boasted in 1996, the “addressable intelligence” in its 
cutting-edge set-top box “turns television into a video store, shopping mall, library, brokerage 
house and more.”529 Despite nagging doubts about viewers’ appetites for dramatically new TV 
experiences, outfitting STBs with microprocessors and internet modems to support a suite of 
multimedia and marketing services was part of long-term strategies for leading actors in cable, 
software, and electronics industries. It was also a priority for the FCC following the 1996 
Telecommunications Act.530 
The set-top box, which was being redesigned to materialize the hopes of an interactive 
future, became a locus for the collision of television and networked personal computing. As an 
article in Broadcasting & Cable put it, “the set-top box is a nexus where different technologies 
can come together and generate new revenue.”531 The 1990s witnessed a gold rush into STB 
markets, as many people at the time expected these devices to be the main consumer gateway to 
an “information superhighway.”532 Broadcasters, marketers, and MVPDs invested in hardware 
and software to support shoppable applications. The ranks of companies designing and 
manufacturing apparatus for multichannel television—led by General Instrument (now Arris) and 
Scientific-Atlanta (now Technicolor)—swelled to include giants from the computer industry, 
notably Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Apple, and Hewlett-Packard.533 These firms coded and built digital 
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set-top box technologies for cable, DBS, and telecom operators who requested electronic 
shopping and other interactive capabilities.534 Tech startups rushed to design shoppable 
applications; for example, Wink Communications, an early standout in television commerce, 
enabled viewers to click their remotes to buy CDs from musical guests on The Tonight Show with 
Jay Leno.535 Collectively, these efforts were, as the title of one consulting report put it, “Turning 
TV Sets into Cash Registers.”536 
To some, these developments heralded “a whole new phase of the cable and computer 
industries,” positioning television companies to tap “the home retail market, which may be worth 
hundreds of billions of dollars every year.”537 TCI’s executive vice president of ad sales 
suggested that advertising within the “direct-response environment” enabled by digital, 
addressable STBs constituted “a whole new way of using television.”538  By the late-1990s, the 
perceived affordances of digital cable systems—to monitor viewing habits, execute behavioral 
profiling and targeting, evaluate the effectiveness of ads, and facilitate immediate purchases—had 
aroused considerable excitement: “The broadband pipe is primed and advertisers are pumped up 
about the prospects of translating the PC ‘click through’ to the TV.”539 Microsoft in particular 
looked to position itself as an indispensable intermediary within this stack of technologies by 
using its operating system to control the set-top box. Dan Schiller explains, “Microsoft thought it 
saw prospectively vast markets in the digital set-top boxes that cable operators would need to 
transform TV sets into versatile interactive terminals.” He continues, “by seeking to use technical 
standards as a strategic weapon, Microsoft made yet another bid for a privileged place on the 
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platform that would link PCs and TVs to consumer programming and information services.”540 
Beyond licensing its software, Microsoft hoped to capture fees on e-commerce transactions, 
which were expected to skyrocket in the near future. Even in 2002, when internet browsing had 
settled around desktops and laptops, Fortune called the STB “the most valuable square of real 
estate in America.”541 
Analysts responded to the commercial and technical convergence of television and 
personal computing with predictions of robust growth for interactive TV. One study projected 
interactive television shopping revenues to total $4.3 billion in 2005, with “the bulk of this 
buying” executed directly with a remote control.542 Other estimates were even grander.543 But 
these predictions were too optimistic. To begin, building a digital STB to actualize the dreams 
publicized by cable operators was difficult and expensive.544 For years, General Instrument 
struggled to produce a box that matched John Malone’s vision, and the set-top terminal running 
Time Warner’s FSN reportedly cost $7,000.545 One observer joked recently that Time Warner 
could have saved money on FSN’s pizza-ordering function by hiring someone to stand beside 
each subscriber’s TV and wait for the viewer to request a pie.546 Even in more modest systems 
planned in the mid-1990s, the price tag for next-generation STBs ($400–$1,000) was well above 
the perceived threshold of viability ($200–$300).547 Activating the capacity implied by digital 
STBs also required outlays for home installations and upgrades to headend facilities, and cable 
operators were reluctant to replace equipment for which expenses were still being amortized over 
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expected lifespans. Even for MSOs with enough scale and cash flow to absorb these expenditures, 
the process was complicated by the patchwork nature of their footprints, which they had built by 
acquiring local cable systems whose facilities ranged widely in age, quality, and compatibility. 
These pressures, in a context of chaos and uncertainty, depressed STB orders, kept manufacturing 
costs high, and discouraged enterprises that required mass-scale deployment of digital equipment.  
Furthermore, as an infrastructural technology, STBs are entangled with actors, 
institutions, and interests across industries and sectors. While shoppable television excited 
imaginations, STBs are essentially designed to transmit and control access to video content. 
Building an interactive storefront held an outsized place in expectant discourses about the future 
of entertainment compared to more pressing concerns, such as program licensing, signal security, 
and digital video standards. Futuristic services made for good publicity, but filling the bandwidth 
unleashed by digital compression with more programming was a safer bet for cable operators. 
Fighting for space on STBs, the engineers designing middleware and applications for interactive 
shopping were up against the needs of the electronic program guide, a crucial user interface for 
navigating hundreds of channels, which nearly monopolized a box’s memory and computing 
power.  Moreover, the coordination needed to stabilize a network of interoperable devices and 
protocols that could support the elaboration of shoppable television in ways that would appeal to 
the national marketers needed to finance these expensive ventures was undermined by proprietary 
dispositions among system operators, equipment makers, and software developers.548 Beyond the 
“chicken and egg” problem of deployment and investment, the tensions involved in building and 
exploiting industrial capacity were aggravated by conflict between the conservative influence of 
fixed capital—that a rigid infrastructure would limit innovation—and a climate of rapid 
technological and cultural change—wherein an STB might be outdated by the time it was 
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installed. As the Fortune article referenced above admitted, TCI, TWC, and Microsoft “have 
spent billions in pursuit of this Holy Grail, with next to nothing to show for it.”549 
Consumers, meanwhile, encountered frustrating interfaces, unfamiliar behaviors, and a 
dearth of appealing interactive content. For their part, advertisers and marketers continued to face 
a promising but largely incoherent technical and administrative environment. While technologies 
existed to facilitate shoppable television, the potential had not been manifested in industrial 
process or cultural habit. As TWC’s chief engineer, Jim Chiddix told me, “It took years for digital 
boxes to get deployed sufficiently to have a realistic business model for something like interactive 
television or interactive advertising. And, in fact, those things both stayed pretty elusive for a 
long time. Everybody sort of got the idea that you could do these things technically, but turning 
them into a business was hard. And, again, the Web sort of ran off with the low-hanging fruit for 
things like interactive shopping and interactive advertising. But the potential was still there.”550 
Ongoing struggles suggest that the assessment of one cable executive remains topical twenty 
years later: “Sometimes the dreamers dream faster than the implementers.”551  
Despite disappointing expectations, shoppability has been a resilient part of discourses 
about the future of television, and the logic has colonized significant territories in the digital 
media landscape. We now return to perhaps the most potent narrative frame for imagining the 
merchandising potential of interactive video entertainment, which carries the story of shoppability 
from the 1990s toward the present.  
                                                          
549 Leonard, “The Most Valuable Square Foot in America.” 
550 Interview with Jim Chiddix, January 28, 2018. 
551 Rich Brown and Richard Tedesco, “Promise vs. Performance,” Broadcasting & Cable, April 29, 1996, 
10, 12. 
190 
 
 
The Acme of Shoppable Media 
In 2000, Josh Bernoff predicted that soon viewers would be able to purchase Jennifer Aniston’s 
sweater while watching Friends. This was only one among his many prescriptions for refining the 
television business, most of which have been much more successful than “t-commerce.” Bernoff 
even elaborated problems with selling wardrobe items. For example, how to share revenues 
among the merchant, the t-commerce service provider, the broadcast network, the affiliate station, 
the MVPD, the show’s producers, and the actor herself remained unresolved. As skeptical 
observers perceived, with “too many fingers in the t-commerce pie…the economics of Jennifer’s 
sweater quickly unravel.”552 “Selling Jennifer Aniston’s sweater is not a business model,” one 
critic opined.553 Another doubter called the idea “pure rubbish,” adding, “I don’t think anyone 
will want to watch Friends to buy a sweater.”554 Bernoff soon admitted that “T-commerce 
expectations have been way overblown.”555 Nevertheless, Jennifer Aniston’s sweater became a 
touchstone for television’s future—and its failures. A 2008 article in the New York Times called 
“Rachel’s sweater” a “catchphrase…for what devotees of interactive television are trying to 
accomplish.”556 It was “Blue Skies” for a digital age. 
The potential to enable impulse buying—reducing to a minimum the steps between 
introducing and consummating a purchase-opportunity—was already recognized by the 1970s 
and was a motivating factor in designing systems that could support impulse pay-per-view. The 
vision of shoppability articulated by Gates and Bernoff seemed to further captivate imaginations, 
aided perhaps by television’s history as a showcase for attractive goods, services, and lifestyles. 
In 2005 USA Today imagined a prosperous future for contextual shoppability in cable 
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programming: “Talk about impulse buying. You’re watching your favorite cable channel and 
admire a product on the show. With a few clicks on your TV remote, it’s yours.”557  
Enthusiasm swelled as digital STBs were installed in 38 million cable homes by 2008 and 
interactive television, according to a Cablevision executive, was no longer the “wave of the 
future,” but rather “the wave of now.”558 That year, a consortium of the six largest cable operators 
in the U.S. directed their resources and clout toward establishing technical and administrative 
standards for making interactive TV work at the scale required to entice national marketers. Even 
as the consortium tried to distance itself from false promises woven into Aniston’s sweater, its 
CEO counted t-commerce among the “four flavors” of interactivity it intended to develop.559 By 
2009, the New York Times observed that “cable companies are starting to slowly move” toward 
“the promise that consumers could instantly buy Jennifer Aniston’s sweater on ‘Friends.’”560 In 
2012, the consortium abandoned its t-commerce venture and dismissed 80% of its staff. 
Long after critics eulogized the plan, selling Jennifer Aniston’s sweater remains a 
tantalizing symbol for a still-nascent technology.561 More current references have been proposed, 
such as Serena’s handbag from Gossip Girl, Sarah Palin’s red jacket from Sarah Palin’s Alaska, 
and Effie Trinket’s wig from The Hunger Games.562 But however personified, the logic remains 
intact. This imagery has been inherited also to describe initiatives that let TV viewers use “second 
screen” devices (laptops, tablets, and mobile phones) to buy products related to the programs and 
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advertisements they watch.563 As more TV viewing occurs within reach of internet-enabled 
devices, advertisers, programmers, and MVPDs are leveraging second-screen connectivity to 
“turn any network, app, multichannel provider and TV set into a kind of home shopping 
network.”564 As early as 2006, Delivery Agent, an e-commerce company, began operating an 
online “tour” that turned the Desperate Housewives set into a shoppable showroom.565 The next 
year an executive from a media buying agency depicted the convergence of television and 
internet video through this lens, describing a scenario in which viewers “mouse over…and click” 
on Aniston’s sweater.566 More recently, Shazam, a mobile application designed for music 
discovery, has been engineered to “reinvent the 30-second spot” by allowing “viewers to buy 
products from mobile devices.”567 And in 2016, A+E Networks produced “the first ‘fully-
shoppable’ TV series,” in which every item featured on the home improvement show can be 
purchased from Wayfair.com.568 With mobile carrier AT&T taking on a bigger role in video 
advertising and Comcast expanding its mobile carriage business, these operators expect to push 
forward the practice, already in limited use, of sending to viewers’ mobile phones advertisements, 
coupons, or shopping opportunities related in some way to either the ads or programming they are 
watching on the big screen. Brian Lesser, the CEO of AT&T’s advertising business recently 
explained, “Imagine, you’re watching content and instead of us interrupting the content with a 
traditional commercial break, we can show an icon on the screen that indicates to you that there 
might be a mixed reality experience where you can get more information about the car you just 
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saw or the dress you just saw.”569 Before joining  AT&T, Lesser tried to implement a similar 
program when he led Xaxis, WPP’s programmatic platform.570 
While these and other developments blur the lines of “television commerce,” since they 
operate through equipment and services provided by someone besides the MVPDs (though they 
typically depend on the latter for internet connectivity), they contribute to the broader project of 
making video entertainment shoppable. Indeed, increased connectivity to digital marketplaces has 
helped sustain hopes that selling merchandise directly through television devices is finally 
becoming mainstream, especially as firms with core competencies in electronic retailing have 
assumed larger roles in video distribution (e.g., Amazon).571 Such initiatives follow an established 
legacy. “Click-to-buy” functions appeared on TiVo in 2008 and on Apple TV and Roku devices 
soon after. Rovi Corp. (now TiVo), which operates electronic program guides for MVPDs, 
launched a shoppable guide in 2011. Delivery Agent—which provided commerce services for 
Rovi, Twitter, YouTube, and others—equipped Samsung and Sony smart TVs with ShopTV, an 
app that “allows television viewers to shop for products seen in network programming and 
advertising via their remote control.”572 Even before introducing ShopTV in 2013, Delivery 
Agent was supporting a variety of t-commerce functions, including letting Verizon FiOS 
customers buy memorabilia related to programs on the History Channel. By 2013, Delivery 
Agent counted three broadcast networks and more than 50 cable channels among the clients for 
which it “sell[s] licensed merchandise from TV programming.”573 Having overcome the barrier of 
“getting that living room connected,” Delivery Agent’s CEO, Mike Fitzsimmons, told CNBC in 
                                                          
569 Ben Munson, “AT&T’s Advertising Behemoth is Coming for Facebook and Google,” FierceCable, July 
9, 2018 https://www.fiercecable.com/video/at-t-s-advertising-behemoth-coming-for-facebook-and-google.  
570 Alex Kantrowitz, “Your TV and Phone May Soon Double Team You,” Advertising Age, April 28, 2014, 
8. 
571 Laura Heller, “Amazon Makes Original Content Shoppable,” FierceRetail, July 14, 2016.  
572 Delivery Agent, “Delivery Agent Rolls Out T-commerce App on Samsung Smart TVs,” press release, 
July 17, 2013. 
573 Winslow, “Tune In,” Broadcasting & Cable. 
194 
 
 
December 2015, “this idea of having a tethered experience between the content that you’re 
viewing and the ability to purchase is becoming a reality.”574 A year earlier, when he announced 
that a shoppable H&M advertisement would air during the 2014 Super Bowl, Fitzsimmons said t-
commerce at last had realized “the potential associated with buying Jennifer Aniston’s 
sweater.”575  
Less than a year after Delivery Agent filed for bankruptcy protection in 2016, 
Fitzsimmons started another company, Connekt, to continue chasing this elusive dream. 
According to a flattering company profile in Broadcasting & Cable, “the technology appears to 
have finally caught up to the idea.” By bringing t-commerce to IP-connected devices, including 
Roku players, smart TVs, and set-top boxes, “Connekt appears to have figured out how to turn 
viewers into instant consumers with the touch of a remote button.”576  
These enterprises remain committed to an ambition that courses through the history of 
commercial media. Yet, despite the promotional hype, equipping the television screen for 
shopping has been a serious challenge. Can we account for the tenacity of this idea and for what 
has delayed its implementation? 
Persistence and Resistance 
The persistence of shoppability is not totally surprising. Convinced that t-commerce is imminent, 
an executive at Acxiom expressed the common sentiment that “TV remains the most powerful 
medium for engaging consumers.”577 In addition to its reach, television is thought to be the 
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premier venue for exhibiting products and brands.578 The emotional register achievable on 
television, and the connections viewers form with programs and characters, help explain why 
marketers exhibit a stubborn attachment to the model of interactivity devised by HyperSoap, a 
project which was described in retrospect as having begun “with dreams of buying the sweater off 
Jennifer Aniston’s back.”579 Researchers have even singled out Friends for its extraordinary 
influence on consumer attitudes.580 But what dynamics underlie and undermine efforts to 
merchandize television entertainment? 
“Persistent patterns of technological change,” Donald MacKenzie observes, “are persistent in 
part because technologists and others believe they will be persistent.”581 The expectation of a 
“technological trajectory” can function like a self-fulfilling prophecy, as actors invest financially 
and symbolically in prevailing ambitions. The evidence detailed above shows how expectations 
and ambitions framed problems and potentials for systems-builders. Shoppability was a 
compelling answer to important questions confronting cable operators beginning in the 1970s, 
including how to win valuable franchises, diversify revenues, and excite investors and regulators. 
For the broader multichannel television industry, shoppability was part of a wedge for expanding 
the cable business beyond retransmission, and it complemented larger efforts to exploit the 
capacity of broadband wires and addressable set-top boxes. As an alluring and long-imagined 
consumer service, interactive shopping was also a public relations device for a political-economic 
agenda of convergence; it shimmered on the surface of a wave that swept through 
communications markets and policy in the 1990s. From the 2000s onward, shoppability has been 
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a hopeful bulwark against existential threats to television, as financial support is imperiled by 
audience fragmentation, advertising avoidance, and competition from digital advertising 
platforms. The vigorous return of product placement and brand integration strategies during these 
years added fuel to t-commerce aspirations.582 Along the way, these dreams and efforts spawned 
legions of firms committed to aspects of shoppability and advanced advertising, many of which 
understand themselves to be working within some part of the “television” business. Their 
collective energies, associations, and histories (including employees’ training and career paths) 
help sustain a shoppable agenda within particular industrial paradigms, networks, loyalties, and 
boundaries.583 
Across these decades, shoppability aroused marketers’ fundamental interest in using 
communication technologies to accelerate the circulation of commodities. Transactive television 
promises advertising’s holy grail—merging medium and marketplace. Shoppability is built to 
match the logic of commercial media, put succinctly in Advertising Age: “The business of 
marketing and the business of entertainment are fundamentally about the same thing: Turning 
audience attention into commerce.”584 Without marketplace connectivity for transacting sales, 
though, this system operates below capacity. For the CEO of Delivery Agent, shoppability 
actualizes television’s full potential: “Entertainment properties create demand for consumer 
product, and there’s a broken link between viewers and networks.”585 “We’re trying,” he says, “to 
take a passive viewing audience and turn them into an active, purchasing consumer.”586 Whether 
or not this corresponds to the experiences of viewers, shoppability clearly is a concentrated 
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expression of a marketing logic that has contributed to the meaning of “television” and its 
industrial, technological, and cultural dimensions.  
But if shoppability satisfies these functional roles, why has the “prophecy” of selling 
Aniston’s sweater gone mostly unfulfilled? As historians demonstrate, technologies become 
operative not through pure affordance, but through the work of binding them to durable 
organizational and cultural forms.587 In commercial TV, the potential implied by shoppability—to 
accelerate the circulation of commodities—confronts the limitations of a sociotechnical system 
situated historically in an institutional setting, wherein the uses of specific technologies are 
circumscribed by established practices, priorities, competencies, rules, and norms. Commercial 
television was built to use video content to attract the attention of viewers which could be sold to 
advertisers. While t-commerce teases the prospect that advertisers could pay only for verified 
sales, it conflicts with some processes for commodifying audiences that have been 
institutionalized over decades. Furthermore, the idea of shoppable television began inching 
toward reality across a period in which program networks remained extremely powerful and 
profitable, cable operators were still years away from having digital boxes in a critical mass of 
homes, and the bursting of the dot-com bubble tempered enthusiasm. To reconfigured TV 
viewing habits to accommodate shopping was no simple matter either, and the fact remains that 
laptops and mobile devices support friendlier and more familiar shopping experiences than TVs. 
Despite the potential to enable consumption behavior, which is the inferred basis of audience 
value, shoppability has not been institutionalized to supplant many taken-for-granted and still-
lucrative ways of thinking and acting that emerged within television’s historically-specific 
configurations. In a final irony, the expensive and protracted deployment of digital STBs, fueled 
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by futuristic promises, now discourages MVPDs from shifting en masse to IP delivery systems 
that could better accommodate interactive advertising and shopping.588  
The aspiration of exploiting television’s full marketing capacity, encouraged by the 
technological possibilities elaborated throughout the development of cable TV, brought 
innovative pressure into conflict with entrenched industrial practices. Recognizing these 
contradictory influences helps to explain the disjuncture between revolutionary forecasts and the 
stubborn pace of sociotechnical change. The translation from imaginable affordance to instituted 
capacity is seldom swift or smooth. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has documented the persistence of shoppability as an aspiration in television and 
cable industries. From the late-1960s through the 1990s, as the cable television and 
telecommunications industry worked to define its place in a convergent media landscape, 
interactive home shopping starred in seductive stories about the future of entertainment and 
information services. These stories influenced the contours of cable’s footprint and regulatory 
framework and were built into hardware and software as part of an effort to position digital cable 
boxes as the domestic portal to a version of the information revolution that was inflected, in part, 
by mindsets and structures from commercial television. From 2000 to the present, the prospect of 
selling Jennifer Aniston’s sweater lingers as the purest expression of marketers’ ongoing efforts 
to turn any medium into a marketplace. But the failures to realize shoppability as it has been 
imagined show the ways in which media systems become bound to relatively durable institutions 
and infrastructures. The story of shoppability shows both the general pressures on communication 
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systems in capitalism to expand and accelerate commodification and market exchange and the 
contradictions manifested in that process.  
As ongoing developments reopen technological and industrial possibilities, as confidence 
in the legitimacy of legacy institutions wanes, and as new stakeholders pursue points of entry to 
implement their visions, shoppability remains a potent discursive tool. Perhaps more importantly, 
shoppability, as first constructed around television, has become a quintessential feature of 
advertising (and, increasingly, entertainment) in online environments. Popularization of the 
internet and the emergence of graphical Web browsers coincided with pervasive discussions 
about how to engineer interactive media systems into platforms for targeted advertising and 
electronic commerce.589 As it exists today, the Web is the fullest expression of what many people 
imagined as television’s future: a commercial platform affording, among other things, interactive 
advertising and shopping.   
While specific visions of shoppable television developed more slowly than many hoped 
and expected, for a variety of technical, economic, cultural, and political reasons, it is hard to 
deny that the efforts to construct shoppability as an affordance of interactive and convergent 
media systems have not influenced profoundly the meanings and, increasingly, the commercial 
and cultural practices associated with many digital environments. Within the last decade, and 
accelerating in recent years, the logic of shoppability is colonizing all sorts of media content, 
devices, platforms, and applications. From digital magazines, to display ads on music apps, to 
both commercial and editorial content on YouTube, the notion that the medium is a marketplace 
is beyond dispute. As mobile phones have been equipped with better cameras and image-
recognition software, marketers have linked their online storefronts to apps that let users turn 
their physical surroundings into a showroom, as a person can photograph what they see on a 
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billboard, a clothing rack, or even worn by fellow passersby, and then find an online merchant 
selling that apparel, accessory, furnishing, or whatever else.  
Across all of these domains, the linking of media usage to shopping opportunities arouses 
the desire that motivates so much of what we have detailed so far—the ability to know that a 
viewer bought what he or she saw advertised. In the next chapter, we turn to accountability, the 
affordance that has been a pervasive backdrop to advanced advertising ambitions. 
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Chapter Five – Vive le ROI!: Accounting, Attribution, and Set-top Box Data 
 
In 1961, the incoming president of the American Marketing Association prescribed to the group 
an ideal approach for preparing an advertising budget: “[It] calls for adding dollar after dollar to 
the appropriation until the point is reached where the last dollar produced no increase in profit. 
This assumes that the sales effectiveness of any given expenditure is known and that relevant 
costs are applied. A few advertisers do claim to have this information to a remarkable degree but 
they are very much the exception.”590  
A great deal of this dissertation has been about companies’ efforts to join these 
exceptional ranks. In many ways the transformation of advertising and commercial media over 
the past 60 years has been fueled by desires for a more comprehensive and sophisticated 
accounting of advertising’s effect on sales. The loudest boast from proponents of digital and 
internet-based marketing has been that the new media world, featuring interactivity and pervasive 
surveillance, would provide a more accountable environment for advertising and media buying. 
By refining and implementing the means for “attributing” purchases to the impact of specific ads 
and marketing interventions, the logic goes, advertisers can calculate their return on investment 
(ROI), and this metric can become the new basis for how audiences are packaged, bought, and 
sold. Accountability indulges the highest ambition for setting advertising on a firmly “scientific” 
footing. As the former chief marketing officer at Coca-Cola wrote more than fifteen years ago, 
“Advertising is not an art form. It’s about selling more stuff more often to more people for more 
money. Success is the result of a scientific, disciplined process, and absolutely every single 
expenditure must generate a return.”591  
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The migration of this logic from the margins to the heart of commercial media systems 
represents a gradual, if incomplete, eclipse of creativity by calculation. Across this century, 
advertising and media executives have been claiming, with as much hope as confidence, that 
digital technology will resolve the endemic dilemma of uncertainty in advertising. As one 
television executive put it, “You know the old John Wanamaker saying, ‘Half of what I spend on 
advertising is wasted, I just don’t know which half’? I think we’ll know which half…And we’ll 
charge double for the other half!”592  
As the reference to Wanamaker implies, the quest for accountability has been a persistent 
force shaping the tools and techniques used in advertising throughout its modern history. This 
force intensified markedly in the second half of the twentieth century, amplified by the 
application of electronic computer processing and other information technologies to aspects of 
audience manufacture. Rather than being a consequence of the internet, as is often claimed, 
accountability has been a catalyst driving and shaping the commercialization of the internet and 
other digital media. Technical and institutional features of the internet presented opportunities for 
marketers to organize this environment around a more calculating approach to audience 
construction and to try to implement more fully than ever before their longstanding vision for a 
commercial medium defined by automation, precise targeting, always-on electronic marketplaces, 
and the measurement capabilities to account for ROI. Companies like DoubleClick, Google, and 
Facebook stepped forward to build the infrastructure for this vision of advanced advertising. 
Selling the American people has mobilized conquests that profoundly shaped our information 
environments, personal technologies, and public spaces and cultures. ROI has been the king 
presiding over many of those crusades. 
                                                          
592Quoted in Mark Andrejevic, “The Twenty-First Century Telescreen,” in Television Studies After TV: 
Understanding Television in the Post-Broadcast Era, eds. Graeme Turner and Tina Jay (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 32. 
203 
 
 
This chapter focuses on efforts to measure audiences, monitor shopping behaviors, and 
draw inferences about how media exposures influence purchases. I will briefly survey some of 
the history of audience measurement both to demonstrate the persistence of demands for evidence 
of sales effectiveness and to reiterate some of the institutional factors that make it difficult to 
institute a business model around ROI metrics, even beyond the challenge of making 
scientifically valid claims about attribution. I then use a detailed examination of household 
addressable advertising via the set-top box to illustrate the state of the art in a sphere of marketing 
activity that promotes accountability as a hallmark.  
To reiterate what might already be clear, in this context accountability does not connote 
public, prosocial, or democratic responsibility. Rather more literally, it means that companies’ 
chief financial and marketing officers, or the managers reporting to those executives, can account 
for how the money spent on advertising impacted sales or other “key performance indicators.” By 
accounting for advertising exposure and shopping activities, marketers want to confidently 
attribute outcomes to specific advertising efforts. A bit more liberally, the term embraces all 
manner of designs to account, measure, and quantify in the advertising business. To the extent 
that accountability refers to a form of transparency, it is about rendering individuals’ consumption 
behaviors transparent to observation and analysis, and gaining a fuller strategic (and economic) 
understanding of persuasion. 
Moving Needles, Ringing Registers 
Ever since modern advertising became understood as a mediated form a salesmanship, as Daniel 
Pope explains, “advertising people of all stylistic bents have agreed upon the purpose of the work: 
the task of advertising is to sell. The only legitimate measure of success is at the cash register.” 
This “credo” not only unites quantitative and creative techniques around a common objective, 
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Pope says, but “it is a fundamental element of continuity in advertising from the beginning of the 
[twentieth] century until today.”593 
The dream of determining the effect of media exposure on sales and purchasing 
behaviors has been a through-line in the history of audience measurement.594 The Nielsen 
company, which has been the dominant provider of television audience ratings for more than half 
a century, originated in market research. One of its earliest services involved attempts to “audit” 
the pantries of radio listeners to see if the representation of sponsors’ products there was 
correlated with the household’s media usage. For a variety of reasons, the industry cohered 
around ratings that claimed to represent the size and composition of listeners or viewers exposed 
to programming. But dissatisfaction with exposure-based audience measurement has endured 
since the broadcast era. Responding to publicity about a new approach for measuring radio and 
TV audiences in the late 1940s, the executive vice president of a Massachusetts station wrote, “I 
don’t think that any radio research technique can be termed revolutionary until a method is 
developed which will determine and disclose the impact of radio on the mind of the listener…The 
success of a program can be known only by its effect upon its hearers, whether its purpose is to 
entertain, to sell merchandise or both.”595  
Despite its obvious appeal to sponsors, the cost and difficulties of sustaining this sort of 
research contributed to the broadcast industry’s settlement around panel-based, nationally 
representative samples for quantifying the audiences tuning in to specific networks, channels, and 
shows. While audience measurement originated from advertisers’ demands for information to 
justify their investments in programming, by the 1940s the ratings industry began servicing the 
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supply side as its primary customers, meaning networks and stations paid the freight for research 
about the audiences gathered around their programming. Because the system was institutionalized 
to facilitate the sale of an abstraction (attention) that had to be manifested as a discrete 
commodity (an audience), inadequacies in measurement technique were weighed against the 
benefits of standardized information that enabled efficient and routine transactions in the 
audience marketplace.596 Consider one example: In the late 1950s, American Research Bureau 
(ARB) introduced a form of instantaneous audience measurement. A meter attached to a 
television set recorded usage and tuning information and transmitted that viewing data every 90 
seconds to ARB’s control center via dedicated telephone lines leased from AT&T. ARB’s initial 
test in Chicago ran into difficulties, however, when data reported by the meters suggested 
declines in houses using television during prime time, compared to data reported by viewers in 
paper diaries. Whatever the basis of the discrepancy, a complaint from the manager of one 
Chicago station neatly demonstrates that the commodity audience is an abstraction brought into 
tangible existence by instrumentation and institutional decisions about what to accept as 
legitimate. “We pay $250 a month for the diary service and are satisfied with it. After the trial 
period, they’ll want $2,000 a month for Arbitron [the metered service]. Now why should we 
spend $1,750 more for a rating service that will only cause us to lose money on our best nighttime 
periods?”597 In other words, the existing system produced more favorable evidence of audience 
attention at a cheaper rate. Philip Napoli’s general comment on how struggles over ratings 
methods are as political-economic as social-scientific is applicable here: “The end result of these 
processes of resistance and negotiation are conceptualizations of the media audience that do not 
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necessarily reflect technology’s full potential to capture audience information, and that reflect, to 
some extent, the specific interests of stakeholder groups.”598 
As historians and analysts of audience ratings have made abundantly clear, technical and 
administrative changes by measurement organizations affect the very nature of the audience 
product, and so the introduction of new instruments or techniques has almost always been met 
with controversy.599 Importantly, because media distributors and exhibitors supply most of the 
ratings industry’s revenues, they have leverage in preserving conventions that advantage their 
interests. While advertisers have dreamed of a paying only based on observable effects on the 
minds and behaviors of viewers, media companies generally prefer to monetize any and all 
discernable audience attention, rather than risking lost payments for audience members who don’t 
cooperate with sponsors’ solicitations—a matter deemed to fall beyond the control of networks, 
broadcasters, and cable operators.  
Still, advertisers have provided the lifeblood of these media systems, and so their 
preferences and pressures are never completely ignored. Nielsen and others like it have been 
attentive to continued demands by advertisers and their agencies for more information about 
consumer behavior. As indicated throughout this study, the introductions of computing, database, 
and surveillance technologies have provided stimulus to thinking about accountability in 
marketing. In 1961, representing his firm’s market research business more than its rating 
business, A.C. Nielsen Jr. “stated that the opportunity for profit in marketing today lies where it 
has always been: in a thorough knowledge of potential buyers’ needs.” Responding to the era’s 
calls for comprehensive tracking of products and purchases, Nielsen Jr. proposed “an effective 
marketing intelligence system which keeps management constantly in touch with consumer 
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demand; a carefully administered program of controlled experimentation in which two or more 
plans are evaluated for their relative contribution to volume, sales share and ultimate profit; with 
the most effective program decided upon, a continuing series of controlled experiments to 
determine the optimum level of marketing expenditure, and a continuous study and analysis of 
the components which make up the marketing plan.”600 Though painfully worded, this sounds 
very much like the sorts of A/B testing and attribution metrics that are the stock in trade of 
internet marketers today. 
This line of thinking has carried lasting influence, especially as electronic surveillance 
and personalization strategies crept closer to the center of marketing in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Proposals for media buying and audience measurement protocols that isolated the relationship 
between advertising exposure and sales outcomes gained renewed vigor. As one observer wrote 
in 1987, “If we believe half of what we hear and read lately, the day is coming when advertisers 
will be planning and buying media on a cost-per-target or cost-per-shopper basis.”601 At almost 
that same moment, Arbitron (formerly ARB) was in the process of developing a service called 
ScanAmerica, a so-called “single-source” rating in which panel members both recorded their 
viewing activity and also used a UPC-reader to provide an inventory of the household’s 
purchases. This venture soon folded—and was it not the first or last foray into the field of single-
source ratings. It arrived at a time when broadcast television remained exorbitantly lucrative, with 
networks still near the height of their power, and so “rocking the boat” was not a top priority for 
anyone. 
Those dynamics would change drastically over the next decade or so, along with 
improved systems for monitoring media users and continued expansion of retail surveillance 
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through electronic payment processing. By the turn of the century, of course, sophisticated 
audience measurement—perhaps even sales attribution—was being polished as a crown jewel for 
digital advertising, both online and in interactive television. The impetus and historical precedent 
for this was not surprising. As Broadcasting & Cable reported in 1998, “What advertisers and 
their agencies want is simple: ads that translate into sales.” 602   
Cable operators like TCI and Time Warner Cable seemed poised to provide not just 
consumer targeting and interactive shopping, but also the granular, comprehensive, and pervasive 
measurement capabilities on which truly personalized commerce depended. The vice president 
and media research director at Starcom USA, a media buying department at the Publicis 
conglomerate, speculated in 1999, “As we move forward five years, I don’t believe we’re going 
to be looking at traditional TV panel measurement—we’re going to be looking at more universal 
measurement using cable TV set-top boxes.”603 Later that year, Advertising Age elaborated on this 
vision for the future: 
Clearly, the model being worked on has cable system operators investing in an 
infrastructure that will allow them to…‘slice and dice their audience’ in ways marketers 
will find attractive…What will make the slicing and dicing possible is the information 
cable operators will be able to get from digital set-top boxes in their customers’ homes. 
That data, which can give the cable operators literally a second-by-second account of 
subscribers’ viewing habits, will be combined with other database information on 
demographics and buying habits for the ultimate in one-to-one communications.  
 
The CEO and president at Time Warner’s TBS network articulated the progressive 
implications: “We can move from selling the audience we think is there to selling the audience 
we know is there to selling the behavior of the audience we think is there to actually making 
sales.”604  
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By the early 2000s, the rapid emergence of online advertising, along with changes in how 
people accessed entertainment, were aggravating “cracks in the foundation” of TV’s 
measurement system.605 Industry observers saw both an impetus and an opportunity for reform. 
One writer in Advertising Age captured a view held by many people on the demand side, arguing 
that media measures “need to be rethought and reset to meet marketers’ needs. In the end, key 
metrics need to help measure what matters most: advertisers’ return on investment.”606 The 
consensus opinion was that STBs would be the lever of change. Unfortunately for advertisers and 
buyers hoping STBs would be a “golden goose,” cable operators turned out to be in no great rush 
to invest billions in upgrading their plant and replacing still-functional set-top boxes that 
generated revenue and were amortized as capital expenditures over a matter of years. While ad 
tech vendors were installing software onto digital STB that enabled the pervasive surveillance 
imagined above, the rollout of those boxes into customers’ premises moved slowly. Furthermore, 
despite the promise of census-level, second-by-second measurement—meaning the whole 
universe of households is accounted for at every moment—STB measurement is not perfect. To 
begin, this “universe” includes only pay TV subscribers, and it takes work and negotiations to 
fuse the splintered data from different operators into any cohesive whole. Furthermore, few 
people turn off the box at the end of a viewing session, and so complex math is required to make 
guesses about when someone is or is not watching. Knowing who within a house is watching is 
also harder than with Nielsen’s ratings system, which requires viewers to log in. Again, much 
ingenuity was applied to design computer-based models that could reliably predict who was 
watching. 
Despite these nagging concerns, by the second half of the 2000s, tens of millions of 
homes were equipped with digital STBs, and more efforts were underway to realign the audience 
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ratings currency. With “increased usage of the web…pressing vendors of traditional media to 
become more accountable and more efficient,” advertisers and media buyers were better 
positioned to influence the system.607 At the national level, Nielsen introduced commercial—
rather than program—ratings, which factored in time-shifted viewing on DVRs.608 The idea of 
measuring “engagement” also surfaced prominently in industry discourse. Reflecting anxieties 
about ad-skipping and commercial clutter, as well as optimism about translating the Web 2.0 
trend into video entertainment, engagement was a loosely defined idea that basically stood for 
whether viewers felt invested enough in content to dedicate serious time and attention. Assuming 
engagement in content would make advertisements more effective, engagement measurement was 
a middle-ground in the pursuit of ROI metrics, and a potential way to squeeze more value from an 
audience. Mark Burnett, executive producer of spectacles like Survivor and The Apprentice 
explained in 2007, “In the end you should never lose sight of what the advertisers really want. 
Actual companies such as General Motors and Procter & Gamble, they just care about selling 
products. There’s never really been a connection between someone viewing an ad and actually 
buying something. And that’s what they really care about. The engagement has to be there. If 
engagement numbers are true, a sponsor might pay 10 times cost-per-thousand. It’s like lead 
generation in advertising: an almost-guaranteed sale is worth 50 times what a cold call is 
worth.”609 
To the extent that engagement has been much more than a fad in TV, it’s been part of a 
defensive posture among programmers trying to convince sponsors that TV possesses a special 
immersive power above what online publishers can offer—and, in some cases, engagement was 
included within a proprietary brew of calculations used by media agencies to differentiate their 
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buying services. Advertisers are surely happy to have engaged viewers, but as Burnett’s remarks 
imply, sales are the true barometer. So, as “engagement” gave way to trendier buzzwords, the 
quest continued toward a more encompassing measurement system that could answer advertisers’ 
call: “Get me data that goes beyond reach to show me how consumers behave.” For the CEO of 
GroupM, the world’s leading media buyer, “what’s important is getting better information that 
can marry product choice, preference and usage to TV viewing.” 610 
By the late 2000s the hope of mining information from STBs had drawn a crowd that 
included Google, Nielsen, and Microsoft. Companies were renewing efforts to offer household-
level data about viewing and to match that with purchase records, in the tradition of “single-
source” metrics. One such firm was TRA, Inc., whose full name was squarely on the nose: “True 
Return on Investment Accountability.” The CEO and co-founder explained the company’s 
proposition in 2008: “Advertisers advertise to sell products, and for 50 years TV has been bought 
on sex and age demographics…What we are saying is, ‘Why not buy based on purchases?’” 611 
More forcefully, he added, in another venue, “We live in an age of accountability. Everything 
needs an ROI component.”612 
Companies like TRA were trying to fill a need that has been recurrent throughout the 
history I’ve documented—to match a technical capability to collect information with an 
administrative infrastructure for coordinating commercial activity around that information. As 
one media buyer put it in 2008, “Cable-systems operators offer a virtual treasure trove of 
consumer data. Their set-top boxes could track how viewers scamper across their channels 
second-by-second. But getting that information for advertisers on a wide-scale national basis is, 
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as it turns out, not so easy to do.” 613 Similarly, a vice president of business development at Cisco, 
then a leading producer of STBs, told the cable industry’s engineering journal, “There’s a lot of 
technology in place for data collection…We can collect almost an unimaginable amount of data 
at a granular level. The industry grapples with what’s the right architecture that would make this 
enormous fire-hose of data more useful.”614 Historian Thomas Hughes might have described this 
as a “reverse salient,” a military analogy that points to an imbalance among components of 
technological system that prevents the whole system from operating at maximum capacity.615 In 
effect, the cable industry was collecting more data than it could meaningfully handle. 
The driving preoccupation for audience measurement in recent years has been to integrate 
data from more sources within the institutionalized frame of calculation—including evidence of 
media use from different screens and platforms and records of shopping or other consumption-
related activities. Marketing consultants at Forrester Research, for example, insist on gaining a 
“360-degree view” of consumers—or sometimes even a (somehow) “720-degree view,” which 
includes sensor data and knowledge of a person’s “circle of social relationships.”616 As I discuss 
further below, the video advertising industry has established capabilities and relationships that 
allow for the lawful circulation and combination of information drawn from seemingly discrete 
part of a person’s life. The increasing involvement by a host of data brokers, management 
consultancies, and software-, platform-, and cloud-based services both responded to and inched 
forward the ultimate goal of verifying ROI.  
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Confirming Pope’s assessment cited above, participants in audience manufacture have 
understood, and sometimes admitted, that the whole purpose of commercial television is to 
“move the needle” on marketing objectives, and that the essential measure of success is whether 
an advertisement led to the “ring of a cash register.”617 Through advances in consumer 
surveillance, data management, and the partnerships necessary to facilitate the matching and 
modeling of media and shopping data, the video advertising business has been positioning itself 
to actually hear the register ring. Lung Huang, a senior vice president at Merkle, a database 
marketing agency owned by Denstu, spoke frankly about the level of insight available to 
merchants collecting transaction-generated data. Drawing on his experience working at the 
consumer insights company created when Kroger bought a part of the analytics firm Dunnhumby 
USA, Huang told attendees at the TV of Tomorrow Show how marketers understand their 
customers:  
[Y]ou are what you buy. You can say all these things about yourself, you can lie on a 
survey…but you are what you buy…I spent many years in the grocery business; we saw 
what you bought. And, you know what? You guys don’t buy very well. So, you are what 
you buy; we don’t care what your demographic [is]; what was in your basket and you 
actually purchased really is indicative of who you actually are.618 
 
Finding out what’s in our shopping baskets, and why we chose to fill it as we did, has 
been a guiding light throughout the history of media and market research. Fifty years after the 
radio station manager quoted above complained that exposure-based ratings were inadequate to 
the underlying purpose of broadcasting, the director of U.S. media research the J. Walter 
Thompson agency expressed the same sentiment: “I don’t really care what the rating is for ‘ER,’ 
nor if it’s on cable, or syndication, or a broadcast network. I want to know, for a target audience 
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that we’ve selected, how many of them are viewing the [Ford] Taurus or the Listerine commercial 
during the break. And, ideally, what influence the commercial has on them.”619 Almost 20 years 
later, this hope still colors expectations for the future. Putting confidence ahead of caution, the 
vice president of programmatic TV at a data management platform called Lotame told an 
audience of peers in 2017 that they should assume they are headed for a world of perfect data, 
perfect targeting, and definitive attribution—it’s not a matter of “if,” but “when.”620 One year 
later an executive from TiVo—a firm best known as a pioneer in DVR devices, but which has 
morphed into a software and data analytics company—boasted that with STB data today 
advertisers and media firms “truly can understand how TV advertising changes consumer 
behavior…No longer using proxies, no longer using correlation metrics, but truly in a 
deterministic fashion understand how we can change consumer behavior through TV 
advertising.”621 
Attribution in Addressable Advertising 
In 1999, David Poltrack told Advertising Age that the meter technology for recording viewer 
behaviors would have to be made “adaptable to the interactive nature and the addressability of 
TV in the future.”622 Despite anticipation about the prospect of using set-top boxes for audience 
measurement, beginning at least as early as the 1980s and intensifying throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, the data collected by STBs has been only slowly incorporated into media buying and 
selling. The boxes, although capable of collecting tuning data, were not designed primarily for 
that purpose, and, moreover, established industrial routines presented barriers to change. But set-
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top box data provides the essential foundation for all household-addressable advertising executed 
by cable and satellite operators. A closer look at addressable advertising will show us how 
accountability and attribution operate in practice today in as many as 64 million U.S. homes. 
Consistent with a variety of sources, the Video Advertising Bureau defines addressable 
TV advertising as “The ability of an advertiser to deliver household-level TV advertising via the 
set-top box based on a defined audience target developed through first-, second-, and/or third-
party data. Under this method, the advertiser buys the audience and not specific networks or 
programs.”623 Contrasting this with earlier approaches to segmenting audiences, the CEO of an 
addressable advertising broker called one2one media told me, “Instead of matching third-party 
data against viewing data and determining which network and programs and dayparts index high 
against [people] in the market to buy a luxury station wagon, we’re now matching against 
subscriber files and determining which households are in the market to buy a luxury station 
wagon.”624 Describing the appeal to advertisers, one industry report explains, “This household-
level targeting is made possible by ‘enriching’ viewing information with consumer transaction 
data, first to pinpoint the households that are the prospects, and then to monitor the sales impact 
after the campaign has run. In effect, precision targeting is a means to achieve the ultimate 
advertiser end goals: improved return on ad spend (ROAS) and better accountability.”625  
According to the latest data available from eMarketer, advertiser spending on addressable 
TV in the U.S. totaled $1.22 billion dollars in 2017, with expectations for spending to reach $3.37 
billion by 2020.626 These are relatively small numbers. By one estimate, addressable, interactive, 
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and VOD advertising together will represent just 2% of the $54.6 billion in national TV ad 
spending expected in 2018.627 Still, this growth suggests that longstanding hopes for addressable 
advertising are beginning to translate into realities. Michael Bologna was the president of Modi 
Media, a company created by WPP’s GroupM media buying agency to focus on addressable 
advertising. In 2016, Bologna reported,  
There are well over 100 advertisers and well over 350 campaigns running right now 
where advertisers take data, match it against subscriber files, identify households that are 
the real people they want to reach. And they send commercials to the households of only 
the homes that they want, ignore the balance, and on the back end, we return to the 
advertisers, ‘Here’s how many cars you sold. Here’s how many cans of soup you sold.’628 
 
Tracey Scheppach occupied basically the same role as Bologna, as the principal addressable 
buyer at Publicis’s Starcom MediaVest. Buying 2 billion impressions from DirecTV a few years 
ago, she told me, “I built a $15 million business with 250 addressable campaigns all with 
essentially census-level measurement and attribution on the backend. So, it’s like everything the 
advertisers were ever looking for, and now it just needs to scale.”629 When a top advertising sales 
executive at NBCU described the firm’s ability to take an advertiser’s customized target segment 
and “match it on a name and address level,” both for targeting and attribution, Scheppach 
responded, “It’s like a dream come true, I have to say.”630 
At this point, let’s take a closer look at the process of buying and inserting addressable 
ads at the STB level. The key actors in the transaction are the advertiser and its agency, the 
MVPD, and a neutral party like Experian or Acxiom who matches datasets from the buyer, seller, 
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and/or third parties. Insertion is facilitated by ad tech companies, such as Invidi and FreeWheel, 
which have developed and deployed software that enables a set-top box to automatically decide 
which ad from a menu of options should play in that household, based on the subscriber’s 
assignment to a specific marketing category.  
To begin the process, an advertiser decides whether household targeting makes sense for 
their business. Reportedly, the best candidates are companies whose target customers comprise 
between about 5% and 30% of the audience universe—any less and it’s too expensive, any more 
and it’s more economical to pay for a normal spot.631 The advertiser then works to specify its 
audience. The advertiser might have information in a customer-relationship management database 
(first-party data) or from relationships with business partners (second-party data), or it might 
procure a dataset from a broker that is not party to the advertiser’s transactions with its customers 
(third-party data). The president of GroupM’s addressable buying unit—by far the industry leader 
at the time—described its data partnerships in 2014, saying “We work with every data company 
from Experian to Dunnhumby to Polk to Acxiom to MasterCard. Whatever data source I need to 
help create and define the target segment that advertisers need, that’s who we work with. Having 
WPP’s involvement in companies like Kantar and Shopcom helps. Our recent partnership with 
Rentrak helps. It’s really just assembling a lot of different pieces to make this work.”632  
Once these pieces are assembled, these lists of customers and targets will go to the 
neutral intermediary, sometimes called a “safe harbor” or “safe haven,” for “anonymized” data 
matching. Experian and Acxiom seem to be the dominant providers of this service; reportedly, 
Experian has information to match 500 million devices to television households.633 At the other 
end, an MVPD provides that intermediary with subscriber files, which are translated by Experian 
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into an anonymized code that assigns each household’s set-top box a unique identifier. Experian 
matches the advertiser’s data with the MVPD’s data to construct the addressable audience. This 
may involve specific matching of individuals from both datasets; often it involves modeling a 
“lookalike” audience to fit the advertiser’s specifications. As long as this matching is executed 
within a “safe haven,” and the data is encrypted so that neither the advertiser nor the MVPD can 
recognize a specific name and address as belonging to a given target, this complies with privacy 
regulations. Privacy compliance is fussed over in technicality and largely disdained in spirit. 
A central value proposition for addressable campaigns is that they afford superior 
“accountability” compared to broadcast and network advertising. The two key dimensions of this 
promise are census-level measurement of exposure, collected from set-top boxes, and attribution 
of sales outcomes. Bruce Anderson of Invidi explains the reporting process for exposure: 
[E]very time an ad gets shown in a set-top box, we put a bean in the bucket. We count 
that we just got an impression. And periodically, we push those impression counts back 
up to the headend; they all get aggregated together into a report that gets pushed off to a 
third-party company like ComScore or Nielsen. They verify that our results are accurate. 
And then that information gets passed into the accounting departments, and a bill is 
generated, and the advertiser eventually gets a thing that says, “You wanted 100,000 
impressions over this four-week period against this audience segment. And, here, we 
delivered that for you. Send us our check for however many thousands of dollars.”634 
 
More importantly for advertisers, addressable advertising providers try to tell Mr. 
Wanamaker if his budget was wasted. “Every campaign is tied back to some type of return on ad 
spend,” one2one’s Michael Bologna said, “whether it’s how many saw the ad and bought the 
soup, how many saw the ad and bought the car, how many saw the ad and became a Mastercard 
customer, how many saw the ad and switched prescriptions.”635 Tracey Scheppach described to 
me what the back-end attribution process looks like (I’ve removed the name of the retailer she 
mentioned). At the end of the campaign, the advertiser  
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will send its sales file [to a data-matching partner like Experian]. And the [advertiser’s] 
website’s all pixeled, so we know when an IP [address] is going to the website. And so, at 
the end of the campaign, the viewership file will be sent from DirecTV to Experian, with 
the boxes attached to it. So, Experian can understand, “That box saw the ad; that box 
went to the website. That box saw the ad; that box went to the store.” Cuz we’re also 
geolocating—we’re using a company called Ninth Decimal that helps you understand 
people that go to stores or locations. So, we can tell that you went to [the store]. [The 
retailer] then sends the purchase file to Experian, and we can tell you bought the 
product.636 
 
In the small but growing business of STB-based addressable advertising, it has become 
standard practice for transactions to include an accounting of whether ad exposures led to 
purchases. As more video consumption takes place on platforms and identifiable devices that 
connect to the internet, this will become the new normal for the video advertising of national 
brands. 
Conclusion 
Advertisers have always wanted to know whether or not their persuasions worked. For a variety 
of reasons, the video advertising business has not been able to install guarantees of sales 
effectiveness within the routines of constructing, exchanging, and measuring audiences. These 
ideas have persisted as ambitions and as (largely experimental) practices at the margins of the 
business. Very gradually, ROI metrics have started to become more prominent in parts of the 
media system. In the final body chapter, we see the mainstream of advertising and video 
entertainment reinventing itself as “data-driven television.” 
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Chapter Six – Data-Driven Television: Ongoing Transformations in 
Advertising and Video Entertainment 
 
The previous four chapters detailed the historical development of a set of ideas that have 
constituted a dream for “advancing” advertising toward existential ambitions and priorities. To 
become more calculating and efficient in deciding how to place commercial messages, 
commodify the attention of audiences, and “know” and influence consumer habits, advertisers, 
media companies, and related service and research agencies interpreted and shaped new 
information technologies as resources for making advertising programmable, addressable, 
shoppable, and accountable. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a variety of 
actors operating near the periphery of commercial media industries attempted to legitimize this 
logic in the television business—especially via cable and interactive video services. This project 
was plagued by challenges owing in part to technology, but equally to institutional, economic, 
and cultural contexts. While these difficulties hampered attempts to turn prototypes and proofs of 
concept into fully scaled businesses, these fours ideas were seized upon and distilled in the 
commercial consolidation of internet and mobile communications from the 1990s to the present. 
Through their efforts to reshape television around these affordances, advertisers and technologists 
helped both to draft a blueprint for a commercial internet and to establish some of the 
technological and organizational resources necessary to build media platforms that provide 
marketing services anchored in automation, personalization, marketplace connectivity, and 
enhanced measurement and analytics. When companies emerged to provide infrastructure 
services for coordinating an internet ad market, these companies could draw on a legacy of more 
than three decades of work toward the goal of advancing advertising. The archeology of 
affordances developed in the previous chapters shows the engineering of administrative and 
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technical capacities, as well as what could be considered a commercial structure of feeling, which 
provided material and intellectual building blocks for the digital, internet-connected world. 
In this final body chapter, I briefly demonstrate that the commercial internet has brought 
to fruition the dream of advanced advertising, orbiting around these four goals or strategies. I then 
detail some recent efforts within the television industry to try to follow through on the dream that 
participants in that industry helped to conjure. While commercial television provided a training 
ground for data-driven advertising, the internet industry sprinted ahead, and now video 
distributors and service providers are frantically trying to catch up in the race toward the future 
they imagined.   
Four Pillars of Internet Commerce 
The future imagined for marketing looks a lot like the history I have presented. Expectations hold 
that targeting, automation, interactivity, and measurement will all expand and deepen. According 
to a writer in the Harvard Business Review, “Soon, every display will be an addressable 
medium—that is, each will be individually targetable by device and, in many cases, down to a 
specific user; and interactive displays will not only deliver ad messages but also track consumer 
response. The result is a new era of marketing accountability, in which advertising ‘budgets’ will 
have turned into marketing ‘investments.’ This sea change in mindset will transform marketing 
forever.” The future of marketing, he says, is programmatic.637 
Programmatic advertising refers to a collection of techniques for buying and selling 
advertising impressions that revolve around relatively sophisticated uses of data and decision-
making software. Often involving “real-time” computer-based auctions that allow media buyers’ 
machines to bid on impressions automatically in the moment that available audience inventory is 
                                                          
637 Jeffery F. Rayport, “Is Programmatic Advertising the Future of Marketing?” Harvard Business Review, 
June 22, 2015. https://hbr.org/2015/06/is-programmatic-advertising-the-future-of-marketing. 
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created (e.g., when a user clicks on a link or opens an app), programmatic advertising has become 
the principal method for brokering exchanges in much of internet and mobile advertising. 
According to current estimates, programmatic digital display ad-spending in the United States 
totaled $36.85 billion in 2017, almost 80% of all U.S. display advertising. That year 
programmatic spending also constituted a majority in mobile display (80.6%), digital video 
(69.3%), and native (84%) advertising.638 Another financial analyst forecast recently that by 2022 
programmatic buying would account for $9.76 billion, or almost 12% of overall spending, in 
linear television.639 According to the chief technology officer at Invidi, an ad tech company that 
places software on set-top boxes to facilitate household-level targeting, “Automation is where all 
of this is headed. And every year it gets more and more automated, and so our software package 
is one more step along the way to just being able to, in real time, identify for you, personally, this 
is the right ad for you to see.”640 
For all the excitement surrounding automated and data-driven advertising, including 
claims of revolutionary technological change, it is almost never acknowledged that media buyers, 
sellers, and researchers in the 1960s and 1970s envisioned the general shape of the programmatic 
ecosystem. As we saw in Chapter Two, these actors were imagining and engineering ways of 
using electronic computers and data communication networks to enable instantaneous 
connectivity between supply and demand sides and to establish “on-line” systems for representing 
the market. The designers of these systems hoped to make the market responsive to real-time 
changes in inventory, price, or other variables. While the scarcity of linear television inventory 
inspired an aversion to auctions, many advertisers and media buyers predicted and advocated for 
                                                          
638 Laruen Fisher, “US Programmatic Ad Spending Forecast 2018,” eMarketer, April 5, 2018. 
https://content-na1.emarketer.com/us-programmatic-ad-spending-forecast-2018.  
639 Michelle Abraham, “Trading of US Linear TV Advertising Shifting to Programmatic,” S&P Global, 
September 18, 2018. 
640 Interview with Bruce Anderson, February 20, 2018. 
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a stock-market style for trading audiences, and they were already experimenting with algorithms 
and other statistical techniques to identify customer targets more precisely and approach 
“optimal” decisions about efficient ad spending. These ideas were taken up and built into the 
defining elements of the online ad market today, including: supply-side platforms that bundle 
publishers’ inventory in ways that aim to maximize the value of the impressions generated by 
users of their websites or applications; demand-side platforms that let advertisers manage their 
spending in combination with data analytics tools; and the advertising exchanges that facilitate 
the interconnection of supply and demand across numerous publishers and advertisers. Machine-
to-machine communication circulates data throughout this market with increasing immediacy. 
And the integration of marketing and advertising information systems, which was part of some of 
the very first computerization initiatives at major ad agencies, is now a core feature of leading 
programmatic platforms and services, like Adobe Advertising Cloud.641 Even a cursory look at 
industry discourse today should convince readers that programmability has become conventional 
wisdom and a majority practice in internet advertising and marketing.  
As a 2017 article in the Journal of Advertising Research posits, “programmatic buying 
and selling have paved the way for digital advertising to benefit from improved efficiency and a 
means of reaching more targeted audience segments…Programmatic technology has enabled a 
powerful combination of scale and targeting that was not possible in the days of directly bought 
inventory.”642 What that opinion fails to admit, and what my research reveals, is that the push 
                                                          
641 Recall that BBDO used its computer to implement the “System for the Integration of Marketing and 
Advertising Data.” Likewise, today, “Adobe Advertising Cloud combines your marketing and advertising 
technology in a single end-to-end platform.” https://www.adobe.com/advertising/adobe-advertising-
cloud.html#featured-video.  
642 Gian M. Fulgoni and Andrew Lipsman, “Measuring Television in the Programmatic Age: Why 
Television Measurement Methods are Shifting Toward Digital,” Journal of Advertising Research 57, no. 1 
(March 2017): 13. 
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toward automation and data-driven optimization has been ongoing at least since the advertising 
industry appropriated computerized data processing in the 1950s. 
Personalization is even more cemented as a pillar supporting online commerce. Since the 
mid to late 1990s, the commercialization of the internet has involved the construction of a 
business model that revolves around and links together surveillance, consumer profiling, and 
device-level targeting.643 By collecting, storing, and analyzing information about internet users’ 
behaviors, and by connecting those insights with data from observable offline consumer habits, 
marketers try to categorize and predict the interests and probable purchasing behaviors of the 
individuals accessing media content or services through uniquely identifiable devices. Advertisers 
and publishers use personalized tracking, algorithms, and other means to curate the information 
and commercial opportunities presented to individuals based on what is “known” about them. A 
system for addressing messages to individual recipients is central to the architecture and 
transmission protocols of internet communication. When the net was opened to commercial 
applications in 1995, advertisers and companies providing infrastructural products and services 
for maintaining an online ad market were able to take the ideas already articulated around the 
affordances of cable’s addressable control systems and elaborate them in a more interconnected 
and interoperable technical environment—one that embraced all users on the network of 
networks, unlike the geographical patchwork of (often unaffiliated) franchisees that developed in 
cable television. As earlier work has demonstrated, the lessons learned from experiments with 
                                                          
643 Joseph Turow, The Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry is Defining Your Identity and Your 
Worth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); Dan Schiller, Digital Depression: Information 
Technology and Economic Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Matthew Crain, “The 
Revolution Will Be Commercialized: Finance, Public Policy, and the Construction of Internet Advertising,” 
PhD diss., University of Illinois, 2013; Darren M. Stevenson, “Data, Trust, and Transparency in 
Personalized Advertising,” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2016; Robert W. McChesney, Digital 
Disconnect: How Capitalism is Turning the Internet Against Democracy (New York: New Press, 2013). 
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interactive television were at the top of mind as powerful advertisers embarked on a concerted 
mission to bend the new digital media environment to their interests.644 
Connectivity to marketplaces, or e-commerce, was one of the earliest applications of the 
Web to generate widespread excitement and cultural change. From 2000 to 2016, the percentage 
of people in the U.S. reporting that they have made a purchase online almost quadrupled, from 
22% to 79%. More than half of Americans by then had used a mobile phone to make a 
purchase.645 E-commerce now makes up almost 10% of all U.S. retail spending.646 
Not only did cable services, like pay-per-view, begin to establish transactive 
entertainment systems, as well as the business and cultural practices to animate them, but the 
more imaginative forms of shoppability promoted throughout the history of cable, and 
particularly since the 1990s, set a template for a commercial logic that is colonizing more and 
more of our public and private spheres, both online and offline. With visual recognition 
technologies, and related forms of augmented reality and artificial intelligence, marketers are 
trying to reengineer our experiences of reality by linking the physical and virtual spaces we 
inhabit to digital retailing platforms.647 Shoppability involves a pioneering approach to producing 
consumers: anywhere we go with smartphones, or even when we use internet-connected devices 
in our homes, we have a storefront constructed around us, making us potential consumers. The 
goal of building a storefront in every home has been a persistent theme in the history of 
television, especially in how people have imagined TV’s convergence with personal computers 
                                                          
644 Joseph Turow, Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New Media World (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997); Dan Schiller, Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); Fernando Bermejo, The Internet Audience: Constitution and 
Measurement (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 
645 Aaron Smith and Monica Anderson, “Online Shopping and E-Commerce,” Pew Research Center, 
December 19, 2016. http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/19/online-shopping-and-e-commerce/.  
646 United States Department of Commerce, “Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales, 2nd Quarter 2018,” U.S. 
Census Bureau News, August 17, 2018. 
https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/18q2.pdf.  
647 Lee McGuigan and Graham Murdock, “The Medium is the Marketplace: Digital Systems and the 
Intensification of Consumption,” Canadian Journal of Communication 40, no. 4 (2015): 717-726. 
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and the internet. The notion that an advertisement, or even editorial content, should link directly 
to a shopping opportunity has become taken for granted in internet commerce, and it is rapidly 
spreading across the social media platforms, such as YouTube and Instagram, at the forefront of 
audience manufacture.648 Slyce—a technology vendor that supports mobile apps for retailers like 
Tommy Hilfiger and Nieman Marcus that allow users to snap photos of items they see in public 
and instantly locate comparable merchandise—captures the expansive spirit of shoppability: 
“Through the power of visual search, the physical world becomes a storefront.”649 
The potential for shoppable media to “close the loop” between advertising and sales has 
been recognized as a monumental opportunity for decades.650 As the internet has been cultivated 
in ways that capitalize on this opportunity, Amazon, Google, and Facebook have been “siphoning 
off TV dollars as marketers look for better data on whether their ads are reaching the right 
consumers and are driving business results.”651 Amazon’s position as the terminus point for 
roughly half of online purchasing in the U.S. strengthens its claim to knowing how well 
advertisements work. Overall, the supply of data in digital advertising has helped normalize the 
expectation of, and the demand for, more precise attribution metrics across commercial 
environments. Tracking customers’ movements in and around retail environments has become 
pro forma in the terms of use for many smartphone applications, and a variety of marketing firms 
are working to connect this data with records of advertising exposure. 
                                                          
648 Victor Luckerson, “Here’s Why ‘Buy Buttons’ are Invading the Internet,” Time, October 16, 2015. 
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Digital Enclosure,” in Connected Viewing: Selling, Streaming and Sharing Media in the Digital Age, eds. 
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In its latest annual report, the Interactive Advertising Bureau admitted the essential 
historical importance of accountability: “No matter the medium on which a marketer is 
advertising, the same questions have always persisted with respect to advertising efficacy: What 
is working? Where? With whom? At what cost? With real-time feedback, advertisers can now see 
what is working and quickly adjust their ad campaigns to improve overall effectiveness.” The 
report goes on to boast about how the “transparency” afforded by the platforms used to trade and 
measure online audience impressions allows companies to “quickly ramp up or turn down 
budgeted spend, based upon their achieved ROI,” effectively reducing risk for marketers.652 The 
IAB, not surprisingly, credits internet technology with enabling this and other opportunities for 
advancement in marketing. But the report fails to recognize what its historical adage implies—
that these technological solutions did not fall from the sky; they were shaped over a long period 
in an industrial context. 
Contrary to the typical tone of contemporary discourse about marketing and new media, 
the internet did create these four possibilities; rather, these ambitions provided a framework for 
interpreting and organizing the commercial and technological potentials of the internet and 
mobile media. As this review suggests, the commercial internet has been constructed in ways that 
realize, or at least better approximate, the dream for advancing advertising that was conjured and 
pursued throughout the second half of the twentieth century. For a variety of reasons having to do 
with technical interoperability, organizational and geographic legacies, and liberalized policies, 
the internet provided an auspicious opportunity for advertisers to implement and continue refining 
their calculative approaches to selling the American people. Appropriating the visions laid out for 
cable television, the internet industry raced ahead in providing automated media buying, 
                                                          
652 Interactive Advertising Bureau, IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report (May 2018), 4-5. Recall from 
the previous chapter that this is almost precisely what the AMA’s president envisioned in 1961 as the 
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personalized targeting, marketplace connectivity, and more granular and pervasive behavioral 
observation and analysis. For all the talk about advancement, most powerful actors in the 
television industry remained fairly complacent, reluctant to disrupt an enormously lucrative 
business model. Even today, networks and MVPDs almost always sell out of ad inventory. Still, 
over the past two decades, the writing on the wall has begun to convince people that the threats to 
TV’s dominance as an ad medium are imminent, and opportunities are also presenting themselves 
for the TV business to move closer to its dream, which by now means becoming more like the 
internet.  
In a 2017 interview, consultant and former media-buying executive Tim Hanlon captured 
succinctly, and in typical terms, a perspective that is widely shared in media and advertising 
industries:  
Television is the supreme medium, especially for advertising. It’s sight, sound, it’s 
motion, it’s a combination of all those three things that [is] probably the best, most robust 
environment to influence, to cajole, to persuade—all the magic sort of things that 
marketing’s supposedly supposed to do…And there’s a reason it’s the most advertised 
medium, and it’s the biggest of the pack. And it’s a very profitable and successful 
business model for many of the traditional players of such. But, I think it’s folly to deny 
that that sort of relatively closed system can’t be further enhanced and augmented by 
some of the best approaches to digital and data.653 
 
This is the rallying cry for advanced TV advertising. As participants repeated at an industry 
gathering I attended in 2016, “Television advertising works. Addressable advertising works 
harder.” 654 Evocative of Sut Jhally and Bill Livant’s discussion of “the work of watching” and the 
                                                          
653 Interview with Tim Hanlon, October 27, 2017. Mike Rosen, executive vice president of advanced 
advertising and platform sales at NBCU, told me the same thing, using the same terms. Interview, May 30, 
2018. Dan Schiller quotes TCI’s John Malone saying, “TV is the best sales mechanism we’ve ever had.” 
Schiller adds, “Simplifying somewhat, it was because of its ability to accommodate live-action 
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TV succeeded radio as the foremost advertising medium.” Digital Capitalism, 116. 
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use of segmentation strategies to make viewers “watch harder,”655 advertisers, programmers, and 
service providers are trying to leverage all the technical resources at their disposal to become 
more systematic about influencing consumption and commodifying viewers’ attention and 
personal information. 
The rest of this chapter pursues two objectives. First, it assembles evidence from across 
trade press analysis, interviews with insiders, and participant observation of industry events to 
characterize the ways that advertisers, agencies, and video distributors and exhibitors are thinking 
about data resources and incorporating them into their organizations and strategies. We will 
observe in this survey that many of the historical themes documented throughout the previous 
chapters resonate loudly today. Secondly, the chapter provides a sketch of ongoing shifts in TV 
ad markets. Most of this dissertation has focused on spot TV advertising because, as a complex 
transactional environment, it offers a useful and underappreciated window into of the ancestry of 
online advertising. The sketch provided in this chapter touches on some of the efforts at the 
network level to use data and technology to improve efficiencies in buying and selling audiences. 
It demonstrates that ideas and practices that emerged around the margins of advertising and 
commercial media are becoming, more and more, the beating heart of these industries—
necessities for competing in a world of internet-enabled devices and apps. 
Moneyball and Math Men: Calculative Industries Come of Age 
A logic of data-driven calculation has become orthodoxy in media and technology industries. 
Two management scholars argued recently that the success of technology companies in 
displacing incumbents as producers and distributors of entertainment content—and the only hope 
for “legacy” media firms to survive this disruption—resides in the capacity and conviction to 
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replace “gut-feel” with “moneyball” analytical tactics.656 Similarly, journalists and news 
organizations have been adjusting to what Robyn Caplan and danah boyd describe as a pervasive 
“focus on numeracy and digital data.”657 Suggestions that data is the “new oil” of the digital 
economy only strengthen the belief that a firm’s most precious assets are its information stores 
and the capabilities to extract insights and value from them.658 
As illustrated in the foregoing chapters, of course, numbers have always been levers of 
power in entertainment industries. The economics of film and television—where costs are high, 
fixed, and sunk upfront, products vary infinitely, and the value consumers assign to those 
products is unknown until they have been “experienced”—have motivated efforts to reduce 
uncertainty, or at least to justify decisions amidst uncertainty.659 By the middle of the twentieth 
century Theodor Adorno discerned that “the products of the culture industry…are themselves 
planned from a virtually statistical point of view.”660 Later, Todd Gitlin found that a command of 
numbers could be wielded to secure influence and corporate advancement in network television. 
With the ascent of “people who specialize in gathering and evaluating the numbers,” Gitlin 
observed, “the language of numbers has become the language of first and last resort.”661 Many 
analysts have noted the authority granted to Nielsen ratings in determining what survives on 
                                                          
656 Michael D. Smith and Rahul Telang, Streaming Sharing, Stealing: Big Data and the Future of 
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TV.662 As one writer put it, referring to adjustments in audience ratings, “Change the way you 
measure America’s culture consumption…and you change America’s culture business. And 
maybe even the culture itself.”663  
What we are witnessing, then, is more evolutionary than many heralds of digital 
disruption tend to imply. The general manager of data and analytics in the media sales division of 
Dish Network admits, “Television has always been data driven. But now we’re working with 
different—and better—kinds of data.”664 Echoing this almost exactly in describing “audience-
based” or “data-driven” TV advertising, one media buyer told me, “At the end of the day, all it 
really is is taking the same fundamental practice and principles that we’ve been doing for years, 
just applying newer forms of data and better forms of data.”665 Statistical and computational ways 
of knowing, planning, and acting are not new to the relationships comprising media industries; 
rather, reflecting underlying values of efficiency and control, they have been gradually integrated 
as more pervasive and foundational elements in administration. 
Marketers have led the quest to find fortune in numbers. A decade ago, a popular 
textbook welcomed a calculated, direct-marketing approach into the core of the advertising 
enterprise: “The exploding availability of digitally driven consumer data has transformed 
marketing into a new frontier application for business mathematics…Just as mathematics has 
revolutionized finance, it is reinvigorating marketing, as new models and algorithms extract value 
from consumer and business databases, enabling more precise targeting of messages to each 
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consumer.”666 Marketers in the U.S. spent an estimated $20.19 billion on data and data services in 
2017.667 While expenditures for paid placements in freely accessible media vehicles—what we 
typically think of as “advertising”— comprise a diminishing portion of marketing outlays, 
companies only continue to increase their investments in trying to “know” and influence 
customers. “The huge growth,” McChesney and colleagues wrote in 2009, “is in direct 
marketing.”668 
Over the last decade, marketing service conglomerates like WPP and Publicis have tried 
to position themselves as science-first, data companies.669 Further intensifying what Armand 
Mattelart diagnosed in the 1980s as a tendency among advertisers and their agencies toward 
assembling facilities, personnel, and competencies for penetrating the “black box” of consumer 
behavior, the composition of industries and organizations continues to react to and advance this 
impetus for data-driven strategy and decisioning.670 As the Wall Street Journal reported in 2018, 
“The ad industry is in upheaval as it grapples with the rise of big data and analytics. Ad giants 
such as WPP PLC, Omnicom and Publicis have gone on acquisition sprees, bringing legions of 
information-technology experts into their ranks.”671 Agencies are courting what Cambridge 
Analytica’s CEO calls “Math Men,” the quantitative successors to Madison Avenue’s creative 
gurus. “[I]n a world where both consumers and brands want accountability,” he says, agencies 
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“that don’t start to embrace data will die.”672 With management consultancies like Accenture and 
Deloitte expanding their purview into new advertising services—leveraging the knowledge and 
analytical capacities that are their stock in trade—that pressure continues to mount.673  
Over the past decade, high-profile agencies, including Ogilvy & Mather, Leo Burnett, 
and Foote, Cone, and Belding, have moved decisively in this direction, establishing 
organizational divisions or research ventures to take advantage of what behavioral scientists have 
learned about how consumers’ habits and decisions can be predicted and influenced.674 When 
Interpublic (IPG) announced plans to acquire the marketing-solutions unit of Acxiom, a leading 
data brokerage, IPG’s chairman and CEO explained, “In a world where everything is becoming 
data-driven, Acxiom Marketing Solutions offers the deepest set of capabilities for helping 
companies navigate the complexity of creating personalized brand experiences across every 
consumer touchpoint.” Bulking up on these capabilities, he said, would help IPG “shape the 
future of our industry.”675 Advertisers are also retaining artificial intelligence services from IBM, 
Quantcast, and others in the hope of making their solicitations sensitive to intimate details about 
individuals, such as dietary preferences or one’s emotional mood in a given moment. Quantcast’s 
chief marketing officer warns, “if brands don’t get religious about this…they’re going to be left 
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out in the cold.”676 As a writer posits in one of the many recent eulogies for Don Draper, 
“Advertising, once a creative industry, is now a data-driven business reliant on algorithms.”677 
The same impulse that puts science and technology to work in monitoring, modeling, and 
managing consumers’ proclivities at a more personal level has also motivated efforts to eradicate 
personality from advertising’s back-end infrastructures. In 2011, the two leading providers of 
software systems used by agencies to process their transactions with media firms merged to form 
a company called Mediaocean. The deal provided observers an occasion to reflect on how 
organizations “offering an array of techniques for buying, targeting and measuring ads across a 
range of media” were overseeing a transformation of the advertising business. Under a number of 
influences, advertising was said to be moving “from a clubby, relationship-driven industry where 
ad deals are negotiated over dinners and drinks into a technology-driven industry where ad space 
is bought through technology systems similar to stock exchanges.”678 The hope is that by building 
platforms to integrate diverse datasets and to automate media planning and buying procedures, 
decisions about whom to target, where to find them, how to engage with them, and what price to 
pay could be made more rapidly and rationally. Competitive threats from the Google-Facebook 
duopoly, as well as general pressures to normalize across media platforms the targeting and 
measurement capabilities typical of internet and mobile advertising, have catalyzed these 
developments in the television business.  
As we have seen, of course, the demand for information technologies and 
communications facilities for rationalizing and accelerating clerical work and transaction-
processing has been a constant over the past sixty years. Early in the second half of twentieth 
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century the same sort of tropes—like boozy lunches giving way to stock-market trading—were 
mobilized in promises about a transition from subjective, interpersonal relationships to objective, 
data-driven decision-making. Advertising Age’s explanation of programmatic advertising in 2014 
is almost indistinguishable from what we saw in Chapter Two: “The term covers a wide range of 
technologies that have begun automating the buying, placement and optimization of advertising, 
replacing human-based methods like phone calls, faxes and, yes, three-martini lunches.”679 
Media analyst Ken Auletta submits as evidence of the ad industry’s “preoccupation with 
Big Data” the rise of media agencies into the “prime seat” in dealings with advertising clients. 
The media agency, he says, is responsible for putting data to work in reaching marketers’ targets 
more precisely and efficiently.680 Mike Rosen, a top executive in NBCU’s advanced advertising 
division and a former media buyer at full-service agencies, confirmed from his experience that 
buyers have indeed transitioned from apparently simple functionaries to major power brokers.681 
As we saw earlier, however, the rise of media buyers was spurred by the introduction of 
computerized data-processing in the 1950s and 1960s, cemented through the restructuring of the 
advertising industry in the 1970s and 1980s, and mutually reinforced with the quantitative 
transformation in marketing and audience construction over the following decades. The math men 
had already arrived on the scene at the dawn of the creative revolution, and the supremacy of big 
data today follows from their rise as much as it facilitated it. Still, these longstanding efforts to 
automate the audience commodity have indeed moved from the margins into the center of how 
attention is packaged, bought, and sold. 
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Sellers of advertising inventory are also looking to obtain a calculative advantage. 
Viacom executives revealed at industry gatherings that the company has built a 60-person 
advanced-advertising team by recruiting people with PhDs in physics, mathematics, psychology, 
and neuroscience and then training them to apply their skills to the TV and advertising 
businesses.682 Variety reports that Viacom has “lured” data scientists from Microsoft and other 
technology firms and set them about “busily calculating ways to help marketers place their 
commercials with more precision.”683 Lachlan Murdoch, the executive chairman of 21st Century 
Fox, explains that through advanced advertising his company is “extracting more per subscriber 
in every way. Also in addition to that, we share more data or we get more data shared with us, 
which allows us to monetize the advertising significantly better as well.”684 Along the same tack, 
Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon have been actively acquiring companies and personnel to bolster 
their ad-tech armories.685 The senior vice president of advanced advertising products and strategy 
at Comcast’s NBCUniversal states plainly her organization’s strategic position: “We feel that data 
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is essential to everything that we do…[E]verything we do revolves around data.”686 Not 
surprisingly, Nielsen has continued its historical tendency of absorbing companies and 
technologies that either compete with or complement its services, including recent acquisitions of 
firms with competencies in big-data analytics.687  
A similar pattern as that drawing “quants” to the center of global finance has reshaped 
practices and workforce composition in the media-marketing complex. With unprecedented data 
storage and computing power, the thinking goes, profit opportunities that would have been too 
tiny or unusual to notice or too transitory to pursue can now be identified and exploited. By the 
same token, supposed inefficiencies and irrationalities will be exercised through a more 
mathematical and machine-like approach to marketing and audience manufacture. As Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier see it, going forward it will be typical for “specialists in data analysis, 
artificial intelligence, mathematics, or statistics…[to] apply those skills to specific industries.”688 
With the “science of habit formation” becoming a mainstay in university and corporate research 
labs over the past twenty years, Amazon’s former chief scientist confirms this general application 
of calculative expertise toward analyzing and influencing behavior, admitting, “It’s like an arms 
race to hire statisticians nowadays. Mathematicians are suddenly sexy.”689 Perhaps no enterprise 
has profited more from behavioral data science than Google, a company that, according to a 2017 
headline, “Wants to Own the Future of TV Ad Infrastructure.” Google’s director of product 
management for video explains, “We use millions of signals. This is really about how to make 
TV ads smarter. Understanding people’s interests and intent will help you really capture their 
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attention.”690 Google recently embarked on its second foray into building an advertising exchange 
for premium video content. In a 2016 report describing its plans, Google captured the “evolution 
of TV” succinctly: “Data is at the very core of the move to addressable advertising—from 
deciding which ad to serve and when to an individual, to giving real-time and actionable feedback 
to advertisers, to providing an absolute picture of the return on investment for an ad spend.”691 
Over the past 60 years, television and advertising have transitioned from being 
understood as creative industries to being recognized, at least as much, as calculative industries. 
We continue to take stock of this shift by detailing developments in what has come to be called 
“audience-based buying”—meaning that advertisers search out consumer targets irrespective of 
the content they are watching.  
Audience-Based Buyers, Sellers, and Brokers 
Under a range of mounting pressures, video distributors and exhibitors have been making 
deliberate efforts to speak to advertisers in a register more like that which brands have come to 
expect from internet- and mobile-based marketing platforms. David Cohen, the president of 
Magna North America, a major media buying agency, was quoted recently as saying “I believe 
TV will figure out how to operationalize similar to the Googles and Facebooks of the world, 
maybe in as soon as 2-3 years from now.”692 With the four pillars of advanced advertising shifting 
from aspirations to normalized expectations, the cable business is scrambling to institute the 
technologies and organizational relationships needed both to match the capacities of other media 
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and to help television interconnect seamlessly with the ubiquitous, cross-device marketing 
environment demanded by advertisers. 
Audience manufacture relies, and always has relied, on what Joshua Braun calls 
“transparent intermediaries.”693 These are firms that do not interface with or present themselves to 
viewers, but which support essential functions, such as encoding and routing video content, 
trafficking and billing ad units, or managing a range of media buying and selling procedures. 
These companies “continue to innovate, and bring change in the national and local TV markets 
through technology, data, and new forms of automation and efficiency.”694 For example, Acxiom 
and Experian “are working to streamline the flow of data needed to power addressable buys.”695 
These firms facilitate the data matching procedures that allow marketers and MVPDs to take 
advantage of the moment-to-moment viewing data collected by set-top boxes and smart TVs, to 
pair that with household- or individual-level behavioral data from credit cards, loyalty rewards 
programs, or other sources (e.g., vehicle and home-ownership registries), and to then find and 
target specific consumers without running afoul of privacy protections. Firms such as Adobe, 
Lotame, LiveRamp, and Cadent provide “data management platforms” that let buyers and sellers 
utilize, in combination, bits of viewership data, customer-relationship management files, and data 
from syndicated source, like SRI, Polk, and Nielsen Catalina Solutions. Lesser known firms like 
Simulmedia and 605 analyze these data to try to establish verifiable effects of advertisements on 
sales outcomes or other “key performance indicators,” and to put these insights to work in helping 
buyers and sellers optimize the value of their outlays and inventories.  
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Other technology vendors provide hardware, software, and infrastructure services that 
orchestrate the routing and insertion of targeted ads—such as Invidi and FreeWheel (a Comcast-
owned company that recently absorbed Visible World, one of the first companies to enable 
advertisers to distribute different versions of ads to different TV audiences). They also execute 
“dynamic” insertion of ads (mostly in video-on-demand), meaning that a decision about what 
advertisement to insert in a given slot is made by computer code just moments before the 
commercial break in the show. DAI functions similarly to an online advertising architecture. In 
fact, some operators, including Comcast, which enables “one-to-one advertising…data-matched 
at the name and address level” in VOD across its more than 20 million subscribers, executes 
VOD transmission and dynamic ad insertion via Internet Protocol.696  
I have treated advanced advertising through the lens of affordances—or potential 
abilities—both to reveal the histories and deep-seated logics of a seemingly recent set of 
developments, and also to reinforce that to become operative technologies, these abilities need to 
be articulated to relatively stable organizational forms and practices. This has presented major 
challenges for advanced advertising, often involving conflict between new and existing protocols. 
Compared with traditional linear television, the multiplicity of digital platforms for viewing video 
entertainment provides opportunities to sell more impressions, at a more granular level of 
targeting, and with improved feedback mechanisms. But both buyers and sellers face difficulties 
in reconciling the diverse workflows that have developed to handle different types of transactions. 
The process of buying or selling linear TV inventory involves personnel, sales and data 
management tools, ratings currencies, software services, internal communications channels and 
accounting procedures, and other forms of organizational authority and coordination that can 
differ substantially from the routines built to manufacture audiences on a different platform or 
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device. For example, the executive in charge of addressable advertising sales at NBCU told me 
that after explaining to an agency buyer that VOD ads bought in prime-time NBC shows like This 
Is Us and The Voice would be delivered by FreeWheel, a leading server of video advertising 
online, the buyer determined that the transaction would have to be negotiated by the agency’s 
digital media personnel, rather than its TV buyers.697 
These and other challenges have motivated various groups to take steps toward making it 
easier to transact around customized audience targets, granular and massive datasets, and 
automation technologies. In a recent attempt to institutionalize audience-based buying procedures 
at the network level, three programming groups—Turner, Viacom, and Fox (later joined by 
NBCU)—introduced a collaborative platform called OpenAP that allows for consistency across 
the datasets used to define audience targets. Typically, due to a lack of standards regulating how 
buyers and sellers define customer segments, a marketer has to define its target audience 
differently across the networks or platforms it patronizes and then struggle to reconcile the 
incompatible campaign data those suppliers report on the backend. OpenAP is, essentially an 
administrative service for managing information and pre-processing transactions; it is about 
“making people likely in the market for pickup trucks, for example, almost as easy to transact 
against as adults 18 to 49.”698 With OpenAP’s web-based platform, advertisers can use set-top 
box data from comScore and ratings and consumer information from Nielsen, as well as their own 
first-party data, to look across these networks’ portfolios “to figure out where to reach narrower 
consumer targets such as first-time car buyers, expectant mothers or avid moviegoers.”699 One 
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industry analyst counted OpenAP among the “first signs of an industrywide move to ad 
targeting.”700  
The intermediary firms swarming to pollinate advanced advertising offer a range of 
products and services that help manage information and coordinate a complex and not yet 
stabilized marketplace. They provide technical and administrative means for processing 
transactions, constructing a scaffolding for comprehending and putting to use a deluge of data. 
Essentially, they strive to make commerce easier. As an instructive example of what these 
intermediaries are driving at, consider the language used in a press release to describe a 
partnership between Nielsen and clypd, a “supply-side platform” that helps TV networks manage 
and maximize yield from their inventory. Like OpenAP, the Nielsen-clypd collaboration makes 
narrowly defined audience segments more standardized and thus more portable across buying and 
selling situations: “It allows linear TV audiences to be defined based on thousands of additional 
consumer attributes and helps marketers reach these audiences across all marketing channels, as 
well as analyze and optimize their performance of their campaigns.” The service is described as 
“creating a streamlined workflow to bring efficiency to marketers looking to transact on TV with 
their own data,” and it also integrates consumer profiles from other sources.701  
A cadre of firms like clypd provide sales services and operate exchange platforms that 
package audience inventory from a roster of participating exhibitors and distributors and make it 
available to buyers. These companies essentially extend the sales rep function, using algorithms 
to unearth audience impressions, to find advertisers’ target audiences in places that buyers and 
sellers might not have been looking. In short, the brokers of audience-based buying use 
information technologies—both databases and trading-desk software—to decouple advertising 
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opportunities from the content surrounding them. The promise for television is that programmatic 
techniques will help networks, stations, and system operators maximize prices for typically 
undersold or undervalued inventory; advertisers, meanwhile, can find their target audiences 
outside the usual range of time slots and programs, paying lower unit costs. The CEO of one 
programmatic TV company explains, “If you have undervalued inventory, [our platform] 
provides a set of tools for bringing in national advertisers. That creates a way to value those 
audiences that didn’t exist two years ago.”702 In other words, data and information technologies 
are used to reconstitute audience impressions in ways that change their worth. Extracting 
maximum value is becoming a top priority for the supply side. Although traditional video 
providers continue to sell out of their inventory and worry that programmatic exchanges will 
erode prices and control, the material decline in measurable viewership “is driving more data-
based ad selling among programmers as they look to capture every dollar possible.”703  
Much of the effort described above has been aimed at liquidating the huge volume of 
“long-tail” inventory spread across the thousands of broadcast stations and cable systems around 
the country. But initiatives are underway to better integrate these technologies into the network ad 
market. Comcast-NBCU has been lighting the way. The company generated headlines in 2017 
when it made $1 billion worth of ad inventory available in transactions for which audience 
delivery guarantees would be based on customized viewer targets rather than Nielsen’s 
demographic categories. In March of 2018, NBCU announced that it would be integrating into its 
offerings Adobe’s Advertising Cloud platform, “the most widely used solution in the industry for 
automated, data-driven planning and buying of television advertising.” Publicizing the deal, 
NBCU’s executive vice president of advanced advertising and platform sales said that it was 
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designed “to give current clients what they want: automation, data, and precision.”704 As he told 
me in describing the company’s ability to find the types of people an advertiser wants to target 
anywhere across NBCU’s content properties, “we’re kind of deconstructing the packaging of 
television to let the data get more granular.”705 
I hope it is evident that the examples brought forward in this section reflect key elements 
of the calculative evolution I have been tracking. Clearly, addressable television, programmatic 
advertising, and many analytics services are designed to identify previously hidden profit 
opportunities and to verify return on investment. More importantly, they aim to account for more 
of reality—more of consumers’ attributes and observed behaviors—and to draw them into the 
frame of rational planning and action. In other words, they are meant to adjust the institutions of 
ad-supported television so that the calculations and decisions that structure routine commercial 
activity can accommodate the enormous troves of available data. The TV business is being 
reorganized so that its administrative infrastructures align better with a personalized and 
surveillant digital environment assembled for internet marketing. As I indicated above, though, 
this mission is not without difficulties. Large-scale efforts are underway to break down the 
remaining barriers holding back premium video advertising from fully imitating the internet. 
Vertical Integration: More Inventory, More Data, More Control 
One major roadblock to addressable and programmatic TV advertising is the limited and local 
nature of the inventory available for household-level targeting. National programming networks, 
in the context of linear TV at least, control no direct connection with viewers; the route to a 
specified household goes through the MVPDs that manage the network to which customers’ set-
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top boxes are linked. The only linear inventory available for addressable insertion, therefore, is 
the two minutes per hour sold by individual cable and satellite operators or their representatives. 
Networks, with the support of technology vendors and data brokers, can promise advertisers that 
certain programs or time slots “index” highly with a desirable audience segment (meaning that a 
particular segment comprises a higher proportion of the audience than the population at large), 
but the network has no means of discriminating among viewers.706 
Expanding the market for addressable TV advertising will require negotiations between 
programmers and MVPDs. For networks to make the national inventory that constitutes the bulk 
of their ad revenue actionable for household- or device-level targeting, they must partner with, 
and likely compensate, companies like Comcast and AT&T. For this reason, consolidation of 
content and conduit firms has always raised hopes for advanced advertising. Tim Hanlon told me, 
“We are literally only one carriage deal away from being able to allow ad units outside of the two 
minutes of local into a national addressable avail environment. Arguably, that’s the bigger picture 
of what, supposedly, an AT&T-Time Warner and a Comcast-NBCUniversal [means]—those are 
the first place that that should be done.”707 When Comcast negotiates with Disney over the cost of 
carrying ESPN, for example, negotiating down the per-subscriber price by a couple of cents is 
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probably more lucrative for Comcast than getting access to national ad inventory. But if Comcast 
deals with a network it owns, the calculus might change. 
When Comcast announced its plan to buy NBCU in 2009, Advertising Age called it a “bet 
on [the] future of advertising.”708 Such expectations are beginning to look well-founded, as 
services like NBCU+ Powered by Comcast—an addressable advertising platform that uses 
Comcast’s STB data to target viewers of NBCU programming—are at the cutting edge of what 
programmers are offering in the way of targeting.709 Describing the company’s suite of data-
driven ad tech offerings in 2017, NBCU’s senior vice president of advance advertising products 
and strategy explained, “The core value proposition in the market is helping marketers reach their 
target audience more efficiently. At this point in time, on many of the platforms, we know who is 
consuming the content. So, from that perspective, shame on us, really, if we’re not giving them 
relevant products and advertisements.” The principal goal, she repeated, “is really to speak to 
consumers individually and to make sure that we’re providing the best return on ad-spend for our 
advertisers.”710 In addition to leveraging its own assets, Comcast has formed a partnership with 
Viacom, in which the cable operator’s ad-tech platform, FreeWheel, will enable advertisers to 
execute household addressability and dynamic ad-insertion within Viacom programming viewed 
on-demand. Viacom’s chief operating officer of ad sales spoke for both sides when he called the 
partnership with Comcast “an alignment around the vision of the future of the TV ecosystem.”711  
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AT&T’s CEO, Randall Stephenson, has announced similar ambitions to exploit 
advertising advantages that accrue to a company with a combination of distribution, content, and 
data assets. “Once we complete our acquisition of Time Warner Inc.,” he said in 2017, “we 
believe there is an opportunity to build an automated advertising platform that can do for 
premium video and TV advertising what the search and social media companies have done for 
digital advertising.”712 Leveraging AT&T’s “incredibly rich trove of data,” Stephenson hopes, 
will let Time Warner offer precise targeting and comprehensive audience measurement, and 
ultimately extract advertising prices that are two- to three-time higher than its current rates.713 
AT&T, which owns DirecTV, the nation’s leading satellite operator, is perhaps the utility best 
positioned to compete with Google and Facebook as a marketing platform. In addition to a 
growing armory of ad tech, the company has first-party data from more than 170 million 
customer relationships. As one media buyer told me, pointing to its ability to know what 
subscribers watch and to track mobile customers through space, “AT&T knows a lot about you.” 
AT&T’s Stephenson boasted as much recently: “When you have those kind of direct-to-consumer 
relationships, you have, we believe, incredible insights to those customers. What are they 
watching? Where are they when they watch it? What times are they watching it? You begin to 
have understanding of the customer that is really, really unique. With ad technology, we’re 
demonstrating already with the small ad inventory we have today, that’s very powerful that you 
can create some serious value when you combine those.”714 
                                                          
712 “AT&T Names Brian Lesser CEO of New Advertising & Analytics,” PR Newswire, August 4, 2017. 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/att-names-brian-lesser-ceo-of-new-advertising--analytics-
company-300499687.html.  
713 Jon Lafayette, “AT&T Looking to Improve on Comcast’s Model,” Broadcasting & Cable, September 
13, 2017. http://www.broadcastingcable.com/blog/currency/att-looking-improve-comcast-s-model/168568.  
714 Ben Munson, “AT&T’s Advertising Behemoth is Coming for Facebook and Google,” Fierce Cable, 
July 9, 2018. https://www.fiercecable.com/video/at-t-s-advertising-behemoth-coming-for-
facebook-and-google  
248 
 
 
In what may come to be regarded a signal event in the complete commercial integration 
of television and internet advertising, AT&T recently acquired AppNexus, a decade-old ad tech 
company providing widely-used software platforms to both suppliers and buyers. It then 
rebranded its entire advertising and data services businesses as Xandr.715 With AT&T absorbing a 
fixture of the programmatic advertising ecosystem, and with Facebook, Google (again), and now 
Amazon making stronger inroads into video advertising, marketers’ data-driven dreams are 
inching closer and closer to reality.  
Conclusion 
In a 2018 promotional video produced by FreeWheel, the executive vice president of business 
operations and strategy at NBCU encapsulates what he and others see as the future of television 
advertising: “We believe TV is evolving in a number of ways. Better measurement across all 
platforms to deliver on a total audience perspective. Automation, to increase the efficiency of the 
workflow. And data, in order to make premium video more intelligent through targeting and 
optimization.”716 In foregrounding targeting, measurement, and automation, he glosses three of 
the constitutive affordances of advanced advertising. Together, addressability, accountability, 
and programmability are the prevailing features of what people in television, advertising, 
marketing, technology, and database industries call “data-driven television.”  
The above statement also signals that these affordances reflect deeper values being 
pursued through technological means, including efficiency and optimization. The dominant 
perception of advanced television advertising, as mentioned throughout, is that this 
“advancement” is the result of applying digital technology—and the techniques typical of internet 
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advertising—to commercial television. This is true enough. But such a characterization also risks 
distorting the historical development of advertising and marketing, implying that the defining 
elements of digital advertising discussed herein—chiefly, targeting, automation, e-commerce, and 
attribution metrics—are products of digital technology. While the capacities of digital 
technologies have indeed enabled these elements to be implemented, historical evidence suggests 
that it is equally important to recognize that advertising and marketing interests have shaped 
digital technologies to approximate these values, which predate by decades the popularization of 
the internet and mobile devices. Examining advanced advertising through the lens of affordances 
has allowed us to keep these values within our view, and consequently to look back historically 
not just at particular technologies or ventures, but also at the situated imaginaries, ambitions, and 
cultural and industrial logics that specific formations reflect. What we gain from this perspective 
is a clear understanding that efforts to know the audience, target profitable consumers, automate 
workflows, and optimize resource management are every bit as central to how television 
advertising has evolved over the past 60 years as to how it is evolving today. 
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Conclusion 
 
Perhaps one of the leading narratives about digital media and economic and cultural change posits 
that starting around the mid-1990s a variety of new technologies arrived suddenly and 
fundamentally disrupted advertising and commercial media. An inevitable tendency toward 
digital convergence, and demand from sovereign consumers for more convenient and relevant 
experiences, are credited as the engines of change. After a closer historical look at the political 
economy of advertising technologies, I am convinced that this interpretation requires substantial 
revision. Through that revision, we get a clearer understanding of how advertising and media 
industries have been connected to the expanding authority of statistical, behavioral, and computer 
sciences in business and everyday life.  
Across the 1950s and 1960s, the advertising industry began to rebuild its information and 
knowledge infrastructures around more sophisticated forms of electronic data processing. It also 
took the first clumsy steps toward instituting networked, computer-based communications 
facilities capable of hosting “on-line” marketplaces and executing machine-to-machine 
transactions. Automation and optimization were goals that framed the appropriation of computer 
technologies within existing routines and challenges and as part of ambitious visions for the 
future. Electronic data processing and networked computing were interpreted, constructed, and 
leveraged both to handle the administrative and informational load in a marketplace where 
complexity and rising costs motivated the search for analytical advantages, and also to advance 
marketing and audience manufacture toward an underlying dream of rapid and perfectly rational 
decision-making. Mathematics, machines, and behavioral sciences were assembled around more 
calculating and data-intensive systems for commodifying attention and influencing consumers. 
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Attempts at using information technology to identify and exploit ever finer profit 
opportunities paired favorably with market segmentation, a theory advocating the discrimination 
of minute differences within consumer populations. As the cable television and 
telecommunications industry engineered a “wired world,” both physically and discursively, 
prospects for a more personalized and interactive media environment seemed to flourish in the 
1970s and 1980s. Addressable technologies manifested the principle of discrimination in cable 
systems’ infrastructures; and with direct lines into subscribers’ homes—connecting identifiable 
devices to a computer database and control center—cable operators were positioned to further 
disaggregate mass audiences and reshape commercial information and entertainment services 
around a direct-marketing paradigm. Selling household-level audiences to national advertisers 
engendered logistical complexities beyond anything experienced in broadcast television. The 
process of coordinating and scaling up a marketplace for hyper-targeted audiences involved 
establishing interconnection across organizations and facilities, interoperability of technical and 
administrative protocols, more extensive and intensive data-collection, and increasingly 
sophisticated approaches to trafficking, routing, and verifying the circulation of ads, orders, and 
payments. The history of spot cable is, in a sense, the history of infrastructure services for 
producing and selling audiences of individuals, targetable at the device level. The 
commercialization of the internet was, in many ways, an extension of this general process to a 
technical and institutional environment free of many challenges that beset cable television. 
Companies like Google and Facebook thrive by doing what cable sales organizations and other 
intermediaries tried to do across the 1980s—build logistical utilities to coordinate a dynamic, 
flexible, and personalized ad market. 
The same wires and electronics that afforded addressability also aroused intense desires 
to market products directly to viewers. The ultimate hope of making television into an interactive 
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storefront, wherein programs and applications are shoppable showrooms, has been a resilient 
feature in popular imaginations about the future of video and entertainment services. The internet 
has factored into a massive transformation of retailing not only because of its interactivity, but 
also because of its transactivity.717 The ability to transact commerce was built physically and 
organizationally into cable systems, and it matured as a cultural expectation, as more electronic 
venues became marketplaces. The long-held hope to turn television into a shoppable catalogue 
has triumphed as a pervasive logic and a matter-of-course-practice in online entertainment and 
commerce, from almost any digital advertisement, to more and more of the user-generated 
content on Instagram and other social media. 
An essential ambition overarching these developments is to “close the loop” between 
marketing communications and marketplace outcomes. The impulse to know whether ad 
spending is profitable or wasteful is endemic to the institution of modern advertising. As the 
president of AT&T AdWorks wrote recently, “What’s the purpose of doing all this advertising if 
you’re not sure that it’s working?”718 Efforts to increase accountability in advertising—to become 
more rigorous in planning and evaluating returns to expenditures, and more capacious in the 
volume of data admitted into the frame of calculation—have been persistent since at least the start 
of the 1960s. To minimize uncertainty and put advertising on a seemingly more scientific and 
mathematical footing, marketers, ad agencies, and other intermediaries have developed or 
adopted many tools and techniques for identifying individuals and collecting and analyzing 
information about their media usage and buying habits. The ubiquity of sensors and tracking 
technologies throughout our physical and virtual environments, and in our most intimate personal 
devices, owes to multiple causes; but one of them is the long-standing desire to penetrate the 
                                                          
717 For more on this distinction, see Darin Barney, Prometheus Wired: The Hope for Democracy in the Age 
of Network Technology (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 163-167. 
718 Rick Welday, “Five Things to Know About Addressable Ads,” Adweek, September 26, 2016, 20. 
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black box of the consumer, as Armand Mattelart put it. Marketers have tried desperately not only 
to put themselves in a position to predict potential buyers’ behaviors, as John B. Watson advised, 
but also to quantify their success. Google, Facebook, and countless others ranging from the well-
known (e.g., Amazon, Adobe, Experian, Acxiom) to the obscure (Simulmedia, Data Plus Math), 
have staked their claim on the ability to attribute sales outcomes to specific marketing efforts. The 
validity of these claims is dubious in many cases; but, the effort has and will continue to nestle 
surveillance and datafication into ever tinier interstices of existence. 
Despite what discourses about the disruptive and revolutionary force of “new media” 
imply, I have found that the buying and selling of audiences, and the systematic efforts to profile 
and influence individuals and publics, have always involved heavy informational, administrative, 
and logistical burdens. The core operations within these industries, long before the internet and 
big data entered the picture, created an enormous appetite for information, for data-processing 
facilities, and for forms of organization that would allow corporations to accrue and leverage 
strategic intelligence. In trying to improve routine activities, and in pursuing designs for more 
efficient and calculative market activity, advertising and television industries helped to shape the 
emergence of digital media and the data-driven techniques that are more often credited with 
disrupting those industries. The marriage of behavioral science and big-data analytics that defines 
media and marketing today developed over decades from within the central dynamics of selling 
the American people.  
The emergence of this paradigm has been part of a larger shift which I have called a 
calculative evolution—an elaboration of the existing tendencies within capitalism to expand 
commodification and market-based forms of exchange that has both influenced and been 
catalyzed by new information technologies. The creative revolution in advertising began almost 
simultaneously with the initial computerization of the industry, starting in the 1950s. From then 
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until the present, the materiality and organization of marketing, market research, and media 
planning, buying, and selling have been reformed around resources for expanding and 
accelerating calculative action. The 1990s mark a critical juncture for the entanglement of media 
and marketing not because the internet gave birth to a quantitative and data-driven ethos, but 
rather because the long-standing desire to account for more of consumers’ behaviors and become 
more calculating about how to classify and influence individuals was realized to an 
unprecedented degree in the commercial construction of online and mobile media. The digital 
world has been built and bent in ways that have allowed more of the individuality, mobility, and 
uniqueness championed in advertising since the 1960s to be accommodated within marketers’ and 
media companies’ fields of observation, measurement, management, and commodification. 
This evolution has deepened the reliance on computing machines and programs in 
advertising. Automation is a necessity for coordinating audience and personal-data markets today, 
when advertisers and publishers number in the millions and available inventory tends toward 
infinity—or at least exceeds 100 billion impressions daily. But algorithms and networked 
databases are also key resources for harnessing commodification and accumulation strategies to 
the diverse experiences, lifestyles, identities, and creative interactions that constitute today’s 
consumer society.719 From the creative revolution of the 1960s through the later turns toward 
neoliberalism and post-modernism, the United States and other advanced capitalist societies have 
presided over what David Harvey calls “the construction of a neoliberal market-based populist 
culture of differentiated consumerism and individual libertarianism.”720 Digitalization and the 
rapid spread of personal technologies have facilitated the “enclosure” of this culture of consumer 
sovereignty within the boundaries of calculation for advertisers, market researchers, and media 
                                                          
719 Detlev Zwick and Janice Denegri Knott, “Manufacturing Customers: The Database as New Means of 
Production,” Journal of Consumer Culture 9, no. 2 (2009): 221-247. 
720 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 42.  
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organizations trying to valorize evidence of attention or place bets on probable consumer 
behaviors.721 As Adam Arvidsson puts it, “The physical, social and cultural mobility of social 
life, the moving about between environments and activities that has become a key characteristic 
of post-modern life, has also become a source of value to be realised on the market for 
commodified information.”722 While the expansion of commercial surveillance has been well-
documented, the less conspicuous institutions and infrastructures for managing information flows 
in marketing and media buying have attracted relatively scant scholarly attention, even though, as 
I argue, they helped set a pattern for the personalized and predictive marketing paradigm that 
reigns in our digital age. Notwithstanding the differences between the 1950s and today in terms of 
computing, storage, and analytical capacities, the computerization of media-buying and 
marketing processes presaged the logistical and, in some ways, epistemological challenges 
involved in reorganizing the attention-selling and persuasion businesses around the precision, 
speed, and discriminating abilities of new information technologies.  
The calculated transformation of advertising and marketing is not attributable to a grand 
conspiracy—though, undoubtedly, it has mobilized strategies for profiting from social control. It 
reflects structural tendencies of communication in capitalism, of organizing media systems to 
produce audiences as commodities and to accelerate the circulation of commodities throughout 
the economy. Marketers, media companies, and information technology firms fighting to protect 
and extend their own interests—and working within rules set by the state (and often working with 
                                                          
721 Mark Andrejevic, iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era (Lawrence, KS: The University 
Press of Kansas, 2007); Vincent Manzerolle and Sandra Smeltzer, “Consumer Databases, Neoliberalism, 
and the Commercial Mediation of Identity: A Medium Theory Analysis,” Surveillance & Society 8, no. 3 
(2011): 323-337; Sven Brodmerkel and Nicholas Carah, Brand Machine, Sensory Media and Calculative 
Culture (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). This enclosure also disguises cybernetic efforts to modulate 
consumer behavior as neutral responsiveness to the ostensibly preexisting preferences consumers express 
through markets. 
722 Adam Arvidsson, “On the ‘Prehistory of the Panoptic Sort’: Mobility in Market Research,” Surveillance 
& Society 1, no. 4 (2004), 457. 
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the state)—have assembled a vast data-driven apparatus for monitoring, predicting, and 
manipulating individuals’ behaviors. According to Shoshana Zuboff and others, this ushers in a 
surveillant or cybernetic regime of economic accumulation, oriented around the commodification 
of personal information.723 
To be sure, the goal of total information awareness—and the ability to respond 
effectively to all this “knowledge”—is far from complete. But it is not just a functional Big 
Brother system that should concern us. We should also be wary of a clear, if often unstated, 
Orwellian ambition that substitutes a faith in statistical and computational judgement for a 
willingness to acknowledge the system’s many inabilities, failures, and biases. A commitment to 
counting everything and making everything count—to eradicating the incalculable—only makes 
it more difficult to reckon with what falls outside the frame of rationality, to confront the 
inevitable incompleteness of calculative agency, and thus to redress the injustices programmed 
into our social infrastructures. Whether or not marketers can achieve the control they dream of, 
their efforts to engineer their dreams into existence have made a profound impression on how we 
experience reality.      
There is no denying that behavioral data science points in some promising directions. 
But, when we evaluate it within our specific historical circumstances—and especially in market-
based contexts—it should give us cause for serious concern. The power of organizations 
possessing a mastery over these data resources to intervene in our choices and opportunities raises 
                                                          
723 Shoshana Zuboff, “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization,” Journal of Information Technology 30, no. 1 (March 2015): 75-89; Joseph Turow and Nick 
Couldry, “Media as Data Extraction: Towards a New Map of a Transformed Communications Field,” 
Journal of Communication 68, no. 2 (April 2018): 415-423; Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, “Cybernetic 
Capitalism: Information, Technology, Everyday Life,” in The Political Economy of Information, eds. 
Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 44-75; John 
Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, “Surveillance Capitalism: Monopoly-Finance Capital, the 
Military-Industrial Complex, and the Digital Age,” Monthly Review 66, no. 3 (July 2014): 1-31. See, also, 
Vincent Mosco’s discussion of “cybernetic commodification,” in The Political Economy of 
Communication: Rethinking and Renewal (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), 150-151.  
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difficult questions about autonomy and agency. Worlds may be closed off to us, or our futures 
might be guided toward undesirable trajectories without our (reasonable) authorization or even 
awareness. Oscar Gandy and others have diagnosed how the use of databases and information 
technologies for social sorting have reinforced and exacerbated forms of inequality.724 Despite the 
veneer of objectivity attributed to automated decision-making, designers and engineers encode 
values, priorities, and biases into algorithms and complementary systems for collecting and 
analyzing information. As one recent analyst argues, the data generated from our transactions in 
marketplaces and media environments, which make individuals legible and subject to categorical 
profiling, “produce knowledges that ‘conduct’ who we are seen to be, who we see ourselves to 
be, and how we are assigned resources.”725 Citizens disfavored by these systems—often due to 
errors or, more troublingly, because longstanding forms of social exclusion that would be illegal 
if formalized in corporate policy have been reproduced within algorithms—can become mired in 
vicious cycles that adversely affect their life chances and yet may be difficult to redress due to 
secrecy, opacity, or the authority bestowed on an automated decision.726  
Advantages have accrued to the organizations best able to leverage behavioral big data, in 
ways that ripple throughout the broader political economy. Concentrations of corporate power, 
realignment of industries, and large-scale restructuring of markets and governance are not the 
worries of alarmists; they are, in many cases, claims and prescriptions submitted by data scientists 
                                                          
724 Oscar Gandy, The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1993). See also Seeta Peña Gagadharan, Virginia Eubanks, and Solon Barocas, eds., Data 
and Discrimination: Collected Essays (Washington, DC: New America, 2014). For a recent critique of the 
anti-democratic implications of big data, see Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction How Big Data 
Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (New York: Crown, 2016). 
725 John Cheney-Lippold, We Are Data: Algorithms and the Making of Our Digital Selves (New York: 
NYU Press, 2017), 98. 
726 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).  
258 
 
 
and management theorists.727 Ostensibly for the purpose of “optimizing” markets by making them 
react dynamically to information about individuals or types of consumers, principles of 
discrimination have been pursued through data-driven niche marketing in ways that undermine 
prosocial values and reverse the expectations of fairness and transparency supposedly 
fundamental to a democratic marketplace.728 Legal scholar Ryan Calo enumerates ways in which 
the application of big data for the purposes of identifying and exploiting increasingly minute 
profit opportunities and competitive advantages makes “market manipulation” and exploitation of 
consumers’ vulnerabilities into systemic features of digital marketing environments.729 Many 
commentators and researchers have maintained that ICTs would help consumers become the 
perfectly rational and calculating agents idealized in economic theory.730 Instead, corporations 
have used these technologies to become both intimately and massively acquainted with human 
habits. What becomes of rationality when a marketer knows that someone is recently divorced, or 
is suffering with depression, or is likely to respond to a “nudge” after a long shift at work? And 
what happens when parties to this “knowledge” have the power to manipulate the information and 
marketplace conditions surrounding that person? Vulnerability is a conditional state, activated in 
specific circumstances, and not just an endemic and enduring characteristic of certain types of 
                                                          
727 Don Tapscott, “Competing in the Age of Hypercapitalism,” Intelligent Enterprise, July 26, 2002, 12; 
Alex “Sandy” Petland, “The Data-Driven Society,” Scientific American 309, no. 4 (October 2013): 78-83; 
Victor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How We Live, 
Work and Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013). 
728 Joseph Turow, Niche Envy: Marketing Discrimination in the Digital Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2006); Joseph Turow, The Aisles Have Eyes: How Retailers Track Your Shopping, Strip Your Privacy, and 
Define Your Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017); Joseph Turow, Lee McGuigan, and 
Elena Maris, “Making Data Mining a Natural Part of Life: Physical Retailing, Customer Surveillance, and 
the 21st Century Social Imaginary,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 18, nos. 4-5 (August-October 
2015): 464-478. 
729 Ryan Calo, “Digital Market Manipulation,” George Washington Law Review 82, no. 4 (August 2014): 
995-1051. 
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people (e.g., children);731 it may be that the data-based arsenals aligned with digital marketers 
increases the possibility for anyone to be exposed and exploited as a vulnerable consumer.732 
Mattelart’s remarks still resonate almost thirty years later: “Marketing pursues its mad dream: to 
predict behaviour and maybe manage to control it. To penetrate the black box of the ‘consumer’. 
For the future of the democracy of daily intercourse, one can only hope that the day on which 
they find the key…is far away.”733 
The fundamental purpose of this research has been to complicate received wisdom about 
the sources of change in advertising and commercial media. Critical historical analysis requires us 
to reconsider the conventional interpretation that digital and internet technologies have disrupted 
and revolutionized advertising and media. At least as much evidence suggests that those 
technologies have been influenced by the ideas, ambitions, practices, and institutions of 
advertising and audience manufacture. The significance of material increases in various capacities 
associated with digitization is undeniable (e.g., storage, bandwidth). But we should resist the 
temptation to attribute the expanding enclosure of personal and public life to purely technological 
explanations. The relationship between advertising/marketing and new technology must be 
regarded as one of mutual shaping. When we look from this vantage point at questions about the 
sources of change, we see the (shifting) political economy of capitalism, and the underlying 
efforts of marketers and attention merchants to influence consumer habits and commodify 
attention and personal data, both urging forward and reacting to developments in information and 
communication technology.  
                                                          
731 Stacy Menzel Baker, James W. Gentry, and Terri L. Rittenburg, “Building Understanding of the Domain 
of Consumer Vulnerability,” Journal of Macromarketing 25, no. 2 (December 2005): 128-139. 
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Chanan (London, Routledge, 1991), 170. 
260 
 
 
The impulse to subject consumers and markets to more systematic forms of accounting 
and calculation has been part of advertising from the turn of the twentieth century onward. Since 
the 1950s, the desire to know and modulate consumer habits within the strategic epistemologies 
of behavioral science and operations research has been lashed to the computer and other 
technologies for generating, storing, processing, and circulating information. These ideas, 
organizations, and machines have been co-evolving ever since. Without denying the profound 
changes wrought by these developments, we can conclude that to characterize today’s 
programmatic and data-driven marketing environment as the result of a radical discontinuity is to 
ignore this historical and reciprocal shaping of technology and the political economy of 
capitalism. I hope this dissertation has made some inroads in uncovering the long historical 
entanglement of marketing and new media. 
Yet, while I have insisted that much is revealed by looking carefully in the rear-view 
mirror, the fact remains that we must navigate the road ahead. It may be that lifting a fog from the 
received history of ad tech is light work compared to the job of curbing the worst possible 
outcomes for a future imagined (and now substantially implemented) around selling the American 
people. By harnessing ambitions of observing, predicting, controlling, and monetizing consumer 
behavior to technologies with remarkable capacities for surveillance, calculation, and numerical 
management, marketers and media organizations have built a sort of momentum, or forward 
propulsion, into their project of “advancing” advertising. The combined vectors of automation, 
personalization, marketplace connectivity, and expanded powers of accounting and analysis have 
come to define the commercial media world, and they will continue to intensify unless people 
question the basis of this trajectory and mobilize the collective will and energy to deflect it in a 
direction more aligned to human values. I have tried to provide a better understanding of this 
trajectory and its motive force than was previously available. As I continue this research, I intend 
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to use these insights to formulate strategies for intervention that might help bend the arc of 
development in media and communication away from the commodification of consciousness and 
human life, and toward something aiming for equality, justice, and an ability to take meaningful 
public steps toward confronting the truly existential threats on our immediate horizon. 
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Appendix A: Interviews and Industry Events 
In the course of my research, I interviewed 16 people with direct experience in the industries and 
organizations under analysis. I list the interviews chronologically, with descriptions of the 
interviewee’s professional positions relevant to advanced advertising. 
September 27, 
2017 
Tim 
Hanlon 
Founder and CEO, Vertere Group, LLC 
 
Previous experience at:  
Starcom MediaVest Group, Publicis Media Groupe 
 
November 6, 
2017 
Tracey 
Scheppach 
CEO and co-founder, Matter More Media 
 
Previous experience at: 
Wink, OpenTV, Starcom Worldwide, Publicis Media Groupe 
 
November 10, 
2017 
Ben Tatta President and co-founder, 605 
 
Previous experience at: 
Cablevision  
 
November 17, 
2017 
Gerard 
Broussard 
Principal, Pre-Meditated Media (analyst) 
 
Previous experience at: 
WPP, OgilvyOne, Mindshare, Canoe Ventures 
 
December 12, 
2017 
Helen Katz SVP and Director of Global Analytics & Insight Practice, Publicis 
Media 
 
Previous experience at: 
DDB Needham, ZenithOptimedia, Starcom Mediavest Group 
 
January 26, 
2018 
Larry Zipin Former Corporate Vice President of Advertising Sales, Time 
Warner Cable 
 
January 28, 
2018 
Jim 
Chiddix 
Former Chief Technical Officer, Time Warner Cable 
 
Former President of Interactive Video Group, Time Warner Cable 
 
Former CEO and Chairman, OpenTV 
 
February 2, 
2018 
Bruce 
Thomas 
Former Vice President of National Ad Sales, Tele-
Communications, Inc. 
 
Former General Manager, Comcast Spotlight 
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February 5 
and 9, 2018 
 
 
Bill Harvey Principal, Bill Harvey Consulting 
 
Previous experience at: 
American Research Bureau/Arbitron, Gray Advertising, Next 
Century Media, TRA, Inc., OpenTV 
 
February 9, 
12, and 26, 
2018 
Paul 
Woidke 
Former Chief Technology Officer, Adlink 
 
Former SVP of Technology, Comcast Spotlight 
 
February 12, 
2018 
Chet 
Kanojia 
 
Former CEO, Navic Networks 
 
February 20, 
2018 
Bruce 
Anderson 
COO and Global CTO, Invidi Technologies Corporation 
 
Previous experience at: 
Sarnoff Corporation, DIVA Systems Corporation 
 
March 30, 
2018 
Michael 
Bologna 
President, one2one Media 
 
Previous experience at: 
Modi Media, GroupM 
 
April 30, 
2018 
Kevin 
Killion 
Former Media Research Supervisor, Leo Burnett 
 
Former VP and Director of Media Research, DDB Needham 
 
May 1, 2018 Lisa Blatt Former VP and Associate Broadcast Director, DDB Needham 
 
May 30, 2018 Mike 
Rosen 
 
Executive Vice President of Advanced Advertising and Platform 
Sales, NBCUniversal 
 
Previous experience at: 
Starcom MediaVest Group 
 
 
I attended and observed the follow eight events, all in New York City: 6th Annual 
Multichannel Summit (November 19, 2015); Advanced Advertising (April 5, 2016); 7th Annual 
Kagan Multichannel Summit (November 16-17, 2016); TVOT 10: TV of Tomorrow – TV at the 
Speed of Light (December 8, 2016); Advanced Advertising (March 27, 2017); The Programmatic 
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Summit (June 13, 2017); Advanced Advertising (October 18, 2017); TV of Tomorrow NYC 2017 
(December 7, 2017).
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Appendix B: Overview of Television Advertising Markets 
The supply or sell side of the market comprises distributors and exhibitors of video content who 
have inventory available for sale. Exhibitors often contract with sales firms, or “reps,” which 
represent them in marketing their inventory to regional and national advertisers. Some of the rep 
firms discussed in this study include Katz, H-R, Blair, and National Cable Communications. The 
demand or buy side includes advertisers who want to promote the products and services 
manufactured, distributed, or rendered under their brand names, as well as the agencies that work 
for those advertisers to conduct market research, plan campaigns, produce commercial messages, 
and procure audience inventory (i.e., pay to place ads in front of potential consumers—what is 
called media buying). These latter functions of market research, campaign creation, and media 
planning and buying are typically undertaken either by a full-service advertising agency, or by a 
complement of specialized firms, often under the banner of a marketing “holding company.” The 
major marketing holding companies are WPP, Interpublic Group (IPG), Publicis, Omnicom, and 
Dentsu.  
National networks like NBC and CNN distribute programming to affiliate broadcast 
stations and cable systems; they use the commercial time within their programs (about 14 minutes 
per hour) to sell audiences to national advertisers, such as Coca-Cola, General Motors, 
Mastercard, Apple, and Geico Insurance. Most of this network inventory (often 75% to 90%) is 
sold in the “upfront market,” which is a negotiating process each spring wherein programmers 
unveil their upcoming schedules and national advertisers reserve space in those schedules, based 
on existing relationships between buyers and sellers. The remaining inventory is sold in “scatter 
markets,” closer to the date of airing. Regional networks—like Comcast SportsNet 
Philadelphia—distribute content to interconnected cable systems in a geographical area, and they 
sell ads to both national brands and to merchants or other organizations that operate within or 
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near the network’s coverage range, such as retail chains concentrated in certain parts of the U.S. 
(e.g., Wawa).  
A portion of the commercial time in the content described above is given over to the 
affiliates that exhibit the content—i.e., that transmit signals to viewers’ premises either by wire, 
satellite, or terrestrial broadcast. These outlets also control inventory in locally produced content. 
These two sources of inventory comprise the spot market. Exhibitors—like WPVI-TV, ABC’s 
owned-and-operated station in Philadelphia, or Comcast of Philadelphia (NE), the headend 
facility serving the northeast part of the city—have usually two to three minutes of time to use for 
promotion of their shows and services or to sell audiences to local, regional, and national 
advertisers. Often, sales rep firms act as liaisons between exhibitors and advertising agents 
beyond the exhibitor’s territory. Cable systems, furthermore, are often “interconnected” and 
represented by sales firms that help ease the administrative burden of spot cable advertising by 
coordinating between the parties wishing to buy spot cable inventory and the many operators with 
inventory for sale.  
The third leg of the stool is audience measurement. Because this market trades in a 
product that, unlike steel or toasters, exists more as potential and promise than as a tangible thing, 
an ostensibly independent and neutral party is needed to determine whether advertisers get what 
they were promised and to help set the price. Historically, this role has been filled by Nielsen, 
which has established a representative panel of TV households, whose viewing habits are 
measured through a combination of meters that detect what channel a TV set is tuned to, and 
paper diaries that provide demographic information about participating households. A firm called 
Arbitron (formerly American Research Bureau) also provided local TV ratings for much of the 
history covered in this study. More recently, comScore/Rentrak has begun providing data from 
set-top boxes to facilitate audience buying. The point of these organizations is to provide a 
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currency by which sellers “guarantee” to buyers a specified delivery of audience size and quality; 
essentially, they package evidence of audience attention as an information product. The history 
and practice of audience measurement has been studied extensively. What you need to know for 
now is that 1) these actors are crucial for brokering advertising buying/selling and 2) many 
conventional routines are in a process of reconstruction due to changes in media options and uses, 
and the explosion of data sources. 
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Appendix C: Spot Cable – The Basis for Addressable Advertising 
The action in this dissertation unfolds mostly in spot markets, especially for spots inserted by 
cable and satellite operators, which provide the basis for addressable advertising. To repeat, for 
decades broadcast stations have reserved a few minutes of time during each hour of network-
affiliated or syndicated programming either to insert promotions for the station or to sell 
audiences to local, regional, or national advertisers. A similar spot market exists in pay television.  
As part of their negotiations to secure carriage on the systems operated by cable, DBS, 
and telecom providers (which are, collectively called multichannel video programming 
distributors, or MVPDs), most national, satellite-delivered networks grant affiliate operators the 
right to insert ads or promotions. In most agreements, two or three minutes per hour of available 
inventory (“avails”) are given to the MVPD. You might be watching ESPN’s Sportscenter as a 
Comcast subscriber in Philadelphia, and during an ad-break you see an advertisement for 
Barbera’s auto dealership on Roosevelt Boulevard and a spot publicizing a limited-term discount 
on hoagies at Wawa. These ads have been bought from your local cable operator or from a sales 
firm representing a collection of cable systems in the region (like Comcast Spotlight). Viewers 
watching the same program at the same time in Albany, New York, will not see those ads. They 
will either see an ad spliced into the program stream by their local cable provider or, if their 
provider does not have the right to insert on that channel, they will see whatever content is in the 
feed that ESPN beams via satellite to all the affiliate cable systems carrying its signals—which 
usually will be either a promotion for a Disney property or a direct-response advertisement that 
has been priced based on viewer responses rather than audience size and composition. National 
brands also purchase spots from sales rep firms (NCC) and interconnected cable systems 
(Adlink). These locally-inserted spots may be difficult for the viewer to distinguish from the 
network’s national feed.  
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Typically, spot inventory is apportioned with half being sold directly to local advertisers 
by a system’s sales staff, one quarter being used to promote the cable operator’s services or 
programming properties, and one quarter being sold to national advertisers, brokered by a 
national sales rep and an ad agency. Satellite operators like DirecTV (owned by AT&T) and Dish 
Network also sell these avails; but since they have no local operators, all of this inventory is 
typically sold to national advertisers. 
In cable, the insertion process takes place at the headend, which is essentially a command 
and control center where an affiliate cable system receives the satellite downlink from national 
networks like CNN and then routes those signals to subscribes over the cable plant. In the early 
days of spot cable, an advertiser or its agency would deliver to the operator a video tape 
containing a commercial spot. A technician would edit that spot onto a master tape that matches 
the daily log (i.e., sequence of commercials) that a “traffic manager” has prepared for a given 
channel. “Trafficking” is an important logistical function for determining when a purchased spot 
will air, and usually it involves verifying that the ad was inserted as planned. When an insertion 
opportunity is about to occur, something called a “cue tone”—an audio signal embedded in the 
program stream—triggers the video deck to prepare for playback and then switches the feed from 
the network to the analog ad server. This signaling process happens in reverse when the avail is 
about to end and the programming is to resume. SeaChange, Channelmatic, and Texscan were 
some of the first vendors of ad-insertion technology to cable operators.792 
By and large, spot cable ads are not addressable; every subscriber wired to given cable 
headend will see the same thing on each channel most of the time. But it is from this inventory 
(particularly the portion of that time sold nationally) and through this insertion process that 
                                                          
792 The cue tone is an interesting example of machine-to-machine automation, and at least two innovations 
in the technology have earned technical Emmy awards. It also reflects coordination among programmers, 
MVPDs, and equipment makers around a standard with important logistical functions for ad insertion. 
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addressable TV operates. Therefore, to understand addressable advertising, we must first 
understand spot cable advertising in general.  
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